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This  report and the work it describes were funded by the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). Its contents, including any opinions and/or 
conclusions expressed, are those of the authors a lone and do not 
necessarily reflect HSE policy. 
There is a potential for major structural damage to offshore 
installations leading to fatalities and serious injuries in the 
event of collision by either a passing or an in-field seagoing 
vessel. Both categories of collision have occurred on the UK 
Continental Shelf although to date only significant, rather 
than catastrophic, consequences have occurred. 
Internationally, collisions have occurred that have caused 
both loss of life and environmental damage.  This report 
describes  work to update the Ship/Platform Collision 
Incident Database for the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and 
the collision frequency analysis which was previously 
described in  Research Report RR053 (2001).  Report 
RR1153 considers collision threat detection.   
 
Data was collected from collision incident record sources to 
confirm or complete previous records and to expand the 
database up to December 2015. The database overlaps with 
the previous version by providing information from 1996 to 
2015. The database of operating experience has been 
recompiled and extended to encompass all mobile and 
fixed installations operating on the UKCS and takes into 
account recent abandonments. The main database includes 
actual collisions, while ‘near misses’ are analysed in a 
separate section. In an attempt to expand the previous 
database and gain further understanding of the scale and 
nature of the ‘near miss’ events, data from a variety of 
sources is included: the findings are interpreted in  section 
4 of the report.  
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet 
consectetuer adipiscing elit 
Sean Loughney, Jin Wang and Alan Wall 
Liverpool John Moores University 
James Parsons Building 
Liverpool L3 3AF 
Ship/Platform Collision Incident Database 
(2015) for offsho e oil and gas installations 
4 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study is carried out by Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU) at the request of the 
Energy Division of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to update the ship to platform 
collision incident database provided in their Research Report 053. 
Data has been gathered and analysed from a number of collision incident sources to complete and 
expand the previous work up to 31
st
 December 2015. The time period of the study overlaps the 
previous database in Research Report 053 and covers a 19 year period from 1996 to 2015. 
Similarly, data regarding the operating experience on the UKCS in this time has been gathered 
and analysed, taking into account any installations that have been taken out of service as well as 
newly installed installations. 
Through the combination of operating experience with the number of incidents per year, it is 
possible to calculate an incident frequency and the confidence intervals that can be placed with 
them. The data has been further broken down to show specific data sets, such as, incidents per 
installation type, by vessel type, by damage severity and by geographical location. It has been 
found that from the analysis the general trend of ship to platform collision incidents has decreased. 
However, when analysing the frequency of incidents per year, the trend of incidents is periodic 
steadily increasing and decreasing over the 19 year period.  
When concerning vessel types for collision incidents, it has not been deemed necessary to divide 
the incidents into “passing” and “attendant” as there have only been 2 collisions involving 
“passing” vessels since 1996.  
However, the consequences of collisions from “passing” vessels has not gone unnoticed. Further 
analysis identified 56 ‘Near Misses’ from 1996 – 2015. In this section of the study the number of 
incidents has been broken down to vessel type due to the increased number of incidents involving 
“passing” vessels. This is due to the potential for major structural damage should a passing vessel 
collide with an offshore installation. 
Given the data gathered and analysed, the mean incident frequencies per year for all incidents and 
for those incidents were damage occurred are shown in the following table: 
 
Mean incident frequencies: 1996 - 2015 
Installation type All reported incidents 
Incidents resulting in minor, moderate 
or significant damage 
All 0.0280 0.0116 
Fixed 0.0139 0.0054 
Floating 0.0507 0.0219 
Jack-up 0.0778 0.0222 
 
The figures quoted in the table above should be taken with some caution as it is likely that there is 
a level of under reporting and incomplete data entries within the information gathered. Primarily 
the levels of under reporting are assumed to be in the areas of geographical location and damage 
classification.  
The database presented in Research Report 053 provided some information regarding the number 
of ‘Near Misses’ and what constitutes a ‘Near miss’. This study expands upon that by re-defining 
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the term ‘Near Miss’ and identifying any incidents from these definitions. A total of 56 incidents 
were found to have occurred within the 500m zone of platforms that did not result in any contact 
but had the potential to result in a collision. These findings are interpreted in Section 4. 
An overall discussion of the results and the implications of the findings as well as conclusions are 
demonstrated in Sections 5 and 6. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A database of vessel/ platform collision incidents on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) 
was originally created for the Health & Safety Executive (HSE), Offshore Safety Division (OSD) in 
1985. It has subsequently been amended and extended on several occasions, in 1995 (MaTR0321), 
1997 (MaTR0447) and in 2003 in the research report 053, “ship/platform collision incident 
database (2001).  
LJMU has assisted the HSE with the compilation and updating of the previous data evaluation, 
contained in research report 053, to include incidents that have occurred since the last review. 
The compilation of the database is outlined in Section 2 of this report.  
As the collision incident database has been compiled, information has been extracted to 
determine incident frequencies per year for different installation and vessel types. Furthermore, a 
second data set has been compiled in the form of the individual installations operating within the 
time period of the study. This includes installations that have begun operations and installations 
that have ceased operations during the time period of the study. The analysis of incidents is broad 
and comprehensive, and is outlined in Section 3. 
As part of the expansion of the previous evaluation from 2003, the section of collision incidents 
regarded as near misses has been expanded. These incidents have been compiled as a separate 
record and an analysis of the incidents has been conducted. The analysis follows the same 
structure as Section 3. Incident frequencies have been calculated as well as the incidents being 
categorized by installation and vessel type. This analysis is presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 provides a discussion of the assessment and implications of the results identified in 
Sections 3 and 4. 
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2. COMPILATION OF DATABASE 
2.1. COLLISION INCIDENT DATABASE 
For this study an incident has been defined as a reported impact or contact between a vessel and a 
fixed or mobile installation in terms of the RIDDOR 2013 database, which utilises reported 
incident information from the OIR/9b and F2508A forms.  
The original 1985 collision incident database was compiled from studies performed by the National 
Maritime Institute Ltd. (NMI) [1, 2] and the International Association of Drilling Contractors 
(IADC) [3]. An update in 1991 by Advanced Mechanics and Engineering Limited (AME) [4] used 
incident records taken from the HSE Energy Division (ED) OIR/9A files (ED was known as the 
Offshore Safety division at the inception of the previous database). A further database was developed in 
2003 (Ship/platform collision incident database (2001)) [5] which extended and cross-checked the 
Collision Incident Database produced under MaTSU reports MaTR0321 (1995) and MaTR0447 
(1997) [6, 7]. The 2003 database included a total of 557 incidents of vessels contacting offshore oil 
and gas installations have been recorded in the period from 1 January 1975 to 31 October 2001.  
The 2001 ship/platform collision incident database has been further cross-checked and extended. 
The complete database is demonstrated by Appendix A, where a total of 176 incidents of vessels 
impacting or contacting both fixed and floating offshore structures have been recorded from 1
st
 
January 1996 to 31
st
 December 2015. There are a number of reasons why this timeframe has been 
used; i) it provides a significant overlap of 5 years with the previous ship/platform collision 
incident database, ii) it is in parallel the initiation of the RIDDOR database which came into force 
on 1
st
 April 1996, and, iii) provides a simpler method of producing operating experience of 
installations per year. The data has been recorded from a number of sources. The prime source of 
information given a data point is demonstrated by the “Source” column in Appendix A. In many 
cases the data is supplemented or confirmed from additional sources. Data across the whole study 
has been compiled from the following sources: 
 Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrence Regulations 2013 (RIDDOR), 
utilising search criteria “Collisions, or potential collisions”, between “vessels and 
offshore installations”. Information source is labelled as HSE in the database [8]. 
 World Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD) using the search criteria (Collision, 
Offshore Units” and “Europe North Sea” [9]. 
 Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) using the search criteria “Offshore 
installations”, “collision” and “contact” [10]. 
 Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) using search criteria “Collisions” 
and “North Sea” [11]. 
 World Energy Related Casualties (WREC) using search criteria “offshore installations”, 
“collisions” and “North Sea” [12]. 
All data sources are labelled using their stated abbreviation in the “source2 column of Appendix 
A. In some cases information is not available, and this is identified by being labelled as 
“unspecified”.  
The database in Appendix A has been compiled by the following sort criteria: 
1. The installation type: Fixed (steel, concrete), Floating (Semi-sub, FPSO, FSU, drillship etc.), 
jack-up and Other (wind turbine, unspecified) 
2. Severity of damage to the installation, i.e. Significant, Moderate, Minor, None and 
Unspecified. 
3. The date of the incident. 
4. The type of vessel: standby, supply, other attendant, passing, and unspecified. 
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2.1.1. Installation damage class 
In order to permit more meaningful evaluation of the database, all incidents have been placed into a 
damage severity category, labelled “Installation Damage”, in accordance with the following criteria. 
In some instances, where the damage class was not originally reported or was clearly inaccurate, the 
category has been assigned by the author based on the extent of reported damage and the criticality 
of the member involved. The damage severity ratings are as follows: 
Significant:  
  
 
 
Damage affecting the integrity of an installation sufficient to 
require immediate repair. i.e.: if the installations integrity is 
compromised through damage resulting in the breaching of the 
structure and/or subsea damage. Similarly, a collision is deemed 
to be significant if the crew must be evacuated and/or the 
installation’s process are shut-down; 
Moderate:  Installation requires maintenance but not immediate repairs as the 
integrity of the installation is not compromised. This damage 
takes the form of large dents above or below the waterline 
without breaching the structure. Similarly, to qualify as moderate 
damage the crew can be mustered but not evacuated and 
processes may be shut down in anticipation for impact if the 
collision path can be predicted.  
Minor: Damage not affecting the integrity of the installation, but still 
required maintenance, i.e.: small dents and scuffs above the 
waterline. 
None: No damage occurred. 
Unspecified:   Status of the installation or damage severity was not specified in 
incident reports. 
2.2. OPERATING EXPERIENCE 
For the purpose of this study a fixed installation is defined as any platform or group of platforms 
linked by bridges or walkways and may be of either steel or concrete construction. The operating 
experience is presented as the number of installations operating in the UKCS within a given year. 
This includes the progression of new platforms that come into service and platforms that have 
been decommissioned. While in the previous database operating experience of fixed installations is 
presented in “installation years” rather than number of operating fixed installations per year, because 
in the southern North Sea a supply vessel, for example, is only likely to approach those platforms 
installed with a crane or living quarters when carrying cargo. This is acceptable in terms of attendant 
vessels, but in a real world scenario it is entirely possible for any vessel to contact any fixed 
installation given the right circumstances. Hence, every fixed installation, where possible, operating in 
the North Sea per year has been identified and included in the study. 
Operating experience of fixed installations has been determined from the Oil & Gas Authority, 
OSPAR and the individual operators where known [13, 14]. This contains the year of first operation 
and the decommissioning year where appropriate. 
Mobile installation operating experience on the UKCS has been determined form OSPAR, the Oil & 
Gas Authority, MarineTraffic, Rig Zone and Infield [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. A mobile or floating 
installation is referred to in this study as a semi-sub and monohulls (FPSO, FSU, drillship etc.). 
Furthermore, the operating experience of jack-up installations has been analysed separately to the rest 
of the floating installations. 
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Furthermore, references [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] were utilised 
to obtain additional information regarding installations that are still in operation or have ceased 
operation.  
A summary of operating experience for fixed installations, floating installations and jack-up rigs over 
the period of study (1996 – 2015), in the UKCS, is represented graphically in Table 1 and presented in 
Figure 1. 
 
Table 1: Operating experience for fixed and mobile installations on the UKCS. 
Number of installations per year Operating experience per year 
Year Fixed Floating Jack-up Total Fixed Floating Jack-up Total 
1996 214 34 14 262 214 24 14 252 
1997 218 39 14 271 432 63 28 523 
1998 223 40 15 278 655 103 43 801 
1999 230 44 17 291 885 147 60 1092 
2000 234 45 21 300 1119 192 81 1392 
2001 241 44 22 307 1360 236 103 1699 
2002 243 43 22 308 1603 279 125 2007 
2003 246 43 22 311 1849 322 147 2318 
2004 248 43 22 313 2097 365 169 2631 
2005 249 43 22 314 2346 408 191 2945 
2006 250 43 22 315 2596 451 213 3260 
2007 264 45 22 331 2860 496 235 3591 
2008 267 48 22 337 3127 544 257 3928 
2009 267 47 24 338 3394 591 281 4266 
2010 260 46 26 332 3654 637 307 4598 
2011 261 45 26 332 3915 682 333 4930 
2012 261 47 27 335 4176 729 360 5265 
2013 266 44 27 337 4442 773 387 5602 
2014 267 43 30 340 4709 816 417 5942 
2015 256 42 33 331 4965 858 450 6273 
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Figure 1: Number of Fixed, Floating and Jack-up installations operating per year between 1996 and 2015 
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3. ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL DATA 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This section presents an analysis of collision incident statistics for the UKCS in the period of 1
st
 
January 1996 to 31
st
 December 2015. For the purpose of the study the total number of incidents 
resulting in contact between vessels and platforms is 176. When determining incident frequencies, 
the installation operating experience is the total number of operational platforms on the UKCS in 
that year. This takes into account the inclusion of new platforms and the decommissioning of 
existing platforms. Appendix B highlights the list of all installations that have been in operation 
from 1996 to 2015.  
The data was analysed for all reported incidents, both by year and cumulatively, as well as by 
damage severity, i.e. “minor”, “moderate” and “significant”. This was to identify any trends 
within the data that may exist. It is possible that there is some element of inconsistency regarding 
the reporting of minor damage and in some cases it may be reported as “none” or no damage. 
However, there is enough data and descriptions to include the damage class “minor” along with 
“moderate” and “significant”. Similarly, incidents resulting in “moderate” and “significant” 
damage are most likely to have been reported accurately due to the damage severity.  
The main areas covered in this Section are: 
 Variation of incident frequency and confidence limits with time for different damage 
categories and types of installations; 
 Variation of incident numbers with time for different types of vessels. 
It has been assumed that the incident likelihood follows a binomial distribution. Based upon this 
assumption, 5% and 95% confidence limits have been produced for all installations both as a 
collective and individually. This information is demonstrated across Figures 2, 5, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 
19, and 23.  The 5% and 95% confidence intervals have been calculated for all reported incidents 
per year utilising an accepted methodology [35, 36, 37, 38].The Confidence Intervals are 
calculated through the application of Equation 1: 
𝐶𝐼 = 𝜆 ± 𝑍√𝜆 𝑁⁄       (1) 
where, λ is the mean or frequency (No. incidents (r) / No. of installations (N)), Z represents Z1-α/2 
which is the percentile of the standard normal distribution and is given as ± 1.96 for 5% (increase) 
and 95% (decrease) intervals. Equation 1 is known as the Wald interval and is a simple method 
for obtaining confidence intervals. However, it has been known for some time that the Wald 
interval performs poorly, unless N is quite large. In this study the value of N is comparatively 
large when compared to the value of r. Hence, there can be some confidence in the application of 
the Wald interval equation. The interval procedure is conservative due to the discreteness of the 
binomial distribution; conservative means that the empirical value of the confidence coefficient is 
larger than the nominal level 1 − α [35, 36, 37, 38]. 
Furthermore, the Wald interval, in Equation 1, can also be demonstrated as follows (Equation 2): 
𝐶𝐼 = 𝜆 ± 𝑍√
𝜆(1 − 𝜆)
𝑁⁄     (2) 
This equation is an adaptation of the Wald interval, however, the use of this instead of Equation 1 
does not alter the results of the study. Due to the comparative value difference between r and N 
the final results for λ are negligible, i.e. the differences are to a degree of 0.0001 or smaller. In the 
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event that the values of N are smaller, there could be a debate as to the most applicable Equation 
[37, 38].  
Similarly, the following section of Equation 1 is also known as the margin of error: 
𝑍√𝜆 𝑁⁄  
This is demonstrated throughout the relevant tables in the study for completeness. 
 
3.2. TREND OF INCIDENT FREQUENCY OVER TIME 
The trends and variation of incident frequencies over with time for all installation types has been 
analysed both as a collective and individually, i.e. fixed, mobile and jack-up. All reported 
incidents of collisions resulting in impact or contact have been analysed, any near misses have 
not been included here. Similarly, incidents that have resulted in some form of damage i.e. 
“minor”, “moderate” and “significant” have also been analysed separately. 
 
3.2.1. All installations 
Table 2 and Table 3 demonstrate the frequency and cumulative of all reported incidents to all 
installation types, by year, between 1996 and 2015.  
 
 
Table 2: Frequency of all reported incidents to all installations per year 
Year 
No. of 
incidents 
in year (r)  
No. of installations 
operating in year 
(N) 
5% Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
1996 9 262 0.057 0.034 0.012 0.022 
1997 17 271 0.093 0.063 0.033 0.030 
1998 17 278 0.090 0.061 0.032 0.029 
1999 15 291 0.078 0.052 0.025 0.026 
2000 18 300 0.088 0.060 0.032 0.028 
2001 12 307 0.061 0.039 0.017 0.022 
2002 10 308 0.053 0.032 0.012 0.020 
2003 6 311 0.035 0.019 0.004 0.015 
2004 4 313 0.025 0.013 0 0.013 
2005 7 314 0.039 0.022 0.006 0.017 
2006 8 315 0.043 0.025 0.008 0.018 
2007 12 331 0.057 0.036 0.016 0.021 
2008 8 337 0.040 0.024 0.007 0.016 
2009 4 338 0.023 0.012 0 0.012 
2010 5 332 0.028 0.015 0.002 0.013 
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Table 2: (continued) 
Year 
No. of 
incidents 
in year (r)  
No. of installations 
operating in year 
(N) 
5% Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
2011 7 332 0.037 0.021 0.005 0.016 
2012 4 335 0.024 0.012 0 0.012 
2013 6 337 0.032 0.018 0.004 0.014 
2014 4 340 0.023 0.012 0 0.012 
2015 3 331 0.019 0.009 0 0.010 
 
 
Table 3: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to all installations per year 
Year 
 
No. of 
incidents 
in year (r)  
Cumulative no. of 
incidents in year 
(r1)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in 
year (N) 
Cumulative 
no. of 
installations 
operating in 
year (N1) 
Mean (λ) 
Cumulative 
mean (λ1) 
1996 9 9 262 262 0.034 0.034 
1997 17 26 271 533 0.063 0.049 
1998 17 43 278 811 0.061 0.053 
1999 15 58 291 1102 0.052 0.053 
2000 18 76 300 1402 0.060 0.054 
2001 12 88 307 1709 0.039 0.051 
2002 10 98 308 2017 0.032 0.049 
2003 6 104 311 2328 0.019 0.045 
2004 4 108 313 2641 0.013 0.041 
2005 7 115 314 2955 0.022 0.039 
2006 8 123 315 3270 0.025 0.038 
2007 12 135 331 3601 0.036 0.037 
2008 8 143 337 3938 0.024 0.036 
2009 4 147 338 4276 0.012 0.034 
2010 5 152 332 4608 0.015 0.033 
2011 7 159 332 4940 0.021 0.032 
2012 4 163 335 5275 0.012 0.031 
2013 6 169 337 5612 0.018 0.030 
2014 4 173 340 5952 0.012 0.029 
2015 3 176 331 6283 0.009 0.028 
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Figure 2: Frequency of all reported incidents to all installations per year 
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Figure 3: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to all installations 
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It can be seen from Figure 2 and Figure 3 that the general trend of ship to platform collisions is in 
decline. However, there are two key spikes within the data, firstly, in 1997 then again in 2007. 
These spikes could be attributed to the general increase in operational installations per year, or 
they could be anomalous spike. However, the data shows that there is a gradual increase and 
decrease within the trend. This could lead one to believe the situations may have occurred to 
account for some fluctuation. One possible explanation is that safety case regulations have been 
released in both 1996 and 2005. It is possible that an alteration in regulation can affect the 
operation and reporting when ship/platform incidents occur. 
Table 4 and Table 5 demonstrate the Damage class of and incidents resulting in minor, moderate 
or significant damage to all installations per year respectively. For the time period of 1996 – 2015, 
2 incidents were reported as significant, 6 were deemed to be moderate and 65 resulted in minor 
damage. The remaining incidents resulted in either no damage to the installation or the damage 
was unspecified. 
Table 4: Damage classification of all reported incidents to all installations per year 
Year Unspecified None Minor Moderate Significant Total 
1996 3 1 5 0 0 9 
1997 11 1 5 0 0 17 
1998 11 0 6 0 0 17 
1999 3 5 7 0 0 15 
2000 8 1 9 0 0 18 
2001 5 2 5 0 0 12 
2002 4 2 2 1 1 10 
2003 2 2 2 0 0 6 
2004 1 1 2 0 0 4 
2005 0 4 2 1 0 7 
2006 3 3 1 1 0 8 
2007 1 5 4 1 1 12 
2008 2 2 4 0 0 8 
2009 0 1 3 0 0 4 
2010 0 4 0 1 0 5 
2011 0 3 3 1 0 7 
2012 1 1 2 0 0 4 
2013 2 2 2 0 0 6 
2014 0 2 2 0 0 4 
2015 2 1 0 0 0 3 
  60 43 65 6 2 176 
  34.1% 24.4% 36.9% 3.4% 1.1% 100.0% 
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Table 5: Frequency of incidents resulting in minor, moderate or significant damage for all installations per year 
Year 
No. of 
incidents in 
year (r)  
No. of installations 
operating in year 
(N) 
5% Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
1996 5 262 0.036 0.019 0.002 0.017 
1997 5 271 0.035 0.018 0.002 0.014 
1998 6 278 0.039 0.022 0.004 0.017 
1999 7 291 0.042 0.024 0.006 0.018 
2000 9 300 0.050 0.030 0.010 0.020 
2001 5 307 0.031 0.016 0.002 0.014 
2002 4 308 0.026 0.013 0 0.013 
2003 2 311 0.015 0.006 0 0.009 
2004 2 313 0.015 0.006 0 0.009 
2005 3 314 0.020 0.010 0 0.011 
2006 2 315 0.015 0.006 0 0.009 
2007 6 331 0.033 0.018 0.004 0.015 
2008 4 337 0.024 0.012 0 0.012 
2009 3 338 0.019 0.009 0 0.010 
2010 1 332 0.009 0.003 0 0.006 
2011 4 332 0.024 0.012 0 0.012 
2012 2 335 0.014 0.006 0 0.008 
2013 2 337 0.014 0.006 0 0.008 
2014 2 340 0.014 0.006 0 0.008 
2015 0 331 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 5: Damage classification of all reported incidents to all installations per year 
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Figure 4: Frequency of incidents resulting in minor, moderate or significant damage for all installations per year 
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3.2.2. Types of vessels involved in collisions 
A summary and graph of the types of vessels involved in collision incidents are demonstrated by 
Table 6 and Figure 6. These indicate that the majority of incidents are caused by attendant vessels. 
A breakdown of the attendant vessels shows that 23 incidents were caused by “Stand-by” vessels, 
92 by “Supply” vessels, 34 were “Other Attendant” vessels, with the rest being “Unspecified”. It 
can also be seen that 2 incidents occurred due to “Passing” vessels (a merchant container and a 
trawler). The category of “Other Attendant” includes the following vessel types: 
 Anchor handler       6 incidents 
 Diver support       5 incidents 
 Inspection vessel      1 incident 
 ISP (Insulation, Scaffolding and Painting)   1 incident 
 Merchant Tanker      5 incidents 
 Other support vessels      3 incidents 
 Tug        7 incidents 
 Other unspecified attendant vessels    6 incidents 
 
Table 6: Number of reported incidents by all vessel types per year 
Year Standby Supply Other Attendant Passing Unspecified Total 
1996 1 7 0 0 1 9 
1997 3 7 3 0 4 17 
1998 1 10 5 0 1 17 
1999 2 11 1 0 1 15 
2000 1 7 3 0 7 18 
2001 6 2 2 0 2 12 
2002 1 3 1 1 4 10 
2003 1 3 1 0 1 6 
2004 1 2 1 0 0 4 
2005 0 6 1 0 0 7 
2006 1 3 3 0 1 8 
2007 0 5 4 1 2 12 
2008 2 4 2 0 0 8 
2009 0 3 1 0 0 4 
2010 1 4 0 0 0 5 
2011 0 5 1 0 1 7 
2012 1 3 0 0 0 4 
2013 0 3 3 0 0 6 
2014 1 1 2 0 0 4 
2015 0 3 0 0 0 3 
  23 92 34 2 25 176 
  13.07% 52.27% 19.32% 1.14% 14.20% 100.00% 
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Table 7 and Figure 7 demonstrate the trend of incidents given the type of vessel and the month of 
occurrence. Given the data presented, most incidents have occurred in the 6 month period of 
October to March when compared to April to September. This can be attributed to an increase in 
the number of incidents involving supply vessels between October and March. In this time frame 
weather conditions are likely to be more adverse and hence increases the risks during cargo 
transfer. Similarly, there is a large spike of incidents in the month of July. This can also be 
attributed to the weather in the sense that the weather is generally better between May to 
September and so increased maintenance and close support work is carried out. This can be seen 
by the cumulative number of incidents between May to September where the majority of 
incidents involving standby vessels occur, as well as other attendant vessels. This is backed up 
further by the fact that the number of incidents related to other attendant vessels increases as the 
months between May and October is usually when annual inspections and repairs take place. This 
can be seen also by the number of Diver support incidents, where 4 of the 5 incidents occur 
between May to August.  
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Figure 6: Number of reported incidents by all vessel types per year 
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Table 7: Number of incidents given the type of vessel and the month of occurrence 
Month Standby Supply 
Other 
attendant 
Passing Unspecified Total 
January 2 7 2 0 6 17 9.66% 
February 1 6 1 0 2 10 5.68% 
March 1 12 3 0 3 19 10.80% 
April 0 7 3 0 0 10 5.68% 
May 4 6 3 1 0 14 7.95% 
June 0 7 2 0 3 12 6.82% 
July 4 9 5 0 4 22 12.50% 
August 3 3 5 1 0 12 6.82% 
September 3 6 3 0 0 12 6.82% 
October 4 11 2 0 2 19 10.80% 
November 0 10 3 0 0 13 7.39% 
December 1 8 2 0 2 13 7.39% 
Unspecified 0 0 0 0 3 3 1.70% 
  23 92 34 2 25 176 100.00% 
  13.07% 52.27% 19.32% 1.14% 14.20% 100.00%   
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Figure 7: Number of incidents by vessel type per month 
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There is a consistent decreasing trend regarding all reported incidents to all installations. It can be 
seen that there is a spike in the number incidents in 1997 before gradually declining to a low in 
2004. This peak in 1997 can be attributed to an increase in the number of reported incidents to 
both floating and jack-up installations. Following the low in 2004, the number of reported 
incident increases steadily again until 2007. This can again be attributed to an unusually high 
number of incidents regarding Jack-up installations. Following 2007, the frequency of incidents 
remains steady until the end of the study’s time period in 2015.  
The average trend of all reported incidents has not fluctuated too drastically but it has gradually 
reduced from 1996 to 2015, with the mean frequency over the whole study is 0.028 per year. 
Utilising the total operating experience this equates to 1 incident every 35.69 installation years or 
9.27 per year for the current level of installation activity in 2015. Following this the mean 
frequency for incidents where minor, moderate or significant damage has been reported is 0.0116 
per year. This equates to 1 incident resulting in damage every 86.06 installation years or 3.84 per 
year for the current level of installation activity in 2015. This statistical analysis highlights a 
general improvement in support vessel operating practices over the 19 year period.  
To provide a more meaningful statistical analysis regarding reported offshore collision incidents, 
the data has been divided and analysed by each installation type. The following sections outline 
the trends in incident frequencies for fixed, floating and jack-up installations. 
 
3.2.3. Fixed installations 
A total of 70 reported incidents were identified involving collisions between vessels and fixed 
installations between 1996 and 2015. The following installation types are included in this 
statistical analysis: 
 Fixed Steel       60 incidents 
 Fixed Concrete      3 incidents 
 Jacket       7 incidents 
Tables 8 and 9 demonstrate the mean frequency and cumulative frequency of all reported 
incidents to all fixed installations on the UKCS between 1996 and 2015. Figures 8 and 9 
graphically represent the information demonstrated in Tables 8 and 9. 
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Table 8: Frequency of all reported incidents to fixed installations per year 
Year 
No. of incidents 
in year (r)  
No. of installations 
operating in year (N) 
5% 
Confidence  
limit 
Mean 
(λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
1996 8 214 0.063 0.037 0.011 0.026 
1997 7 218 0.056 0.032 0.008 0.024 
1998 4 223 0.036 0.018 0 0.018 
1999 6 230 0.047 0.026 0.005 0.021 
2000 7 234 0.052 0.030 0.008 0.022 
2001 8 241 0.056 0.033 0.010 0.023 
2002 2 243 0.020 0.008 0 0.011 
2003 3 246 0.026 0.012 0 0.014 
2004 2 248 0.019 0.008 0 0.011 
2005 3 249 0.026 0.012 0 0.014 
2006 4 250 0.032 0.016 0 0.016 
2007 3 264 0.024 0.011 0 0.013 
2008 2 267 0.018 0.007 0 0.010 
2009 1 267 0.011 0.004 0 0.007 
2010 1 260 0.011 0.004 0 0.008 
2011 5 261 0.036 0.019 0.002 0.017 
2012 1 261 0.011 0.004 0 0.008 
2013 1 266 0.011 0.004 0 0.007 
2014 2 267 0.018 0.007 0 0.010 
2015 0 256 0 0 0 0 
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Table 9: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to fixed installations 
Year 
 
No. of 
incidents in 
year (r)  
Cumulative no. 
of incidents in 
year (r1)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in year 
(N) 
Cumulative no. of 
installations 
operating in year 
(N1) 
Mean 
(λ) 
Cumulative 
mean (λ1) 
1996 8 8 214 214 0.037 0.037 
1997 7 15 218 432 0.032 0.035 
1998 4 19 223 655 0.018 0.029 
1999 6 25 230 885 0.026 0.028 
2000 7 32 234 1119 0.030 0.029 
2001 8 40 241 1360 0.033 0.029 
2002 2 42 243 1603 0.008 0.026 
2003 3 45 246 1849 0.012 0.024 
2004 2 47 248 2097 0.008 0.022 
2005 3 50 249 2346 0.012 0.021 
2006 4 54 250 2596 0.016 0.021 
2007 3 57 264 2860 0.011 0.020 
2008 2 59 267 3127 0.007 0.019 
2009 1 60 267 3394 0.004 0.018 
2010 1 61 260 3654 0.004 0.017 
2011 5 66 261 3915 0.019 0.017 
2012 1 67 261 4176 0.004 0.016 
2013 1 68 266 4442 0.004 0.015 
2014 2 70 267 4709 0.007 0.015 
2015 0 70 256 4965 0 0.014 
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Figure 9: Frequency of all reported incidents to fixed installations per year 
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
In
c
id
e
n
t 
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
Mean (λ) Cumulative Mean Mean (λ1) 
Figure 8: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to fixed installations per year 
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Tables 10 and 11 summarise the number and damage classification of all incidents relating to 
fixed installations as well as those categorised as resulting in “minor”, “moderate” or “significant” 
damage. The data presented in Tables 10 and 11 is represented graphically in Figures 10 and 11. 
23 incidents were classed as minor, with 3 moderate and 2 significant incidents. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Damage classification of all reported incidents to fixed installations per year 
Year Unspecified None Minor Moderate Significant Total 
1996 2 1 5 0 0 8 
1997 4 1 2 0 0 7 
1998 3 1 0 0 0 4 
1999 1 2 3 0 0 6 
2000 1 6 0 0 0 7 
2001 4 2 2 0 0 8 
2002 0 0 1 0 1 2 
2003 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2004 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2005 0 2 1 0 0 3 
2006 0 2 1 1 0 4 
2007 0 0 1 1 1 3 
2008 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2009 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2010 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2011 0 2 2 1 0 5 
2012 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2013 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2014 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  16 25 23 3 2 69 
  23.2% 36.2% 33.3% 4.3% 2.9% 100.0% 
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Table 11: Frequency of incidents resulting in minor, moderate or significant damage for fixed installations per year 
Year 
No. of 
incidents in 
year (r)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in year 
(N) 
5% 
Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
1996 5 214 0.044 0.023 0.003 0.020 
1997 2 218 0.022 0.009 0 0.013 
1998 0 223 0 0 0 0 
1999 3 230 0.028 0.013 0 0.015 
2000 0 234 0 0 0 0 
2001 2 241 0.020 0.008 0 0.012 
2002 2 243 0.020 0.008 0 0.011 
2003 1 246 0.012 0.004 0 0.008 
2004 1 248 0.012 0.004 0 0.008 
2005 1 249 0.012 0.004 0 0.008 
2006 2 250 0.019 0.008 0 0.011 
2007 3 264 0.024 0.011 0 0.013 
2008 1 267 0.011 0.004 0 0.007 
2009 0 267 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 260 0 0 0 0 
2011 3 261 0.025 0.011 0 0.013 
2012 1 261 0.011 0.004 0 0.008 
2013 0 266 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 267 0.011 0.004 0 0.007 
2015 0 256 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 10: Damage classification of all reported incidents to fixed installations per year 
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Figure 11: Frequency of incidents resulting in minor, moderate or significant damage for fixed installations per year 
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Within the initial years of the study (1996-2001) the frequency of incidents remained at a 
consistently high level until a large decrease in 2002. The incident frequency fluctuated very little 
with a small spike in 2006 – 2007, which is in concurrence with the spike for incidents across all 
installations. There is one anomalous data point in 2011 were the frequency of incidents rapidly 
increases and instantly decreases in 2012. Generally the mean frequency displays a consistent 
decrease over the 19 year period.  
Over the whole 19 year time period, the frequency of an incident occurring with a fixed 
installation is 0.0139 per year. This equates to 1 incident every 70.9 installation years or 3.6 every 
year for the current level of installation activity in 2015. Similarly, the frequency of an incident 
that causes damage to a fixed installation is 0.0054 per year. This equates to 1 incident every 
177.32 installation years or 1.44 every year given the current installation activity in 2015. It is 
highly probably that the data is slightly skewed to the higher frequencies in the early years of the 
study, as well as the random spike of incidents in 2007. Both of these incidents could have an 
adverse effect on the overall data and effect the present activity.  
 
3.2.4. Floating installations 
For the purpose of this study number of different installation types have been included in this 
category. All of the installations in this section are considered to be floating installations, in other 
words, the surface section of the installation is able to move with the section of the sea. A total of 
44 incidents involving floating installations where identified. The following is a breakdown of the 
number of incidents per floating installations type: 
 Semi-submersible drilling      14 incidents 
 Semi-submersible production     1 incident 
 Semi-submersible accommodation    1 incident 
 Semi-submersible unspecified operation   14 incidents 
 Floating production and storage (FPS)    6 incidents 
 Floating Storage unit (FSU)     1 incident 
 Floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO)  5 incidents 
 Single mooring buoy      1 incident 
 Buoy unspecified operation      1 incident 
 Articulated loading column     1 incident 
Tables 12 and 13 demonstrate the mean frequency and cumulative frequency of all reported 
incidents to all floating installations on the UKCS between 1996 and 2015. Figures 12 and 13 
graphically represent the information demonstrated in Tables 12 and 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Frequency of all reported incidents to floating installations per year 
Year 
No. of 
incidents in 
year (r)  
No. of installations 
operating in year (N) 
5% 
Confidence  
limit 
Mean 
(λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
1996 1 34 0.087 0.029 0 0.058 
1997 7 39 0.312 0.179 0.047 0.133 
1998 7 40 0.305 0.175 0.045 0.130 
1999 4 44 0.180 0.091 0.002 0.089 
2000 3 45 0.142 0.067 0 0.075 
2001 3 44 0.145 0.068 0 0.077 
2002 5 43 0.218 0.116 0.014 0.102 
2003 0 43 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 43 0 0 0 0 
2005 3 43 0.149 0.070 0 0.079 
2006 1 43 0.069 0.023 0 0.046 
2007 3 45 0.142 0.067 0 0.075 
2008 2 48 0.099 0.042 0 0.058 
2009 2 47 0.102 0.043 0 0.059 
2010 3 46 0.139 0.065 0 0.074 
2011 0 45 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 47 0 0 0 0 
2013 1 44 0.067 0.023 0 0.045 
2014 0 43 0 0 0 0 
2015 0 42 0 0 0 0 
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Table 13: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to floating installations 
Year 
 
No. of 
incidents in 
year (r)  
Cumulative no. 
of incidents in 
year (r1)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in year 
(N) 
Cumulative no. of 
installations 
operating in year 
(N1) 
Mean 
(λ) 
Cumulative 
mean (λ1) 
1996 1 1 34 34 0.029 0.029 
1997 7 8 39 73 0.179 0.110 
1998 7 15 40 113 0.175 0.133 
1999 4 19 44 157 0.091 0.121 
2000 3 22 45 202 0.067 0.109 
2001 3 25 44 246 0.068 0.102 
2002 5 30 43 289 0.116 0.104 
2003 0 30 43 332 0 0.090 
2004 0 30 43 375 0 0.080 
2005 3 33 43 418 0.070 0.079 
2006 1 34 43 461 0.023 0.074 
2007 3 37 45 506 0.067 0.073 
2008 2 39 48 554 0.042 0.070 
2009 2 41 47 601 0.043 0.068 
2010 3 44 46 647 0.065 0.068 
2011 0 44 45 692 0 0.064 
2012 0 44 47 739 0 0.060 
2013 1 45 44 783 0.023 0.057 
2014 0 45 43 826 0 0.054 
2015 0 45 42 868 0 0.052 
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Figure 12: Frequency of all reported incidents to floating installations per year 
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Figure 13: mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to floating installations per year 
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Tables 14 and 15 summarise the damage classification of the reported incidents to floating 
installations as well as a breakdown of the number of incidents that cause minor, moderate and 
significant damage. In total, 16 incidents were classified as minor, 3 as moderate and none were 
deemed to be significant. Similarly, 26 incidents were found have suffered no damage or the 
damage classification was unspecified.  
 
 
 
Table 14: Damage classification of all reported incidents to floating installations per year 
Year Unspecified None Minor Moderate Significant Total 
1996 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1997 5 0 2 0 0 7 
1998 4 0 3 0 0 7 
1999 1 0 3 0 0 4 
2000 1 0 2 0 0 3 
2001 3 0 0 0 0 3 
2002 2 1 1 1 0 5 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 1 1 1 0 3 
2006 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2007 0 2 1 0 0 3 
2008 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2009 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2010 0 2 0 1 0 3 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2014 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  17 8 17 3 0 45 
  37.78% 17.78% 37.78% 6.67% 0.00% 100.0% 
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Table 15: Frequency of incidents resulting in minor, moderate or significant damage for floating installations per year 
Year 
No. of 
incidents 
in year (r)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in 
year (N) 
5% Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
1996 0 34 0 0 0 0 
1997 2 39 0.122 0.051 0 0.071 
1998 3 40 0.160 0.075 0 0.085 
1999 3 44 0.145 0.068 0 0.077 
2000 2 45 0.106 0.044 0 0.062 
2001 0 44 0 0 0 0.000 
2002 2 43 0.111 0.047 0 0.064 
2003 0 43 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 43 0 0 0 0 
2005 2 43 0.111 0.047 0 0.064 
2006 0 43 0 0 0 0 
2007 1 45 0.066 0.022 0 0.044 
2008 2 48 0.099 0.042 0 0.058 
2009 2 47 0.102 0.043 0 0.059 
2010 1 46 0.064 0.022 0 0.043 
2011 0 45 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 47 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 44 0 0 0 0 
2014 0 43 0 0 0 0 
2015 0 42 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 14: Damage classification of all reported incidents to fixed installations per year 
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Figure 15: Frequency of incidents resulting in minor, moderate or significant damage for fixed installations per year 
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The trend of collision incidents regarding f loating installations on average decreases over the 19 
year period, however, there is an element of fluctuation. A peak in the number of incidents is 
reach in 1997 and 1998. This eventually decreases to zero in 2003 and 2004 and the frequency of 
incidents remains consistent until 2011 at which point the number of incidents decreases to zero 
again through to 2015, with the exception of 1 incident in 2013.  
Over the entire 19 year period (1996 – 2015) the frequency of an incident occurring regarding a 
floating installation is 0.05 per year. This equates to approximately 1 incident every 19.72 
installation years or 2.12 every year given the operating levels in 2015. The statistical analysis for 
incidents resulting in damage identified an average incident frequency of 0.022. This can also be 
said to be 1 damaging incident every 45.68 installations years or 0.919 per year at the current 
operating levels in 2015. 
 
3.2.5. Jack-up installations 
A total of 35 reported incidents were identified involving collisions between vessels and jack-up 
installations between 1996 and 2015. Tables 16 and 17 demonstrate the mean and cumulative 
frequency of all reported incidents to all jack-up installations on the UKCS between. Figures 16 
and 17 graphically represent the information demonstrated in Tables 16 and 17. 
Table 16: Frequency of all reported incidents to jack-up installations per year 
Year 
No. of 
incidents 
in year (r)  
No. of installations 
operating in year (N) 
5% 
Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin 
of error 
1996 0 14 0 0 0 0 
1997 3 14 0.457 0.214 0 0.242 
1998 5 15 0.626 0.333 0.041 0.292 
1999 4 17 0.466 0.235 0.005 0.231 
2000 3 21 0.305 0.143 0 0.162 
2001 1 22 0.135 0.045 0 0.089 
2002 1 22 0.135 0.045 0 0.089 
2003 2 22 0.217 0.091 0 0.126 
2004 1 22 0.135 0.045 0 0.089 
2005 1 22 0.135 0.045 0 0.089 
2006 1 22 0.135 0.045 0 0.089 
2007 5 22 0.426 0.227 0.028 0.199 
2008 3 22 0.291 0.136 0 0.154 
2009 1 24 0.123 0.042 0 0.082 
2010 1 26 0.114 0.038 0 0.075 
2011 1 26 0.114 0.038 0 0.075 
2012 0 27 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 27 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 30 0.099 0.033 0 0.065 
2015 1 33 0.090 0.030 0 0.059 
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Table 17: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to jack-up installations per year 
Year 
 
No. of 
incidents in 
year (r)  
Cumulative no. of 
incidents in year 
(r1)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in year 
(N) 
Cumulative no. of 
installations 
operating in year 
(N1) 
Mean 
(λ) 
Cumulative 
mean (λ1) 
1996 0 0 14 14 0 0 
1997 3 3 14 28 0.214 0.107 
1998 5 8 15 43 0.333 0.186 
1999 4 12 17 60 0.235 0.200 
2000 3 15 21 81 0.143 0.185 
2001 1 16 22 103 0.045 0.155 
2002 1 17 22 125 0.045 0.136 
2003 2 19 22 147 0.091 0.129 
2004 1 20 22 169 0.045 0.118 
2005 1 21 22 191 0.045 0.110 
2006 1 22 22 213 0.045 0.103 
2007 5 27 22 235 0.227 0.115 
2008 3 30 22 257 0.136 0.117 
2009 1 31 24 281 0.042 0.110 
2010 1 32 26 307 0.038 0.104 
2011 1 33 26 333 0.038 0.099 
2012 0 33 27 360 0 0.092 
2013 0 33 27 387 0 0.085 
2014 1 34 30 417 0.033 0.082 
2015 1 35 33 450 0.030 0.078 
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Figure 16: Frequency of all reported incidents to jack-up installations per year 
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Figure 17: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported incidents to jack-up installations per year 
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Tables 18 and 19 summarise the damage classification of the reported incidents to Jack-up 
installations as well as a breakdown of the number of incidents that cause minor, moderate and 
significant damage. In total, 10 incidents were classified as minor, and none were deemed to be 
moderate or significant. Similarly, 25 incidents were found have suffered no damage or the 
damage classification was unspecified. Figures 18 and 19 graphically demonstrate the data 
presented in Tables 18 and 19. 
 
Table 18: Damage classification of all reported incidents to jack-up installations per year 
Year Unspecified None Minor Moderate Significant Total 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 2 0 1 0 0 3 
1998 5 0 0 0 0 5 
1999 1 1 2 0 0 4 
2000 2 0 1 0 0 3 
2001 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2002 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2003 1 1 0 0 0 2 
2004 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2005 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2006 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2007 0 3 2 0 0 5 
2008 1 1 1 0 0 3 
2009 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2010 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2011 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 1 
  15 10 10 0 0 35 
  42.86% 28.57% 28.57% 0.00% 0.00% 100.0% 
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Table 19: Frequency of incidents resulting in minor, moderate or significant damage for jack-up installations per year 
Year 
No. of 
incidents 
in year (r)  
No. of installations 
operating in year (N) 
5% 
Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% 
Confidence 
limit 
Margin 
of error 
1996 0 14 0 0 0 0 
1997 1 14 0.211 0.071 0 0.140 
1998 0 15 0 0 0 0 
1999 2 17 0.281 0.118 0 0.163 
2000 1 21 0.141 0.048 0 0.093 
2001 1 22 0.135 0.045 0 0.089 
2002 0 22 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 22 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 22 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 22 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 22 0 0 0 0 
2007 2 22 0.217 0.091 0 0.126 
2008 1 22 0.135 0.045 0 0.089 
2009 1 24 0.123 0.042 0 0.082 
2010 0 26 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 26 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 27 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 27 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 30 0.099 0.033 0 0.065 
2015 0 33 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 18: Damage classification of all reported incidents to jack-up installations per year 
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Figure 19: Frequency of minor, moderate and significant damage to jack-up installations per year 
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The incident frequency in the earlier part of the study for jack-up installations is relatively high 
given the small population of operating installations compared with the number of incidents, with 
a peak frequency in 1998. The trend in incident frequency decreases and remains consistent from 
2001 onwards. There is on key spike in the incident frequency in 2007 where a significant 
number of incidents occurred. A key issue with the jack-up operating data compared to fixed and 
floating data is that the number of platforms that have been decommissioned or taken out of 
service in the 19 year period was not known accurately. Hence the number of jack-up 
installations operating on the UKCS steadily increases, and potentially devalues the data 
presented. 
Over the whole study the average frequency of an incident occurring between a vessel and a jack-
up installation is 0.077 per year. This equates to 1 incident every 12.85 operating years or 2.56 
incidents per year given the current operating levels in 2015. Furthermore, the avera ge frequency 
of an incidents causing damage is 0.022 per year. This can also be stated as 1 damage causing 
incident every 45 installation years or 0.73 incidents per year given the current operating levels in 
2015. 
3.2.6. Summary of incident frequencies 
A summary of the incident frequencies for all vessel and installation types is presented in Table 
20. The data in the tables has been generated using the both the number of all recorded incidents 
and those incidents which have resulted in minor, moderate and signif icant damage. The mean 
incident frequencies have not been conducted separately for attendant and passing vessels as there 
have only been 2 reported incidents of collisions with passing vessels over the 19 year period. 
Table 20: Summary of mean incident frequencies of all reported incidents and incidents that have resulted in damage to the 
installation 
Mean incident frequencies: 1996 - 2015 
Installation type All reported incidents 
Incidents resulting in minor, moderate 
or significant damage 
All 0.0280 0.0116 
Fixed 0.0139 0.0054 
Floating 0.0507 0.0219 
Jack-up 0.0778 0.0222 
 
3.2.7. Geographical distribution 
For this section of the statistical analysis the geographical locations of all incidents and 
installation types are analysed as a whole. This is due to the fact that certain installation types are 
used more frequently in different sections of the North Sea. For example, floating installations 
would not be used as much as fixed installations in the southern North Sea due to the shallower 
waters. Similarly, jack-up installations are not utilised as often as other installation types in the 
northern North Sea. If the installations were analysed individually by type and by area, the data 
would seem skewed as the results may suggest that the certain installations have experienced an 
average of more or less incidents due to the relative size of their population in a given area. 
A straightforward comparison of the reported incidents by region is demonstrated by Table 21 
and Figure 20. The information shows areas that have endured more incidents than others, yet the 
data should be viewed against the varying levels of activity between the North Sea sectors. 
Unless the number of incidents per region is cross referenced with the number of installations 
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operating in that region, then an incident frequency is difficult to obtain. Similarly, the activity 
within each sector could be said to be difficult to map accurately as mobile floating unit can be 
moved from location to location while under the same contract.   
 
Table 21: Geographical distribution of all reported incidents 
Incident by Sector 
Sector Number Percentage 
Northern North Sea 28 15.91% 
Central North Sea 33 18.75% 
Southern North Sea 32 18.18% 
West of Shetland 5 2.84% 
Morecambe Bay 3 1.70% 
Liverpool Bay 3 1.70% 
Unspecified 72 40.91% 
Total 176 100.00% 
  
All incidents outlined in the statistical analysis were attendant vessels with the exception of 2 
incidents which were passing vessels, a trawler and a merchant container ship. Similarly, these 2 
incidents occurred in the southern North Sea. This would be expected as this is deemed to be the 
most congested sector in terms of offshore operations and general shipping activity. 
Figure 20: Geographical distribution of all reported incident on the UKCS 
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3.2.8. Other or unspecified installations 
While the majority of the data within the statistical analysis was complete, i.e. the information 
contained; installation type, date (with month), location, vessel type, damage classification and in 
many cases the installation name. However, there are a number of collision incidents that have 
been reported between 1996 and 2015 which have incomplete data recordings or do not involve a 
fixed, floating or jack-up installations. Within this section of the data the oil or gas field may be 
known but the specific installation may not be. It may be possible to estimate the installation type 
however, it is possible that within a field of predominantly fixed installations, a floating 
installation may also be under contract in the same field. Hence, the installation type has not been 
predicted even though the field may be known. Within this data set there is enough information to 
include it within parts of the analysis where a specific installation type does not need to be known. 
The data contains the following number of incidents: 
 Unspecified installation type    23 incidents 
 Wind turbines      3 incidents 
Table 22 and Figure 21 demonstrate the number of incidents involving other or unspecified 
installations types per year. 
 
Table 22: Number of incidents reported for other and unspecified installation types per year 
Year Unspecified Wind turbine 
1996 0 0 
1997 0 0 
1998 1 0 
1999 1 0 
2000 5 0 
2001 0 0 
2002 2 0 
2003 1 0 
2004 1 0 
2005 0 0 
2006 1 1 
2007 1 0 
2008 1 0 
2009 0 0 
2010 0 0 
2011 1 0 
2012 2 1 
2013 4 0 
2014 0 1 
2015 2 0 
  23 3 
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Figure 21: Number of incidents reported for other or unspecified installation types per year 
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4. NEAR MISSES 
The previous ship/platform collision database (2001) identified a database review from 1997 
which highlighted that a large body of data existed relating to ‘near misses’, and that these occur 
frequently in all areas of the UKCS. Within the report in 1997 a ‘near miss’ was defined as an 
infringement of the 500m safety zone. Similarly, it was also concluded that more comprehensive 
reporting of said incidents would improve the understanding of the magnitude of the problem and 
lead to identifiable causation factors. In this regard the causation factors were referred to as being 
similar to those which involved passing vessel collisions. This is due to the fact that the majority 
of passing vessel collisions were due to poor watch-keeping or the inability to recover from a 
dangerous situation.  
In an attempt to better the understanding of ‘near miss’ situations, a number of initiatives were 
implemented between the database review in 1997 and the production of the ship/platform 
collision database in 2001. These new initiatives , utilising the HSE’s ORION system, identified 
the following information:  
 HSE ‘Orion’ system using search keyword “POS COLLISION OFF" (28 incidents – 14 
classified as ‘near miss’ – 14 classified as not ‘near miss’) 
 HSE ‘Orion’ system SZI section and OIR9A reports (59 incidents – not possible to 
determine whether ‘near miss’) 
 ERR VA Warning Off Reports (246 incidents – not possible to determine whether or not 
it is a  ‘near miss’) 
Furthermore, during the latter years of the 2001 database, the HSE revisited their definition of the 
term ‘near miss’ and determined that “only incidents that lead to the activation of any part of the 
Duty Holder’s Emergency Response Plan should be classified as a ‘near miss’”. This was deemed to 
be a better criterion for definition than, for example, one that refers to an approaching vessel’s 
Closest Point of Approach (CPA) because of the different external factors and circumstances 
prevalent in different areas of the UKCS. The busier waters of the Southern North Sea will lead to 
many more close approaches by vessels than West of Shetlands where a potentially errant vessel 
may cause alarm more readily because it is a relatively rare event. Although the reporting routes 
outlined above led to increasing amounts of reports being received by HSE and ERRVA, many of 
which yield important information about an event, it is somewhat debatable whether all should be 
classified as a ‘near miss’ within the confines of the recent definition. Some of the doubt is centred 
on the inability to determine whether an installation’s Emergency Response Plan was activated 
purely from the information contained within the report; this is particularly true for the ERRVA 
Warning Off Reports which it appears are completed and filed by the ERRV without recourse to 
the installation. 
While this is a valid approach to determining whether a near miss has occurred it is not the 
preferred method in this study. A key reason for this is that a number of the OIRION incidents 
using the keyword “POS COLLISION OFF” involve incidents that are not classed as near misses 
but involve uncontrolled vessels missing a platform by small margins , within the 500m zone. 
Two examples of incidents not considered as near misses are as follows: 
 Incident 1: Anchor handler experiences total loss of power in 500m zone and drifts 
towards a fixed steel installation. 
“Whilst preparing for rig move of jack up drilling rig - anchor handling vessel suffered 
total loss of power. Vessel started drifting and narrowly missed colliding with platform.”  
 
 Incident 2: Shuttle tanker experiences DP computer failure during cargo offloading and 
moves towards an FPSO.  
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“Shuttle tanker was making its approach in preparation for cargo offloading. At a distance 
of approximately 200 metres shuttle tanker experienced failure of main propeller pitch 
control. This initiated a sequence of events which resulted in a 100% ahead pitch demand 
from the DP system. The vessel started to move ahead and manual control was selected. 
The vessel was steered to starboard and arrested 120 metres from the FPSO's stern at 
approximately 90 degrees.” 
These incidents were not considered as near misses as the installations emergency response plan 
was not initiated in both cases, yet if key decisions were not made during the incidents, they may 
have resulted in contact to the respective installations. Given incident 1, there was an element of 
luck that the vessel drifted past the installation.  
Therefore, in this study the definitions quantifying a “near miss” are as follows: 
Passing vessels: 
 Any passing vessel on a collision course with an installation, without any apparent 
operating failures, that enters the 500m zone unauthorised but does not make physical 
contact with the installation. 
 Any unauthorised passing vessel that enters or is within the 500m zone and experiences 
failures which compromise the ability to handle the vessel, and can be deemed to be on a 
collision course but does not make physical contact with the installation. 
Attendant vessels:  
 Any attendant vessel in the 500m zone that experiences failures which compromise the 
ability to handle the vessel, and can be deemed to be on a collision course but does not 
make physical contact with the installation. 
Given the outlined definitions above, 56 incidents were determined to be classed as “near misses” 
in the 19 year period between 1996 and 2015. These incidents are outlined by installation type in 
Table 23 and Figure 22. These incidents are broken down by installation type, as follows: 
 Fixed steel       26 near misses 
 Fixed concrete      1 near miss 
 Jacket       2 near misses 
 Floating production     1 near miss 
 FPSO       5 near misses 
 FSU       3 near misses 
 Semi-submersible     4 near misses 
 Semi-submersible drilling     4 near misses 
 Semi-submersible accommodation   1 near miss 
 Jack-up       3 near misses 
 Unspecified      3 near misses 
Further to this, an additional near miss incident involved two installations. A supply vessel which, 
suffered an engine fire and as a result lost all ability to navigate and steerage, presented a 
collision threat to a fixed steel installation and a semi-submersible accommodation installation. 
This is counted as one incident as the floating platform was carrying out operations with the fixed 
platform along with the supply vessel. All near miss incidents identified in this study are 
demonstrated in Appendix C. 
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Table 23: Number of near misses on the UKCS per installation type per year 
Year Fixed  Floating  Jack-up Multiple Unspecified Total 
1996 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1997 2 4 0 0 0 6 
1998 3 2 0 0 0 5 
1999 6 3 1 0 0 10 
2000 3 0 0 0 1 4 
2001 2 4 0 0 0 6 
2002 3 2 1 0 1 7 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 2 0 0 0 0 2 
2005 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2006 3 0 1 0 0 4 
2007 4 0 0 0 0 4 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2012 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 1 0 3 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  31 18 3 1 3 56 
  55.36% 32.14% 5.36% 1.79% 5.36% 100.00% 
 
52 
 
 
 
It can be seen that the number of incidents directly correlates to the relative number of 
installations of a given type operating in the North Sea per year, i.e. there are more fixed 
installations operating on the UKCS, hence the number of near misses relating to fixed 
installations is much higher when compared to floating or jack-up installations. 
Tables 24 and 25 demonstrate the mean and cumulative frequencies of all reported “near misses” 
per year on the UKCS between 1996 and 2015. Similarly, Figures 23 and 24 demonstrate such 
frequencies information graphically.  
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Figure 22: Number of near misses on the UKCS per installation type per year 
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Table 24: Frequency of all reported near misses on the UKCS per year 
Year 
No. of 
near 
misses in 
year (r)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in 
year (N) 
5% 
Confidence  
limit 
Mean (λ) 
95% Confidence 
limit 
Margin of 
error 
1996 1 262 0.011 0.004 0 0.007 
1997 6 271 0.040 0.022 0.004 0.018 
1998 5 278 0.034 0.018 0.002 0.016 
1999 10 291 0.056 0.034 0.013 0.021 
2000 4 300 0.026 0.013 0 0.013 
2001 6 307 0.035 0.020 0.004 0.016 
2002 7 308 0.040 0.023 0.006 0.017 
2003 0 311 0 0 0 0 
2004 2 313 0.015 0.006 0 0.009 
2005 1 314 0.009 0.003 0 0.006 
2006 4 315 0.025 0.013 0 0.012 
2007 4 331 0.024 0.012 0 0.012 
2008 0 337 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 338 0.009 0.003 0 0.006 
2010 0 332 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 332 0.009 0.003 0 0.006 
2012 1 335 0.009 0.003 0 0.006 
2013 0 337 0 0 0 0 
2014 3 340 0.019 0.009 0 0.010 
2015 0 331 0 0 0 0 
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Table 25: Mean and cumulative frequency of all reported near misses on the UKCS per year 
Year 
No. of 
near 
misses 
in year 
(r)  
Cumulative 
no. of near 
misses in year 
(r1)  
No. of 
installations 
operating in 
year (N) 
Cumulative 
no. of 
installations 
operating in 
year (N) 
Mean (λ) 
Cumulative 
mean (λ1) 
1996 1 1 262 262 0.004 0.004 
1997 6 7 271 533 0.022 0.013 
1998 5 12 278 811 0.018 0.015 
1999 10 22 291 1102 0.034 0.020 
2000 4 26 300 1402 0.013 0.019 
2001 6 32 307 1709 0.020 0.019 
2002 7 39 308 2017 0.023 0.019 
2003 0 39 311 2328 0 0.017 
2004 2 41 313 2641 0.006 0.016 
2005 1 42 314 2955 0.003 0.014 
2006 4 46 315 3270 0.013 0.014 
2007 4 50 331 3601 0.012 0.014 
2008 0 50 337 3938 0 0.013 
2009 1 51 338 4276 0.003 0.012 
2010 0 51 332 4608 0 0.011 
2011 1 52 332 4940 0.003 0.011 
2012 1 53 335 5275 0.003 0.010 
2013 0 53 337 5612 0 0.009 
2014 3 56 340 5952 0.009 0.009 
2015 0 56 331 6283 0.000 0.009 
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Figure 23: Frequency of all reported near misses per year 
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Figure 24: Mean and cumulative frequency of near misses per year 
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4.1. TYPES OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN NEAR MISSES 
Tables 26 and 27 demonstrate the number of “near miss” incidents per vessel type per year as 
well as per month. This data indicates that the majority of “near misses” involve attendant vessels. 
A breakdown of the attendant vessels shows that 5 incidents involve “standby” vessels, 7 involve 
“supply” vessels and 18 involve “other attendant” vessels. It can been seen from Table 25 that the 
number “near misses” involving “passing vessels” accounts for more than 25% of the total 
number of “near misses”. This is a significant number of vessels when compared to the number of 
“passing vessels” that cause collisions. Finally, “unspecified” vessels account for 11 “near 
misses”. The categories of “attendant vessels” and “passing vessels” includes the following 
vessel types: 
Attendant: 
 Anchor handler       1 near miss 
 Barge        2 near misses 
 Diver support       2 near misses 
 Research vessel      1 near miss 
 Shuttle tanker       8 near misses 
 Unspecified cargo      1 near miss 
Passing: 
 Fishing vessel       5 near misses 
 Trawler       3 near misses 
 Merchant cargo      1 near miss 
 Merchant container      1 near miss 
 Merchant tanker      1 near miss 
 Unspecified passing      4 near misses 
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Table 26: Number of near misses per vessel per year 
Year Standby Supply 
Other 
attendant 
Passing Unspecified Total 
1996 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1997 2 2 2 0 0 6 
1998 1 0 1 2 1 5 
1999 1 2 4 2 1 10 
2000 0 0 3 0 1 4 
2001 0 0 1 2 3 6 
2002 0 0 3 2 2 7 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 2 0 2 
2005 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2006 0 1 0 2 1 4 
2007 0 0 1 1 2 4 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2012 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 2 0 0 0 3 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  5 7 18 15 11 56 
  8.93% 12.50% 32.14% 26.79% 19.64% 100.00% 
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Table 27: Number of near misses per vessel type per month 
Month Standby Supply 
Other 
attendant 
Passing Unspecified Total 
January 1 0 1 1 1 4 7.14% 
February 0 0 1 1 1 3 5.36% 
March 3 0 2 0 0 5 8.93% 
April 1 0 1 1 2 5 8.93% 
May 0 0 1 3 0 4 7.14% 
June 0 1 4 2 2 9 16.07% 
July 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.79% 
August 0 2 2 1 0 5 8.93% 
September 0 1 2 2 1 6 10.71% 
October 0 0 1 4 1 6 10.71% 
November 0 1 2 0 2 5 8.93% 
December 0 2 1 0 0 3 5.36% 
Unspecified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 
  5 7 18 15 11 56 100.00% 
  8.93% 12.50% 32.14% 26.79% 19.64% 100.00%   
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Figure 25: Number of near misses per vessel per year 
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Given the data presented, slightly more incidents have occurred in the 6 month period of April to 
September as opposed to October to March, when most actual collisions occur. This can be 
attributed to two factors; firstly, the number of incidents involving attendant vessels increases in 
the summer months due to preferred weather conditions for maintenance and other operation; 
secondly, the increased number of incidents involving passing vessels. Most of the passing 
vessels involved in near misses in the summer months are fishing vessels and trawlers with 6 of 8 
near misses involving these vessels occur between April and September. However, there are still 
a large number of incidents during the months October to March. Most of these incidents can be 
attributed to standby vessels and shuttle tankers, where 10 of the 13 incidents involving these 
vessels occurring in the winter months (October to March). A potential reason for this is the 
adverse weather conditions, and in the event of a vessel losing power or control, the weather 
plays a significant part in the uncontrolled direction in which the vessel will head.   
 
4.2. NEAR MISSES BY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION 
For this section of the statistical analysis the geographical locations of all reported near misses are 
analysed as a whole. This is for the same reasons stated in the analysis involving collision by 
geographical location; certain installation types are utilised more frequently in different sections 
of the UKCS. If the installations were analysed individually by type and by area, the data would 
seem skewed as the results may suggest that the certain installations have experienced an average 
of more or less incidents due to the relative size of their population in a given area. 
Again a straightforward comparison of the reported “near misses” by region is demonstrated by 
Table 28 and Figure 27. The information shows areas that have endured more “near misses” than 
others, yet the data should be viewed against the varying levels of activity between the North Sea 
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Figure 26: Number of near misses per vessel type per month 
60 
 
sectors. Unless the number of incidents per region is cross referenced with the number of 
installations operating in that region, then an incident frequency is difficult to obtain.  
 
Table 28: Geographical distribution of all reported near misses on the UKCS 
Near misses by sector 
Location Standby Supply 
Other 
attendant 
Passing Unspecified Total 
Northern 1 2 4 1 0 8 14.29% 
Central 2 3 6 4 1 16 28.57% 
Southern 0 0 3 7 5 15 26.79% 
Morecambe 
Bay 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1.79% 
West of 
Shetland 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1.79% 
Unspecified 2 2 4 2 5 15 26.79% 
  5 7 18 15 11 56 100.00% 
 
All “near misses” in this analysis involve all vessel and installations types. The data would 
suggest that most incidents occur in the central and southern North Sea. This is a fairly accurate 
statement as these two sectors have the highest concentration of installations. Furthermore, the 
data in Table 28 demonstrates the number of incidents per region per vessel. The data implies that 
the majority of “near misses” involving “passing vessels” occur in the southern sector of the 
North Sea. This makes sense as the southern North Sea is heavily congested with both offshore 
platforms and commercial shipping. Similarly, the majority of the unspecified “near misses” 
occur in the southern sector. It would be reasonable to suggest that many of these unknown 
vessels would be “passing vessels”.  
Figure 27: Geographical distribution of all reported near misses on the UKCS 
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5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. INCIDENT FREQUENCIES 
In the time period of 1996 to 2015, the general trend of ship/platform collision incidents, in 
accordance with the outlined criteria, has demonstrated a decrease in the number of incidents. 
Similarly, while there were few incidents involving moderate or significant damage, the number 
of incidents involving minor damage has also decreased. This may be attributed to the adoption 
and application of improved working practices. While the cumulative trend of incidents has 
decreased there are fluctuations within the incident frequencies. It can be seen for all installations 
that there are peaks in the data in 1997 and in 2007. This can possibly be attributed to the release 
of Safety Case regulations and amendments in 1996 and 2005. The periodic release in SC 
regulations can potentially be a factor in the reporting and occurrence of ship/collision incidents 
as ship collision is seen as being a Major Accident Hazard as it is an event which may cause 
major damage to the installation and therefore subject to regulatory requirements. Hence, changes 
in practices through regulations may affect the occurrence frequency of results in the immediate 
years after the regulations are released. Similarly, it is also possible that the release of new or 
amended regulations may result in improved working practices in terms of the level and quality 
of incident reporting. This can be backed up further by analysing collision incidents across the 
different installation types (fixed, floating and jack-up). Each of the different installation types 
experiences a spike in the number of incidents between 1996 -1997 and 2006 – 2008.  
5.2. DATA COMPLETENESS 
The compiling of this database involved rigorous and exhaustive cross checking of incidents 
across the 5 data sources utilised to avoid any repeated entries and to confirm that the relevant 
data had been used. Similarly, comprehensive checking was applied to the data entries to ensure 
that all relevant data was obtained in order to produce the most accurate data base possible. 
Furthermore, where data entries were not fully complete, i.e. where the name of the installation 
was given and the date of the incident, further sources of information were utilised to complete 
said entries to provide information on the vessel type, the type of installation, the month of 
occurrence, the geographical location etc. many data entries were deemed to be incomplete and 
the best possible effort was made to fully complete these entries. Unfortunately, not all data 
entries were able to be 100% completed. In most cases these entries have an unspecified 
installation type or date and hence identifying the correct incident when analysing various sources 
of information was difficult to impossible. In addition, 40% of incidents do not have a 
geographical location in their data entry due to two key factors. Firstly, the initial data source did 
not specify a geographical location or an installations type, making completing the data entry 
very difficult. Secondly, some of the entries without geographical locations are related to floating 
installations in operation across the 19 year period of the study. It can be difficult to pin point 
which geographical location these installations were in at the time of the incident , if further 
required information is not available.  
Regarding the damage classification for the data entries, more often than not the damage 
classification was stated using the relevant descriptors in the incidents reports. However, some 
data entries have an unspecified damage classification but have a report attached. In this event the 
incidents reports were examined and if the damage report gave a substantial description of the 
incident and the consequences, then a damage classification could be assigned to the incident. On 
the other hand those incidents that have no damage classification stated and a very limited to no 
existent incidents reports, have been assigned the damage classification of unspecified.  
5.3. VESSEL TYPES INVOLVED IN COLLISIONS 
Given the ship to platform collision incidents that have been recorded from 1996 to 2015, only 2 
of the 176 incidents have involved passing vessels , in 2002 and 2007. Both passing vessel 
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incidents involved fixed platforms (Jacket in 2002 and fixed steel in 2007), and there seems to be 
no explanation as to why other installation types have not been involved in collisions. This seems 
to be an example of passing vessels abiding by the regulat ions and not venturing in the direction 
of offshore platforms as well as possibly being slightly fortuitous.  
Furthermore, the potential damage classification that can be experienced by the collision of a 
passing vessel can be deemed to be high, i.e. significant or even total loss. Fortunately, no total 
losses were experienced in this study. However, the passing vessel collision in 2007 resulted in 
the sinking of the vessel itself (with all persons on board recovered) and significant damage the 
platform. Significant damage was observed on the riser and clamping arrangements, with no 
hydrocarbon loss, forcing the shutdown of the platform. It is highly fortuitous that the vessel 
collided with a NUI (Normally unattended Installation) at a time when it was completely 
unmanned. Had the vessel collided with the NUI while personnel were operating on-board, the 
consequences could have been much more severe. 
The risk levels associated with passing vessels increases significantly in the event that an 
unauthorised vessel infringes the 500m zone of a platform. It has been stated in [5] that the 
kinetic energy possessed by passing container vessels or tankers is sufficient to cause great 
structural damage, even with a glancing blow. That being said the vessel would most likely have 
to suffer a malfunction whereby the velocity and heading cannot be altered. Similarly, the 
potential for a passing vessel to collide with a platform is to a large extent out of the control of 
the platform operators and the surrounding attendant vessels. However, it is possible to provided 
warning if the necessary actions are taken.  
The two incidents involving passing vessels have occurred in the southern North Sea. This is 
unsurprising as this area of the North Sea is the most congested in terms of commercial shipping 
on local coastal voyages (including passenger vessels), short distance voyages between the UK 
and the European Mainland, and long voyages between Northern European ports and 
International, Non-European ports. As well as this there are a large number of fishing vessels 
operating from both the UK and other European ports. Given the vast number of vessels coupled 
with the large number of offshore platforms operating in the Southern North Sea, the vessels must 
adhere to traffic lanes rather than follow their own course. 
Following from passing vessels, 174 of the 176 recorded incidents have either occurred from 
attendant vessels or are unspecified. This is not completely surprising given the number of vessel 
in close proximity to offshore platforms and the time that they spend within that proximity. While 
this seems like a significant ratio, the fact is that the number of collision incidents has steadily 
decreased since the inception of Safety Case regulations. The safety case of a platform must give 
full details of the arrangements for managing health and safety and controlling major accident 
hazards on the installation, and vessel to platform collision events are considered as a major 
accident hazard. Hence with the continuous updating and enforcement, the general trend of 
collision incidents has decreased, with some periodic fluctuations.   
With the entering into the statute of The Statistical Returns (Carriage of Goods and Passengers by 
Sea) Regulations 1997 and the advent of the Maritime Statistics Collection Agency (MARSTATS) 
on 1 January 2000 it was possible for the previous database (2001) to present information about a 
number of factors that may have an impact on ship/ platform collision incidents. More specifically, 
information regarding the number of voyages into and out of U.K. ports from/ to the UKCS, the 
identity of the vessels involved and the type of cargo carried by those vessels was extracted from 
MARSTATS. However, in this study this information is not provided due to the current 
accessibility of such data, yet the importance of said information is reiterated. Possessing 
knowledge regarding the specifications of the passing and attendant vessels in the lanes 
surrounding offshore platforms is key to the further assessment of ship/platform collisions. Yet, 
there are some issues regarding the level and quality of information that is required to be reported.  
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Under Article 2 (Definitions) of EU directive 2009/42/EC (statistical returns in respect of carriage 
of goods and passengers by sea), the scope includes goods shipped to offshore installations, yet it 
does not include vessels used for drilling or exploration. Furthermore, under Article 4 (Ports), of 
2009/42/EC, each Member State shall select from the list referred to in paragraph 1 any port 
handling more than one million tonnes of goods or recording more than 200 000 passenger 
movements annually. This shows that there is a limited interest in the movements off offshore 
vessels. I would appear that the key interests, from this directive, are in the areas of bulk trading, 
hence minor ports are somewhat discounted [39].   
Finally, what is clear from the 2001 database is that the average dimensions (length, breadth 
&draught) and tonnages (gross, deadweight & displacement) have steadily increased from 1975 
to 2001. Furthermore, the 2001 database also states that the port of Great Yarmouth saw the 
largest number of voyages and cargo tonnage by Emergency Response and Rescue Vessels 
(ERRV) carrying commercial cargo between UK ports and the UKCS, with Aberdeen second and 
Heysham, Immingham, Liverpool and Peterhead bay all paling in comparison. It can be assumed 
that this trend has remained the same due to the locations of the ports and the UKCS Oil & Gas 
fields.  
5.4. NEAR MISSES 
Of the 56 ‘Near Misses’ identified for this study more than 50% occurred in the 500m zone 
around fixed installations, with a further 32.14% occurring around floating installations. However, 
what is more significant regarding ‘Near Misses’ is the types of vessels that are involved. It has 
already been outlined that 2 collision incidents out of 176 involved passing vessels. Yet when 
analysing the data from ‘Near Misses’, 15 of the 56 incidents involve passing vessels, with 30 
being attendant and 11 unspecified.  
When comparing with the number of passing vessel collisions, this number seems rather high. 
However, what it demonstrates is that 15 collisions have potentially been avoide d when an 
unauthorised vessel enters a platforms 500m zone. This shows some immediate action has been 
taken to ensure contact is avoided. Similarly, the 2 collision incidents occurred in the Southern 
North Sea. When considering’ Near Misses’, 7 of the 15 involving passenger vessels have 
occurred in the Southern North Sea, adding further verification that collision with passing vessels 
are more likely in in this region. However, when identifying the key geographical locations for all 
‘Near Misses’, the Central North Sea has the majority with 28.57%, then Southern and 
unspecified with 26.79%. This shows that many more collision involving attendant vessels have 
been recorded in other areas of the North Sea. The data also suggests that there is a level of 
incompleteness when recording and reporting data. For ‘Near Misses’ in this study the location is 
only unspecified if the name of the platform is unknown or the platform is floating and its 
whereabouts at the time of the incident are unknown.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The database contains a compilation of ship/platform collision data from several widely differing 
sources and so potentially represents the most complete record of collision incidents on the UKCS. 
The data presented should be interpreted with caution as it is highly likely that some degree of under 
reporting of incidents has occurred. Primarily this is thought to be of those incidents where little or 
no damage resulted to the installation.  
It is important to note that the confidence with which the database should be assessed is to the level 
that it represents the best case so far as the frequency of incidents is concerned. In reality it is likely 
that the frequency of incidents which result in less serious damage could well be higher than 
indicated in this report. In more recent years it is believed that a much higher degree of accuracy 
has been achieved, particularly for more serious incidents. However, the issue with under reporting 
is more associated with incidents that result in very little damage. This has a knock on effect, i.e., if 
the installation is floating and damage from a collision is minor to none existent, then the report may 
not be fully complete, and subsequently, the location of the incident may not be reported. This leads 
to an unspecified geographical location in the analysis as it is very difficult to retrace where the 
incident was as the installation may have moved to a new field. This event, associated with floating 
installations has occurred repeatedly throughout the data gathering process. Furthermore, the 
operating experience of jack-up installations should also be considered as best case as an accurate 
number of installations operating per year was not accessible. This resulted in the meticulous 
compilation of the number of operational Jack-up installations per year from 1996 to 2015. Similarly, 
little data is given as to which jack-up installations have been completely removed from service or 
when a Jack-up has been moved off site. The information available was not accurate enough to fully 
determine the precise number of jack-up installation operating on the UKCS per year, hence the 
number of jack-up installations gradually increases. However, this increase is not excessive and it is 
assumed that only a small number of installations will have been removed from the UKCS. 
Therefore, any change in the operating experience of jack-up installations during the 19 years will be 
minimal and subsequently not have a great effect on the incident trends or outcomes.  
The conclusions from the 2001 report state that a larger data set of ‘near miss’ incidents has been 
collated by both the HSE and, since April 2001, by ERRVA. The statement in the 2001 database 
reads: “Based upon the definitions of a ‘Near Miss’ in the 2001 database, the latter source of data 
should more properly be considered as ‘warning off’ because it contains little to independently 
support the new definition of a ‘Near Miss’, i.e., when any part of an installation’s emergency 
response plan is activated.” However, the data is still relevant as it quantifies the amount of 
potentially errant traffic, provides information on the range at which approaching vessels may take 
avoiding actions and outlines the effectiveness of radio contact or other means to warn of 
installation’s presence. This study has expanded this further by analysing ‘Near Misses’ through a 
clear set of definitions. Based upon these definitions 56 ‘Near Miss’ incidents were identified and 
analysed in the same manner as the collision incidents in Section 3. This is an expansion of the 
previous database as the information presented in the 2001 report produced data utilising three data 
sources and analysed the information from each source separately. This study analysed the ‘Near 
Miss’ information by vessel type and by geographical location, as did the 2001 report, however, this 
report also demonstrated the frequency and cumulative frequency of the 56 incidents as well as the 
type of installation involved.  
This report has expanded the knowledge base regarding ship to platform collisions and ‘Near Misses’ 
based upon information from five key data sources as well as previous collision databases and offshore 
industry reports and publications. The definition of a ‘Near Miss’ has been redefined in an attempt to 
remove any uncertainty about what classifies as a ‘Near Miss’, particularly in this study.   
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APPENDIX A:  
SHIP/PLATFORM COLLISION INCIDENTS
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No. Year Source Month Location 
Name of 
Unit 
Type of Unit Vessel Damage Comments 
1 1996 HSE November Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified   
2 1996 MAIB November Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply None No damage reported. 
3 1996 HSE May Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor Superficial damage to NE leg. 
4 1996 HSE June Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor - 
5 1996 HSE July Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor 3 bolts sprung on redundant 8" glycol riser approx. 12' above L.A.T. 
6 1996 HSE August Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor   
7 1996 HSE August - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Stand-by Unspecified 
Slight indentation to column. Separate contact with Nos. 5 and 6 anchor chasing 
pennants. 
8 1996 HSE October Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Unspecified Minor Bent boat fender. 
9 1996 HSE July Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified Contact did not occur. Potable water hose burst as vessel pulled clear. 
10 1997 HSE January - Unspecified Jack-up Unspecified Unspecified   
11 1997 MAIB April Northern Unspecified FPS Supply Unspecified Heavy indent damage to a shell plate in way of a wing ballast tank. 
12 1997 HSE March - Unspecified Jack-up Unspecified Unspecified   
13 1997 HSE January Central Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Stand-by Minor   
14 1997 HSE July Northern Unspecified FPS Merchant Tanker Unspecified Some unspecified structural damage. 
15 1997 HSE February Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Unspecified Minor   
16 1997 HSE May Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Stand-by Unspecified Profile damage to the fire pump caisson. 
17 1997 HSE September Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor   
18 1997 HSE March Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply None No apparent damage at 6.5m level. 
19 1997 HSE February Central Unspecified FPS Supply Unspecified   
20 1997 HSE July Morecambe Bay Unspecified Fixed Steel Diver Support  Unspecified   
21 1997 HSE August Central Unspecified FPS Merchant Tanker Unspecified   
22 1997 HSE July - Unspecified 
Semi-Sub 
Accommodation 
Stand-by Unspecified 
Structural damage to the port and starboard aft life raft platforms and bulk hose rack 
on aft end of unit. 
23 1997 HSE October Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified   
24 1997 HSE December Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified   
25 1997 HSE September Central Unspecified 
Articulated Loading 
Column 
Supply Minor 
Damage to the ladder's verticals and scraping the outer concrete surface of the 
installation. 
26 1997 HSE December - Unspecified Jack-up Unspecified Minor Scratching on 2 teeth of outboard cord in port aft leg. 
27 1998 HSE July - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Anchor Handler Minor Some timber splintering on the boat bumper arrangement, no structural damage. 
28 1998 HSE July - Unspecified Jack-up Anchor Handler Minor Small dent in water well. 
29 1998 HSE February Central Unspecified FPS Stand-by Minor Frame 93-94, sl40 bend approximately 3 - 5cm inside water ballast tank 6 port. 
30 1998 HSE May  - Unspecified Jack-up Supply Unspecified   
31 1998 HSE December  - Unspecified Jack-up Supply Unspecified   
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32 1998 HSE June Northern Unspecified Fixed Concrete Supply Unspecified   
33 1998 HSE August Central Unspecified Single Buoy Mooring Merchant Tanker Unspecified   
34 1998 HSE June Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Unspecified Unspecified   
35 1998 HSE February - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Unspecified   
36 1998 HSE March - Unspecified Jack-up Supply Unspecified   
37 1998 HSE April West of Shetland Unspecified FPS Anchor Handler Unspecified   
38 1998 HSE April - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Minor Indention to hull 2' x 4' - no breach to tank. 
39 1998 HSE November Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified   
40 1998 HSE December - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Unspecified   
41 1998 HSE April - Unspecified Jack-up Supply Unspecified   
42 1998 HSE July Northern Unspecified Fixed Concrete Supply Minor 
Platform north side diesel bunker hose burst causing a spillage of approximately 10 
gallons. No structural damage. 
43 1998 HSE September West of Shetland Unspecified Unspecified Merchant Tanker Minor Number 9 starboard water ballast tank and approximately 5 meters of handrails. 
44 1999 HSE March  Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified Vessel made glancing contact. 
45 1999 HSE April  - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Unspecified - 
46 1999 HSE May - Unspecified Jack-up Tug Unspecified Minimal damage to crane pedestal and helideck supports. 
47 1999 HSE January Morecambe Bay Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified None Contact did not occur. Potable water hose burst as vessel drifted clear. 
48 1999 HSE December Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor Boat bumper dented and top support pipe slightly kinked on the top   side. 
49 1999 HSE December Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor Potable water hose parted and damage to No. 4 lifeboat. 
50 1999 HSE March - Unspecified Jack-up Supply None No damage to the leg chord. 
51 1999 HSE December - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Minor Damage to five timber fenders and distorted frames and stiffeners. 
52 1999 HSE October - Unspecified Jack-up Stand-by None No damage to the leg chord. 
53 1999 HSE March  - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Minor Indentation of the shell plating resulting in no penetration of the plating. 
54 1999 HSE June Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor Superficial paint scratches on the diagonal brace. 
55 1999 HSE October - Unspecified Jack-up Supply Minor White metal marks and some shaved off metal from vessel on one side of the teeth. 
56 1999 HSE January - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Minor Paintwork damage only. 
57 1999 HSE July Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Stand-by None None apparent. 
58 1999 HSE September Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply None None apparent. 
59 2000 HSE January Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified - 
60 2000 HSE April - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Supply Unspecified Unspecified damage reported. 
61 2000 HSE July - Unspecified Jack-up Anchor Handler Unspecified Unspecified damage reported in the area of preload tanks Nos. 20 and 22. 
62 2000 HSE January Morecambe Bay Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified None No apparent damage. 
63 2000 HSE January Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor Serious damage to lifeboat. 
64 2000 HSE January Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Diver Support  Minor 
Outer skin of No. 2 lifeboat punctured and mooring pins wrenched from the side of 
the boat. The stiffener is also distorted on the lifeboat land area support frame. 
65 2000 HSE February Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor 
Minor structural damage to the support frame of cable trays on the south-west corner 
of the Cellar Deck. 
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66 2000 HSE April - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling Anchor Handler Minor 
Damage to stringers and vertical stiffeners and setting in of the shell plating at the 70ft 
draft level. 
67 2000 HSE August Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor Paint scraped off. 
68 2000 HSE September Central Unspecified Semi-Sub Production Stand-by Minor 
Slight superficial damage to the column fender and also an access ladder on No. 2 
winch. 
69 2000 HSE November Northern Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor 
Damage to escape platform for the life rafts, lifeguard guide wires and bunkering 
hoses. 
70 2000 HSE November Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Supply Minor Damage to fire water main. Mitigation measures in place. 
71 2000 MAIB Unspecified - Unspecified Jack-up Unspecified Minor   
72 2000 WREC January - Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
73 2000 WREC January - Unspecified Jack-up Unspecified Unspecified   
74 2000 WREC July - Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
75 2000 WREC July - Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
76 2000 WREC December - Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
77 2001 HSE February - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling  Supply  Unspecified   
78 2001 HSE May - Unspecified Semi-Sub Drilling  Stand-by Unspecified   
79 2001 HSE October Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Stand-by None No obvious damage. 
80 2001 HSE March - Unspecified Jack-up Stand-by Minor Two score marks and a small indentation in leg. 
81 2001 HSE June Central Unspecified Fixed Steel Diver Support  Minor Paint removed. 
82 2001 HSE July Southern Unspecified Fixed Steel Stand-by Minor Superficial damage of the platform leg. 
83 2001 HSE May - John Shaw Semi-Sub Stand-by Unspecified 
"TOISA PLOVER" STDBY vessel was checking the John Shaw’s navigation lights 
after completing the inspection it  turned back on a course of 210 degrees the master 
reported that he forgot to de-clutch one of his engines when he turned on his new 
course (while the vessel was checking the lights both engines were clutched in).  He 
went to the chart table to do some correspondence, the vessel subsequently struck the 
rig on the STBD AFT Diagonal Brace and Column.  No injuries reported. Weather - 
Fine & Dry.  Wind 18-22 kits.  DIR 265 degrees.  Seas 2 - 2.5m.  Pitch 0.4 - 1.0 
degrees (Full APM).  Roll 1.4 - 3.2 degrees.  Heave 0.4 - 1.0 m. 
84 2001 HSE June Northern Captain WPP Jacket  Inspection Vessel Minor 
Minor contact (scuff) by another inspection vessel (DP Eagle) in the field at the time.   
Paint removed from one of the cross members on the jacket (steel) structure.  Some 
damage to instruments on the vessel.  Damage to the ROV launch structure on the 
side of the vessel.  The current status is the vessel has been stood off and sent off to 
Peterhead Harbour to meet an Investigation Team.  Our installation was inspected by 
our stand by vessel.  Photographs and witness statement have been taken.    We will 
complete the investigation and let the HSE know the outcome. 
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85 2001 HSE July Southern Viking CD Fixed steel Stand-by Minor 
The Field Standby Vessel 'Rassay' struck the NUI Viking CD South West Leg. The 
installation was unmanned Rassay's reports no injuries to vessel's crew. Superficial 
damage of the platform leg reported. Vessel reported damage to focsle. The incident is 
now under further investigation by both Conoco UK Ltd & the vessel's owners BUE. 
86 2001 HSE October Southern 
Murdoch 
44/22A-MD 
Fixed Steel Supply None 
Vessel collision occurred during unloading operations.  The Sea state at the time was 
1 metre, wind 314 degrees at 14 knots.  The Marine Vessel blue lona & Murdoch MC 
platform were engaged in cargo handling operations.  The Lona was slowly moving 
astern and hit the platform.  No obvious damage could be seen from the platform to 
either the structure or vessel.  The Structure will be inspected by a specialist  team.  
The Vessel returned to Great Yarmouth Base 
87 2001 WREC January - Ekofisk Fixed Steel Unspecified Unspecified   
88 2001 WREC March - P12C  Fixed Steel Unspecified Unspecified   
89 2002 WOAD December - STENA DEE Semi-Sub Stand-by None 
A vessel crashed into the semi while it was drilling some 140 miles SE of Aberdeen 
(UK). The operators did however not report the event to the emergency services. 
Neither the coastguard nor the police knew about the event before being noticed by 
the press the following day. The accident occurred at about 0930 hrs when standby 
vessel "Havila Sea" crashed into one of the four legs of the semi slightly damaging the 
leg above the water line. The vessel sustained very minor damage. No one was 
injured. 
90 2002 WOAD May Southern 
ROUGH,47/8
,BD 
Jacket Passing Trawler Significant 
No injuries were reported when 100 non-essential personnel on the accommodation 
platform (in the Rough gas storage field, 80 km off the Yorkshire coast) were 
evacuated to a nearby oil tanker using a Sea King helicopter, after the trawler 
Marbella hit  the southwest leg in foggy conditions. There is a 500 m exclusion zone 
around the installations. A team of engineers remained on board to assess the damage 
to the leg. The Rough site has been closed for annual maintenance since May 2... The 
trawler, which had a crew of 20, was badly holed but made its way to the river 
Humber. The platform structure was gashed above the waterline. A diving support 
vessel will be hired to search for any subsea damages. Investigations concluded that 
the integrity had not been compromised. Tentatively, operations will resume 1 June. 
More information is found in the WOAD archive. 
91 2002 HSE January - 
Ocean 
Guardian 
Semi-Sub Supply Moderate 
The supply vessel 'striking iona' was manoeuvring close to the starboard side of the 
rig in order to work cargo. The vessel's bow struck column C1 above the boat bumper, 
18 feet below the main deck. There is a large dent in the plating and deformation of 
two ring beams but no penetration. The vessel master advised that he inadvertently 
cancelled the yaw  
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92 2002 HSE April - Magellan Jack-Up Tug None 
At approximately 15:35 on the 11 April the global Santa Fe Magellan was moving on 
the Franklin platform with 4 anchors deployed, to tractor tugs on the beams and AHT 
on the bow. Contact was made between a perimeter walkway at the rear of the 
Magellan drill floor and a railing and light below the Franklin weather deck the 
condition at the time were wind 12 Knots from the south east to south east. Seas 0.5 
meters tide flow was south west away from the platform. The rig was moving in from 
standoff location to alongside Franklin platform. A low northerly swell was inducing 
a fluctuating oscillation in the rig structure. Whilst the rig was alongside in position it 
experienced such an oscillation which grew to such an extent the contact was made 
between the two installations. This oscillation mast the true position of the rig and led 
the person in charge of positioning the rig to believe the rig was further off. The GSF 
tow master was person on charge of positioning rig. 
93 2002 HSE April - Sedco 706 Semi-Sub Supply Unspecified 
Off-loading Supply Vessel. Events prior to the incident are as follows: Load lifted 
from Troms Falken deck being landed on 706 pipe deck by deck crew. At this time 
the Troms Falken pulled off further from the stbd side and lifted his fwd 'jib crane' 
and started to move an empty skip just below and aft of his bridge windows. At this 
time he was in a safe position to carry out this operation. As this deck operation was 
taking place on the Troms Falken the 706 stbd crane slewed round from the pipe deck 
ready to take another lift. At this time the Crane Op was instructed to stop and standby 
until deck operations on the Troms Falken, the vessel started to move in closer to the 
rig. The Troms Falken master was instructed that he should start to pull away as he 
was getting closer to the rig. This request was repeated 2 or 3 times but there was no 
response from the vessel master. The Troms Falken continued to come closer to stbd 
fwd 30 ft . column with still no response from him at requests to pull off. The Troms 
Falken's Port Bridge handrails collided with the underside of the stbd fwd 30 ft . 
column overhang (aft). It was only at this point that the vessel responded to repeated 
requests and said he was pulling away from the stbd side of the rig. 
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94 2002 HSE October Northern Alba FSU FSU Supply Minor 
The operation in progress was supply boat operations supply FSU with water and 
diesel oil bunkers. The weather was logged at 06.00 as Wind NNW by 10 knots: sea 
state 2.4m maximum height 4.1m slight cloud with good visibility. Air temp 5.9 C sea 
temp 11.8C Barometer 1012mb. The supply boat vessel Kaubturm was being worked 
by the ALBA FSU and holding position using supply boat engines and thrusters. The 
supply boat started to drift towards FSU and after applying controls to move supply 
boat from FSU no response from thrusters was noticed. The controls were changed 
over to the supply boats fwd control and again no response noted. The supply boat 
then drifted into FSU causing damage to stbd side hull plating but no actual 
penetration of the ballast tank. The supply boat No2 thruster was regained. The 
bunkering hoses were disconnected and the supply boat exited the 500m zone at 9.54. 
At 10.00 hrs the supply boat began testing of equipment to determine actions to be 
taken. No 2 Thruster taken out of service until control systems / thruster can be 
checked at next port of call. This being Aberdeen. 
95 2002 MAIB Unspecified Northern Brent D Fixed Steel Unspecified Minor   
96 2002 WREC February - 
Kingsholme1
2  buoy  
Buoy Unspecified Unspecified   
97 2002 WREC March - 
 SB 
STIRLING 
ESK 
Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
98 2002 WREC July - 
SC 
ABERDEEN 
Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
99 2003 WOAD November Northern 
EIDER 
211/16A 
Jacket Supply None 
Supply Highland Eagle made very minor contact with leg of production platform 
Eider An in lat 61 21N, long 01 10E. Highland Eagle is checking to see if it  has 
sustained any damage, while the production platform has only very minor damage to 
an escape ladder on the leg which was contacted. (Lloyds Casualty Week) No more 
information available. 
100 2003 HSE February - 
Maersk 
Enhancer 
Jack-Up Anchor Handler None 
While connecting the tow wire from the Maersk Trinity port off corner of the rig the 
anchor handling vessel collided with the rig at least twice. The rig suffered 
indentation of hull side and bottom plating and damaged paintwork. Watertight 
integrity of the rig was not compromised. The Maersk Trinity sustained a hole in the 
stern roller and damage to strong back. 
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101 2003 HSE May Northern Forties Alpha Fixed Steel Stand-by Minor 
Investigation team: - Mike McHale - HSEC, Richard Humphage - HSEA, Colin Bryce 
- Safety Representative.  Incident Description: - Standby vessel BUE Canna had been 
on close standby since 08.17hrs for abseilers working on the flare tower.  At approx. 
15.15hrs The CCR received a phone call from a Woodgroup employee reporting that 
the standby vessel had just collided with the platform.  At the same time the skipper of 
the BUE Canna called the CCR to report that he had collided with the platform and 
was pulling away to inspect his damage.  The skipper of the boat made contact with 
the CCR several minutes later, saying that he had sustained damage to the top of his 
mast with nav lights hanging down and damage to the minicom aerial.  Immediate 
Actions:  At approx 15.22, the BUE Canna was instructed by the OIM to move out of 
the platform 500 mtr zone.  OIM, OTL and HSEC attended SE corner Level 1 to 
discuss what happened with witnesses.  After examination on the 66ft level, marks on 
a fire main discharge pipe below the 66ft level were observed.  Paint had been 
scrapped.  No other damage was observed.  The area was inspected by the Offshore 
Inspection Engineer who confirmed that paint had been scraped from the line and no 
other damage has been sustained.  It seems that the vessel was passing under the 
platform in NE direction and the radio mast of the vessel had come into contact with 
the installations pipe work and the vessel had sustained minor damage. LOGCO were 
informed by FA CCR.  At the time of the collision, the wind was at 20 knots at 
direction of 200 deg, sea state 1 mtr sig wave and 4 mtr max wave.  Investigation: - 
The platform was advised that the vessel was to be relieved 24-5-03, 07.00hrs without 
re-entering the 500m zone.  It  returned to Montrose Port where a marine investigation 
was initiated, led by an Apache North Sea Ltd representative.  For further details of 
the investigation, please contact Richard Abbott, Apache Logistics Manager, Tel:  
01224 756400. 
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102 2003 HSE October Southern 
Ravenspurn 
North 
Fixed Concrete Supply Minor 
At 0945 Hrs 24/10.2003 the Putford Aries MRV was undergoing routine marine 
operations within the 500m zone. It was to carry out back load and bunkering 
operations. On moving astern to come within reach of the care crane the captain had 
difficulty in stopping the vessel from going astern. The captain used the vessels other 
engine/thrusters to manoeuvre away from the platform. However the vessel glanced 
the caisson, which contains the incoming risers from ST2, ST3 and JN. These lines 
have been shut in till the cassion can be proved sound. The vessel was instructed to 
leave the500m zone of the platform.  A visual inspection was carried out on the vessel 
and the caisson. Damage appears to be superficial i.e. seaweed deposited on the vessel 
and 2 orange paint scuffs on the caisson. No indentation that can be seen. A high level 
investigation teram (Headed by an external performance unit leader) was sent to the 
platform on the 25/10/2003 to carry out the investigation. This was followed up on the 
same day with a visit  to Great Yarmouth Quay to meet with the vessel. HSE duty man 
has been informed. 
103 2003 HSE December Southern 
Noble Julie 
Robertson 
Jack-Up Supply Unspecified 
The Eider Alpha has been struck by the supply vessel the Island Eagle.  The platform 
is at muster at the moment.  Standboat arriving to inspect for any possible structural 
damage. 
104 2003 WREC June - Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
105 2004 HSE March - C Prospect  Unspecified Supply Minor 
Weather conditions were wind 170 x 25 - 30 knots. Sea 170 x 2.5m 8sec period. Rig 
Operation - routine drilling. The supply vessel Far Service was transferring bulk barite 
and deck cargo to the rig. Far Service was port side to the rigs port side with his bow 
facing aft. At 05:00 the Service struck the rig on PC2. The Far Service struck the rig 
again between the centre column PC2 and aft column PC3. Far Service pulled off 
parting bartie hose. No personnel injured on either the rig of the Far Service. 
Watertight integrity of both vessels intact. Minor deck plating damage to rig and 
minor bend to diverter line. Far Service damage broken portside bridge wing window. 
Minor damage to bridge wing superstructure and bent mast.  No Environmental 
incident occurred due to parting of dry bulk hose. Incident cause: Far Service stbd 
main engine cut out due to coupling failure on lube oil pump causing supply vessel to 
slew into rig. For Further details please contact M Edwards OIM GSF Arctic III 
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106 2004 HSE March Liverpool Bay 
Douglas 
Complex 
Jack-Up ISP Unspecified 
The ISP was in close approach to the East face of the Douglas Wellhead platform in 
preparation for a well intervention programme.  Environmental conditions at the time 
were wind direction 270degs, Force 3 & 4, wave height 0.5metres, Visibility 10 miles. 
Dry.  2 Douglas scaffolders were dismantling an overboard scaffold that had been 
constricted to remove the TEMSC PROD in advance of the ISP coming alongside the 
East Face of DW.  One scaffolder was working overside dismantling the scaffold, the 
second scaffolder has inboard of the platform handrail (acting as standby man and 
assisting with material removal).  Unknown to the scaffolders the ISP had commenced 
its approach to locate on the East Face.  As the ISP approached its final location, the 
standby scaffolder recognised the risk, reached overside and pulled his colleague 
inboard just as the ISP came in to contact with the scaffold structure.  Contact was 
made between the temporary outboard scaffold and the ISP after crane A frame.  The 
operation was stopped land made safe. Incident investigation launched. 
107 2004 HSE August Southern 
West Sole 
Alpha 
Platform 
Fixed Steel Stand-by None 
Operation - Cargo operations onto standby boat.  Sea state - 1.5 to 2M, wind 15 - 20 
knots.  No substances involved.  Standby Boat - Putford Provider.  13.21 Vessel 
enters 500m zone.  13.25 Vessel set up 50 metres off platform.  13.40 Vessel settled 
alongside platform, portside to commence work.  13/43 First lift landed on vessel.  
13.43 - 13.55 Vessel moved ** heading and settles 10m off platform.  Now lying 
stern on to platform for comfort and to give water.  13.58 / 13.59 APPROX Impact 
with protruding structure (bumper) on leg. 14.10 OIM stops job.  Crane driver called 
down from crane by OIM. 
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108 2004 HSE October Central 
Forties 
Charlie 
Fixed Steel Supply Minor 
The above incident occurred on 7th October 2004 at approx 1400 hours. At the time 
Charlie was in normal production mode. The Highland Champion was working 
alongside the North Face of the platform taking backload of material. The platform 
CRT was unaware of a collision until at 1442 the Highland Champion advised him 
that it  was taking on water into its steering compartment and that it  may have 
impacted the platform at  around 1400. Initial investigation of the platform structure 
revelled that a timber fender on the diagonal brace between the 44ft level of the NW 
leg and the 17ft level of the north central vertical member had been badly splintered 
and steelwork fixing the fender to the brace severely deformed. It was observed that 
the Highland Champion had a gash in the stem towards the port quarter at 
approximate waterline level (it may have been below waterline level initially but it  is 
understood that after the impact, the vessel had been deballasted to lift the gash above 
water). A written statement was obtained from the Master of the Highland Champion 
confirming that no failure of control or propulsion system had taken place and that all 
navigation systems and aids to manoeuvring were functional. On this basis further 
work in the field was permitted. A detailed visual inspection has been completed by 
means of rope access and initial assessment is that no damage has been sustained by 
the diagonal member itself or other than a graze to the surface. The report has been 
submitted for further review by structural specialist. An onsite operational risk 
assessment has been carried out of potentially increased risk to the integrity of this 
member from any further impact. 
109 2005 HSE March - 
GSF Galaxy 
III 
Jack-Up Supply None 
At approximately 1950hrs on 27/3/5 the Bourbon Topaz commenced pumping diesel 
oil on the stbd side of the rig.  Because of the direction of the water the boat had its 
port side to the rig and at approximately 2025hrs the vessel lost its heading and moved 
stern first  into the Galaxy IIIs stbd leg braces.  Weather - Fine, Dry night, Wind Speed 
- 25 Kts direction 100degs seas - 2 mtrs 100 degs, swell - 3 mtrs 95 degs.  Pumping 
was stopped, the hose recovered from the vessel without any spillage and it  was sent 
by std by outside the 500mtrs whilst the damage to the leg was assessed. 
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110 2005 HSE May Central Buchan A Semi-Sub Supply None 
The supply vessel "Grampian Explorer" had entered our 500 metre zone, after having 
carried out her manoeuvrability/control checks and had just come alongside. The 
vessel was in a steady position when she lost transverse thrust. This resulted in her 
contacting 'B' & 'C' column, before she was able to re-start her thrusters and pull clear 
of the platform. She immediately informed the platform Marine Control of the 
contact. Initial indications are that platform damage is limited to a walkway handrail 
on 'C' column and a grating platform just above sea level on 'B' column. Damage has 
also been sustained to the Grampian Explorer to handrails and superstructure, at and 
just below her bridge. The reason for the failure of her thrusters cannot be determined 
at this time.  Further investigations will need to be carried out and the vessel is 
returning to Peterhead for that purpose.  The weather at the time of this incident was 
calm; wind dir. 267 degrees, speed 16/17 knots; sea height 1.1 / 1.7 metres; wave 
period 4.7 secs.  The platform intend to conduct an internal structural inspection of the 
adjacent column tanks a.s.a.p.      16/05/05 - Notifier requested part b info be amended 
and also part G. 
111 2005 HSE May Central Forties Alpha Fixed Steel Supply None 
Supply vessel (Toisa Intrepid) struck the underside of NW corner at the 70 degree 
level extended deck of platform at midnight. The vessel sustained damage to its radar/ 
comms dome. There was no damage to the platform. Our marine and logistics 
coordinator will be interviewing the vessel master when he is next in port with the 
contracting company management. Due to the damage sustained to the vessel 
communications are limited. It is not thought there was any failure of equipment and 
the vessel was still able to hold its position and supply platforms throughout the field. 
The HSE manager, Logistics manager and OIM's have been informed of the incident 
and they have agreed to let the vessel remain working in the Forties field whilst the 
investigation is ongoing. Weather at the time- Weather from log in CCR wind 18. Sea 
1.9- 3.5. Bearing 156. Vis lo. 
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112 2005 HSE July Northern Brent A Fixed Steel Supply None 
24/07/05 at around 13h50. Weather conditions: Seastate 2.5 m, wind direction 0 deg, 
strength 26 knots at 50 m level. The supply vessel Skandi Barra had been worked on 
the East Side (weatherside) of the platform for about 20mn when she went astern and 
made contact with the steel structure off the South Eastern Leg of the platform. The 
vessel's bridge came under the crane pedestal and her antenna made contact with the 
underside of the pedestal. As soon as they noticed the supply vessel coming 
abnormally close to the platform the crane driver and deck foreman alerted the PSS to 
the situation. The PSS immediately changed the platform status to GPA, setting off a 
platform muster. All personnel were stood down after a full muster and the vessel 
having been able to pull off to a zone of safety.  The impact had been of slight 
strength, but perceptible. A full report has been requested form the vessel Master. The 
damage on the platform structure was investigated.  No visible damage at the crane 
pedestal could be found. At the 21" level off the south eastern Leg of the platform, a 
jump off platform and stairway were found kinked, indicating a point of contact with 
the platform structure. No visible damage could be observed on the platform main 
structure. The vessel bounced off the jump off platform which absorbed the shock. 
Two impacts could be observed on the stern of the Skandi Barra well above the sea 
level, the lower one likely to be punctured. The vessel also reported a kinked antenna. 
The platform requested the sdby boat to take pictures of the impacts on bot h the 
supply vessel and the platform. 
113 2005 HSE August Central Forties Delta Fixed Steel Supply Minor 
At 02:45hrs on Thursday 25th August 2005 the supply vessel Northern River was 
sitting on the NW corner of the Forties Delta Platform, prior to carrying out backload 
operations.  There was a moderate breeze with good visibility with a moderate sea 
state, with a current between 0.3 knots.  The distance from the vessel to the platform 
reduced to 7-8 meters and, during manoeuvring operations to increase this distance, 
the vessel hit  the NW leg fender, causing damage to the wooden fender on the leg of 
the installation and also damage to the vessel.  The cause of this incident may be 
attributed to the rudder not being to midships, when the poscon was engaged. 
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114 2005 HSE October Central Buchan A Semi-Sub Supply Minor 
The supply vessel Sea Links had entered our 500m zone, after having carried out the 
manoeuvrability/control checks.  Whilst attempting to move the stern to come along 
side, witness accounts says "he seemed to be approaching rather quickly and at an 
angle close to the platform".  The Sea Links contacted a platform oblique bracing (B-
2) and then a she thrust forward she contacted Sea Column, before moving clear.  
Both impacts were above the water line.  The visual internal inspection of platform 
structures has revealed some structural distortion.  There appears to be no loss of 
water tight integrity/impact stability.  The seal links has sustained minor paintwork 
scratches, a slight indentation starboard side, between mid-ships and stern and she has 
lost a fender.  There were no injuries to any personnel on platform, or vessel, nor was 
anyone known to be at risk at any time.  The weather at the time of this incident was, 
wind direction 250 degrees, speed 18/24 knots, sea height 1.7 - 2.6 m, wave period 5 
seconds.  Although still dark, visibility was clear.  Further investigations will need to 
be carried out when the vessel returns to Aberdeen. 
115 2005 HSE November West of Shetland 
Schiehallion 
FPSO 
FPSO Tug Moderate 
During connection operations with the tug "Braveheart”. The towing chain was being 
passed up to the stern of the Schiehllion prior to heading control duties. During this 
operation the stern of the tug made contact with the stern of the FPSO. The interior of 
the Schiehllion aft peak ballast tank was inspected and it  was identified that damage 
had been sustained to the steelwork and the internal coating of the tank bulkhead.    
29/11/05 - Notifier requested amendments to part g. 
116 2006 HSE August Liverpool Bay Douglas DW Fixed Steel Support  None 
The Clwyd Supporter Vessel was involved in deck cargo handling operations 
alongside the Douglas Deck (South Side). The vessel drifted east, the cargo was lifted 
clear of the Clwyd Supporter deck. As the vessel attempted to leave station the fan tail 
of the funnel impacted on a steel protrusion on the DD cellar deck (protrusion was the 
remnants of a sea fastening). No impact to structure or jacket. Only slight markings on 
steel work. Minor damage to fan tail of vessel funnel. Immediately actions taken: 1) 
Vessel pulled away to safe location 2) Platform CCR notified and Douglas OIM 
notified. 3) Platform structure checked for damage - no faults found (paint from vessel 
funnel deposited on vessel structure). 4) Vessel returned to dock - marine 
investigation ongoing. Weather: Calm and clear Sea state: 0.6 M sig, wave height 
(period 7 seconds) Wind direction: North speed : 15 knots Sea direction: North 
Westerly 
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117 2006 HSE September Central 
Shearwater 
WHP 
Fixed Steel Other Moderate 
Whilst carrying out jacking up manoeuvres, the GSF Magellan made contact with the 
NW leg on the Shearwater Wellhead jacket.  Approximate weather conditions: 
Southerly 15 knot winds.  Wave height < 1m.  The leg that was contacted has not been 
inspected by Shearwater personnel but the indications from the GSF Magellan staff is 
that there is minor damage to the Shearwater Wellhead jacket NW leg paint work and 
minor damage to secondary structural steel on the starboard side of GSF Magellan 
stern.  Immediate corrective actions are: Minimum distance between the two 
installations set at 2 ft ., A watchman on station at all t imes on the GSF Magellan. 
118 2006 HSE September Southern 
Scroby Sands  
Wind Farm 
Wind Turbine Other Unspecified 
A programme of pro-active generator replacement is currently being undertaken at 
Scroby Sands Offshore Wind Farm. At approximately 2100 on 29/09/2006 the A2 
Sea? Sea Energy? Vessel approached Wind Turbine T14 where the blade rotated and 
the tip end of the blade struck the vessel leg. Nobody was hurt during the incident and 
an internal report has been compiled following a formal investigation.    ICC Note - 
"This report has missing data and has been completed to the best endeavour of the 
ICC". Unable to contact Notifier to ascertain B4. Saved as "Not Known" and 
"Reportable" as best judgement. 
119 2006 HSE October Central Buzzard Fixed Steel Supply None 
Whilst working supply vessel Northern Supporter contact was made between the 
vessel and the installation platform leg. 
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120 2006 HSE October Central 
Enquest 
Producer 
FPSO Stand-by None 
We had a requirement for an essential transfer of a crew member from the standby 
vessel for compassionate reasons. This involved the use of a frog which is a personnel 
transfer capsule. This required the Viking T iree (standby vessel) to come stern first 
towards the FPSO on our starboard side under the reach of our starboard crane which 
has a 25 metre jib line. The first approach by the vessel failed due to being unable to 
hold position. The second approach took place after the vessel had re-aligned itself. 
On the second approach we lowered the capsule to the aft deck of the standby vessel. 
The capsule was then to be disconnected from our crane line. During this time the 
vessel continued to move stern first towards the FPSO making minor contact with our 
hull in the location of number 6 starboard water ballast tank. The weather conditions 
recorded on the standby vessel at 11:27 were wind 210 degrees by 14 knots, 1.5 
metres confused swell. The conditions recorded on FPSO at approximately 11:15 
were maximum roll over the previous 10 minutes, 2.2 degrees port and 2.5 degrees 
starboard. The maximum pitch was 0.8 degrees up and 0.2 degrees down. The 
maximum heave was 2.5 metres. The compassionate was then strapped into the frog 
and the standby vessel approached again. The crane pendant was re-connected and the 
frog was hoisted off the vessel onto FPSO without incident. 
121 2006 HSE November - Ensco 92 Jack-Up Supply Unspecified 
Supply vessel 'Havila Fame' working Port side of Installation.  At 12:19 hours the 
vessel had a momentary loss of station keeping and made contact with cord 'B' on the 
installations forward leg.  Vessel asked to stand off outside the 500mtr zone.  Damage 
assessment revealed some paint marks on cord 'B' forward leg. No deformation of leg 
teeth or structural damage. 
122 2006 HSE December Central ETAP CPF Fixed Steel Supply Minor 
At 1500hrs on Friday 8th December the supply vessel Caledonian Victory had been 
called in to discharge cargo at the PDR platform. The weather conditions at the time 
were recorded as 270 degrees at 18 - 22 knots, wave height was 2 -2.5 metres. The 
vessel approached the platform from a North Westerly direction, however, at some 
point during the positioning stage of the operation the master of the vessel 
momentarily lost control and came into contact with the platform riser protection 
frame. An investigation has been initiated to determine the mode of failure. 
123 2006 WREC October - Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
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124 2007 HSE March Central 
FPSO 
Maersk 
Curlew 
FPSO Tug None 
The tug Magnus was manoeuvring close to the stern at the curlew having connected to 
tow line. One controllable pitch propeller failed in the stern position causing the tug to 
move towards FPSO. The captain stopped the engine for the failed propeller. 
Unfortunately the Chief officer also stopped an engine but the wrong one. This left the 
tug with no power and it  collided with the FPSO. The tug suffered slight damage to 
the bulwark but there was no damage to the FPSO and no injury. The engine was 
restarted and the tug moved clear of the FPSO. 
125 2007 HSE June Southern Sea fox 4  Jack-Up Supply Minor 
The supply vessel 'power express' entered the 500 metre zone of the Leman Bravo and 
Sea Fox4 (combined operations). Whilst positioning alongside the SF4 leg Number 2 
and one of the anchors secured on the side of the SF4 the vessel came in contact with 
the SF4 Leg Number 2 and one of the anchors secured on the side of the SF4. Minor 
damage to both the SF4 and Power Express. Weather - wind 076 degrees 9 knots, 
wave heights 0.5 metres, visibility mist approx 800 metres. 
126 2007 HSE June Central 
Rowan 
Gorilla VII 
Jack-Up Unspecified None 
On 16th June 2007 The Northern Conroyd was manoeuvring in on the portside of the 
RG7 to take on an anchor for running and setting of same.  Whilst manoeuvring back 
towards the rig Northern Conroyd made contact with the rig hull causing an 
indentation along the turn of the hull approx 8 ft long.  No injuries to any personnel 
on board the RG7 or The Northern Conroyd.  After inspection of the hull on the RG7 
had been completed, frames F17 & F18 had been bent approx 4" - 6" and 8 ft  long 
turn in the section of the hull.  No cracks or welds in the steel were observed.  The 
pre-load tank 10T was also inspected and no cracks were observed.  The RG7 was 
jacked down to an 8 ft  draught and checked for water tight integrity.  The integrity of 
the RG7 was in good order, The Northern Conroyd had slight damage.     No quadrant 
or block as vessel was moving 
127 2007 HSE July - Sedco 704 Semi-Sub Supply None 
Supply Vessel FD Invincible was discharging Pot water and fuel on the Starboard side 
when supply vessel fire alarm activated, this was quickly identified as a false alarm. 
Fuel and pot water transfers were stopped. Master arrived on bridge to be informed by 
the Chief Officer that the Joystick power supply had failed. At this point the 4 tunnel 
thrusters had 50% Port thrust i.e. pushing the vessel towards the rig. FD Invincible aft 
Port fender came in contact with starboard aft 18ft column before control could be 
regained by the Master. Hoses were recovered and vessel exited 500 metre zone. No 
damage to either vessel evident 
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128 2007 HSE July Central 
Rowan 
Gorilla VI 
Jack-Up Supply None 
M/V Siem Carrier was along the port side of the rig.  They were positioned with their 
port side to the rig and had just finished transferring base oil to the rig.  The port bow 
of the boat swung around into the port leg of the rig coming in contact with I Rack.  
The captain pulled the bow away from the leg, the base oil transfer hose was removed 
and the boat pulled outside the 500 meter zone to do damage assessment and make 
phone contacts. According to captain jan stromme the cause of the contact with the rig 
was caused by the loss of the boats fixed heading system (dropped out).  He said that 
he should have gotten an alarm to let him know this, but alarm did not work.  He 
switched over to manual to pull the boat away from the leg.  The boat was then 
released to go into town to perform a complete investigation.  Upon inspection, there 
is no apparent damage to the leg of the rig.  The captain of the boat reported damage 
to the port side of the vessel under the bridge (minimal damage).    ICC Note - "This 
report has missing data and has been completed to the best endeavour of the ICC." 
Unable to contact notifier to obtain B4 information. Saved as "Not Known" and 
"Reportable" saved as best of judgement. 
129 2007 HSE July - GSF Galaxy Jack-Up Supply Minor 
The supply vessel Maersk Fetcher was approaching GSF Galaxy 1, from the North to 
commence bulk hose operations.  As the vessel approached the installation, the duty 
officer changed over from wheelhouse forward control to aft control initially set up in 
manual joystick mode.  First attempt to switch 'auto-heading mode' on vessel failed, 
as the buttons had not been properly pressed down.  The bow of the Maersk Fetcher 
drifted fast towards the rig.  Vessel controls were switched back to manual and full 
bow thrust away from the rig was given.  The bow of the Maersk Fetcher drifted 
under the rig and there was contact between the foremast of the vessel and he hull of 
the GSF Galaxy.  1.  This resulted in damage to the foremast and superficial damage 
to the hull.  The weather conditions at the time of the incident - wind - WSW 15 - 20 
Kts, Sea state moderate. 
130 2007 HSE July - 
GSF 
Labrador 
Jack-Up Supply None 
At 1830 the supply vessel boulder had just commenced offloading wireline VSP 
equipment on the starboard side of the rig. Weather, light airs, fair current 160 
degrees, 1.4knots rig heading 309 degrees. Due to causes unknown at this time the 
boulder began to bodily move to port and collided twice with the bow leg on the 
forward starboard chord. The vessel then whilst moving FWD got its Aft mast 
entangled with the towing bridle. The rig went to emergency stations and mustered all 
personnel. HMCG informed, no personnel injured.     B5 actual response: Collision 
with GSF Labrador’s bow leg stbd forward chord by supply vessel 
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131 2007 HSE August Southern 
Viking ED 
NUI 
Fixed Steel 
Passing Merchant 
Container 
Significant 
On the 4 August 2007 at approx. 18:00, the MV JORK (IMO-No-8500082) collided 
with the Normally Unattended Installation Viking Echo Delta.  Viking Echo Delta 
was unmanned at the time of the collision and suffered damage to the Echo Delta 
Riser and clamping arrangements.  Production from the Viking Echo Delta platform 
was stopped immediately and there was no release of produced hydrocarbon.  
Following the collision MV JORK anchored approx one kilometre from Viking Echo 
Delta and subsequently sank at 08:00, 5 August 2007.  All POB from MV JORK were 
recovered prior to the vessel sinking.  Incident reported to HSE by telephone at 19:40, 
4 August 2007, and followed up by further verbal contact at 21:15, 4 August 2007 
(Mr Paul Adamson).  OIR13 will be submitted once full supporting information 
available. 
132 2007 HSE October southern Leman Alpha Fixed Steel Other Minor 
The Seafox 4 accommodation vessel is presently interfaced to the Leman Alpha 
platform for shutdown activities. During cargo operations by supply vessel, the 
Northern Mariner alongside the Seafox 4, the vessel lost station and contacted the 
starboard aft (No.2) leg of the SF4 and the NW leg of the AK jacket. Initial (visual) 
assessment of damage to the platform suggests that it  is primarily coating damage 
though the stub that supported the boat fender (removed) is also bent. The SF4 leg 
looks OK but has paint marks from the vessel. The vessel struck the AK with his stern 
and 'glanced' the SF4 with his port side. He has reported that he has one person with a 
minor eye injury, following a fall, as a result of the contact. 
133 2007 HSE November Southern Sea fox 4  Semi-Sub Other Minor 
The Seafox 4 accommodation vessel is presently interfaced to the Leman Alpha 
platform for shutdown activities. During cargo operations by supply vessel, the 
Northern Mariner alongside the Seafox 4, the vessel lost station and contacted the 
starboard aft (No.2) leg of the SF4 and the NW leg of the AK jacket. Initial (visual) 
assessment of damage to the platform suggests that it  is primarily coating damage 
though the stub that supported the boat fender (removed) is also bent. The SF4 leg 
looks OK but has paint marks from the vessel. The vessel struck the AK with his stern 
and 'glanced' the SF4 with his port side. He has reported that he has one person with a 
minor eye injury, following a fall, as a result of the contact.  
 
(N.B. Comment is duplicated from previous incident as the vessel struck both the 
jacket and the semi-sub installations) 
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134 2007 HSE December Northern 
BP Harding 
Platform 
Fixed Steel Support  Moderate 
Normal operation was underway. Weather was good with a 14 knot Westerly and a 
2.5m sign wave and > 10k visibility. The Regional support Vessel the Caledonian 
Victory was moving away to the West of the Harding platform after discharging 
cargo. At a distance of approx 550 metres the vessel lost all power. The weather was 
such that the drifting vessel returned to the Harding platform and impacted the West 
and North legs. The platform went to muster and shutdown prior to the impact. No 
one was injured in either the vessel or on the platform. 
135 2007 WREC July - 
TSB 
BOULDER 
Unspecified Unspecified Unspecified   
136 2008 HSE May Southern 
Noble Julie 
Robertson 
Jack-Up Other Unspecified 
After sailing number 2 lifeboat as part of the yearly preventative maintenance 
programme and ABS Class Rules, the boat was being manoeuvred into position to 
hook up to the davit winch wires in order to recover it to the rig.  Difficulty was 
encountered engaging the second hook, so the first hook was disengaged in order to 
make a second attempt.  At this point the coxswain lost control of the helm and the 
boat sailed forward, striking the rig's bow leg.  The lifeboat was subsequently 
successfully recovered to the rig and surveyed for damage, which was found to be 
minimal and the boat was still fit  for purpose. Procedures have been amended to 
ensure only 'fully' experienced coxswains sail the lifeboats during recovery 
operations. 
137 2008 HSE September Northern 
Goldeneye 
Platform  
Fixed Steel Stand-by Minor 
This incident has been verbally communicated to Gus Findlay.  At approximately 
18:55 hours on 02nd September 2008, the Goldeneye platform standby vessel 
Grampian Guardian came into contact with the south west leg structure of the 
Goldeneye platform.   All personnel on both the platform and the standby vessel were 
safely accounted for. Goldeneye platform production was not in place at the time due 
to planned shutdown.   Further meetings have since taken place with several 
Technical authority personnel resulting in approval to proceed for a production restart.   
Damage believed to be superficial. Photographs available for inspection. 
138 2008 HSE September - 
Transocean 
Rather 
Semi-Sub Supply Minor 
At 07:15 hrs supply vessel Maersk Fetcher had completed bulk loading and in process 
of returning hoses to the rig when he lost power for a few seconds to his thruster 
controls. The swell brought his bridge superstructure into contact with the overhang of 
the winch deck starboard forward causing some damage to the walkway and 
navigation running lights enclosure. The vessel suffered damage to internet antenna 
and telex antenna on his mast. No equipment fell at sea. The vessel quickly recovered 
and moved clear of the rig for evaluation. 
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139 2008 HSE October Central ENSCO 100 Jack-Up Stand-by Minor 
The Putford Viking was on location off the port side of the rig.  The Putford Viking 
had been worked by the Murdoch platform, with no apparent reason there was a loss 
of control of the vessel and it veered towards the ENSCO 100 bow leg. The Master of 
the vessel made adjustments to the controls, without the desired effect. This resulted 
in the vessel contacting the bow leg of the ENSCO 100. Substantial damage was 
incurred to the Putford Viking. 
140 2008 HSE October - Unknown Unspecified Supply Unspecified 
Description of event: Weather during incident: S?ly winds 20 knots, sea state Approx. 
2,5 m significant. A minor impact with the supply vessel (Greatship Dipti) occurred 
during a heading change. The starboard side of the FPSO at water ballast tank no 4, 
contacted the supply boat on her port quarter (aft) gunwale and plate below. This 
caused minor damage to the supply vessel in these positions. In order to assess the 
FPSO damage, WBT 4 stb was emptied and checked for extent of damage: four 
positions identified with various indents, the largest indent being about 75 mm.  This 
area needs to be further checked with MPI after the scaffolding is built . A report will 
be made during the night and forwarded to the engineering department for review and 
recommendations. Note: No cracks observed during visual inspection. Causes: 
Improper communication and checks prior to heading change.  Ballast operator 
believed that the supply vessel was still outside the 500 m zone when he initiated the 
heading change. Supply vessel had been called in by the work force leader on deck. 
This action had not been noted by the ballast operator and a check of the location of 
the supply boat was not performed before the ballast operator commenced the heading 
change. Actions taken to prevent reoccurrence Instructed the ballast operator(s) to do 
a visual check on both sides prior to any heading change. Improve the communication 
between all parties involved in this type of operation. Investigation initiated. Awaiting 
report.    ICC Note - "This report has missing data and has been completed to the best 
endeavour of the ICC." Unable to contact notifier to obtain B3, B4 and B5 
information. Saved as "Not Known" and "Reportable" saved as best of judgement. 
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141 2008 HSE November Southern 
Stamford 
Well 
Fixed Steel Support  None 
The following info comes from the incident report provided by the Guard Vessel 
"Content". At 1245 contact with NG 5 towing 270░ at estimated 3.4 knots, vessel was 
clear of pipeline and therefore requested to continue on course  until west of Stamford 
well. NG5 Skipper agreed but then altered course to approx 300░. Vessel was warned 
that he was on a heading which would cross the vulnerable pipeline and precise 
coordinates were issued.  Instruction given to vessel turn away from pipe.  At approx 
1400 vessel NG5 stopped in position 53░48.35N 002░49.97E. When contacted he 
said he thought he had snagged the wellhead. Guard vessel then reported incident to 
standby vessel Britannia Conquest. At 2100hrs NG5  reported that he had slipped her 
gear because weather was poor 
142 2008 HSE November - Sedco 704 Semi-Sub Supply Minor 
The UP Esmeralda, supply vessel, was alongside the rig discharging cargo. It  was 
observed that the vessel was getting closer to the rig and he was asked on several 
occasions to move away from the rig. He failed to do this and made contact with the 
Stbd forward 18' column. The vessel made a minor dent on the column, the column 
was not breached. The vessel also suffered minor damage. It has been ascertained that 
the vessels Joystick system had failed allowing him to drift onto the rig. 
143 2008 HSE November Southern 
Noble Julie 
Robertson 
Jack-Up Supply None 
While performing back load operations from the rig, the supply vessel Greatship 
Dwanhi was located on the starboard side.  Due to the positioning of the cargo that 
was being handled, the vessel was side on to the rig, with 40% power being used on 
his stern and bow thrusters.  At one point this power appeared to be insufficient as the 
vessel drifted in towards the rig, contacting the starboard leg.  The boat immediately 
pulled off and operations stopped to check for damage.  Close inspection of the leg 
and vessel revealed no structural damage to either, just paint marks on the leg where 
the boat had contacted it . 
144 2009 WOAD February Central Ensco 92 Jack-up Supply Minor 
The jack up, with 93 persons on-board, collided with supply vessel “Supply Express” 
45 miles east north-east of Flamborough Head and mustering was initiated. 
Inspections revealed no visible damage to the rig, while vessel suffered hull damage. 
The vessel hit the rig’s aft leg. The vessel was on a break from supplying the rig when 
the incident happened. Some of the waves may have accelerated the speed of the 
vessel towards the rig. There were no injuries and no environmental issues from the 
incident. No further information available. 
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145 2009 WOAD May Northern 
Thistle, 
211/18A, A 
Jacket Supply None 
Tug/supply boat "Maersk Feeder" collided with the platform's cellar deck, only 
causing minimal damage. At the time of the incident the vessel was close in to the 
platform with fresh water hose attached when it  sustained a main engine failure. 
Vessel used thrusters to manoeuvre away from the platform, but brushed the platform 
causing damage to guardrails and an aerial sited on the bridge roof. Within 30 mins 
the vessel drifted away from the platform and managed to establish power from one 
engine. No further information available. 
146 2009 HSE June - Stena Spey Semi-Sub Supply Minor 
The PSV Greatship Dhwani was engaged in deck cargo operations on the Port side of 
the installation, cargo operations where completed on the port side and the PSV was 
asked to make her way to the starboard side for thirty minutes time.  The Barge 
Engineer and Roustabout where engaged in maintenance of the Aft Lifeboats and 
observed the PSV manoeuvring from port side to stbd side of the installation about 
100 metres astern, in a line Fore and Aft between the Aft Lifeboats and the ROV unit.  
At approximately 2220hrs the PSV suddenly started moving rapidly ahead and 
distance was closing on the installation, despite the best efforts of the PSV to 
manoeuvre away from the installation the PSV impacted the Blister on P3 Caisson  
Weather & Environmental Conditions: Wind: Light airs, Sea: 0.5m max swell, Roll & 
Pitch: Negligible, Heave: Nil, Wx: Fine & Clear, Visibility: + 10 nm.  The PSV was 
asked to make her way to a safe area to conduct a damage assessment to ensure safety 
of her own vessel and the ERRV was tasked with assisting in the damage assessment 
of the installation.  A damage assessment team (technical and marine) conducted 
inspections of P3 Caisson and Port Propulsion room and reported no damage, control 
room reported no abnormal soundings, alarms or unexplained trim or list .  The PSV 
informed the installation she had suffered minor damage to the flare of her bow with 
no structural damage evident and all equipment had been tested, no defects.  The 
ERRV Vos T iree FRC inspected the P3 Caisson blister and confirmed the installation 
looks to have suffered minor coating damage with no puncture to the hull, impact 
looks to have been in an area with a stiffener present.   Presently PSV is fully 
operational and her hull integrity is intact. 
147 2009 HSE October West of Shetland 
Schiehallion 
FPSO 
FPSO Merchant Tanker Minor 
Shuttle Tanker "Loch Rannoch" was manoeuvring into position in preparation for an 
off-loading operation.  Shuttle tanker bow impacted oil off-loading reel on stern of 
FPSO.  No injuries, no oil release.  Damage to hose reel and its supporting structure 
currently being assessed. 
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148 2010 HSE March West of Shetland 
FPSO 
Petrojari 
Foinaven 
FPSO Supply Moderate 
Whilst bunkering diesel to the Foinaven FPSO @8:40 1st march, the Havila Fortress 
lost DP position control and drifted into the port aft quarter of the FPSO contacting 
her guard rail against the FPSO. Havila Fortress stopped off-loading diesel at 08:42 & 
the FPSO disconnected the hose at 0845. No diesel entered the sea. The standby 
vessel Grampian Frontier was called in to check for damages on FPSO and reported 
evidence of damage (small paint strip) on the port side of the FPSO. Subsequent 
investigation on board FPSO confirmed some structural damage to the aft void space 
of the FPSO, no crack in the hull. 
149 2010 HSE March Central Ensco 100 Jack-up Supply None 
The vessel Toisa Coral, was approaching the rig in order to take some backload cargo 
and swung into the wind at a distance of approx 200 metres, when according to the 
vessel master, control was lost resulting in contacting the rigs starboard leg, starboard 
leg inspected and no damage was observed.  Vessel making its way to Aberdeen to 
inspect damage. 
150 2010 HSE August - 
Byford 
Dolphin 
Semi-Sub Stand-by None 
While the Standby Vessel the VOS Explorer was alongside the port side of the rig to 
receive a basket that had been back loaded from the port main deck. The boat lost 
power of his main engine, and drifted towards the port fwd pencil column making 
contact with the port PCP's and glancing against the port side pencil column before 
drifting clear fwd of the rig. The VOS Explorer used its remaining thruster to 
manoeuvre clear of the rig. No damage was sustained to the rig or the boat. 
151 2010 HSE October - 
Ocean 
Princess 
Semi-Sub Supply None 
MODU Ocean Princess Well Completion Operations Wind 090░X 18mph Seas 
090░ x 2mts Heave 0.5mt Pitch 0.5░ Roll 0.8░ Dry and Cloudy. The supply vessel, 
FS Aquarius entered the 500mt zone of the Ocean Princess tbd Side  to discharge one 
container, after completing the lift 1156hrs the supply vessel lost power to the aft 
thrusters resulting in the vessel colliding with the Ocean Princess Columns SC3 & 
SC4 resulting in damage to the columns. Inspection of the damaged space showed no 
water ingress. There was do injuries to personnel. 
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152 2010 HSE November - Unspecified Jacket Supply None 
Whilst the supply boat the Putford Protector was positioning itself to work the 
quarters jacket it appeared to move too quickly and extremely close to the AC North 
East leg, possibly touching. The deck hand gave signal of the close proximity to the 
Captain and the boat tried to pull away but caught the NE leg of AC which appeared 
to swing the boat parallel to the jackets. The boat then appeared to have lost control 
and bumped itself down the jackets, AC, AP and then onto AD whereby it  snagged 
the water hose pulling it  away from the platform. This was reported quickly to the 
OIM who took the decision to GA and shutdown the platform. The sea conditions 
were < 10 knots, <1m wave height, wind 065 deg. There is superficial damage to the 
boat railings and scuffed jacket legs. No injuries to boat crew. A further internal 
investigation is to take place 
153 2011 WOAD April Northern 
Magnus,211/
12, 
Production 
Jacket Supply None 
BP’S UK North Sea Magnus platform was shut down for a short period after the 
North Star Shipping vessel Grampian Defender collided with the facility. The UK 
supermajor shut the platform for about 36 hours following the incident, which 
happened on 22 April, it  has emerged. BP said there was very minor damage to the 
platform, which has been repaired. Only minor damage occurred to the vessel, which 
acts as an emergency response and rescue unit for Magnus. The vessel returned to port 
and has been repaired. Managing director of North Star, said: “It would appear that a 
mechanical failure affected the vessel but thankfully no-one was hurt.” 
154 2011 HSE February Northern 
Britannia 
Platform 
Fixed Steel Supply Minor 
At 15:04 cargo discharging between the supply vessel MV "Supply Express" and the 
Britannia platform was suspended to release the Britannia deck crew for a break.  The 
supply vessel remained on station with the Master on watch.  At 15:05 the supply 
vessel lost all power.  At 15:07 the Master of the supply vessel informed the Britannia 
platform that he had lost power and could not control the movement or direction of 
the ship.  The vessel drifted towards the platform and at 15:10 the port side of the 
vessel contacted the platform jacket on the North side.  Shortly afterwards the bow of 
the vessel passed below the bridge connecting the Britannia platform to the BLP and 
the vessel sustained damage to his top mast array and heat shielding on the platforms 
connecting bridge was damaged.  After passing beneath the connecting bridge the 
vessel then struck an underdeck platform causing minor structural damage.  Upon 
hearing that the vessel had lost power the platform GPA was sounded and personnel 
went to muster stations.  There were no injuries to personnel.  Investigation continues 
onshore. 
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155 2011 HSE June Northern 
Piper B 
Platform 
Fixed Steel Supply None 
Supply Vessel SBS Tempest commenced cargo operations at Piper Bravo and at 
approximately 20:40 hrs.  Supply Vessel came too close to the platform and had 
minor impact with the platform at the South West corner.   SBS Tempest immediately 
pulled away from platform to a safe distance of approximately 100 metres.  The 
Vessel television dome was damaged during the impact. SBS Tempest then stood off 
Piper whilst initial investigations were undertaken. It was ascertained that no 
structural damage had occurred on Piper Bravo and that there was no engineering or 
mechanical problem with SBS Tempest.    Weather Conditions at t ime of incident 
were as follows: - Wind Speed û 16-22knots Wind Direction - 215 degrees. Sea State 
2.5 to 3 metres T ide  036 degrees at 0.3 knots (3 hours before high water) Visibility  
10+ Nautical Miles   Investigation ongoing 
156 2011 HSE July Southern 
Noble Julie 
Robertson 
Jack-Up Supply None 
While supply vessel NSO Fortune was carrying out cargo loading / unloading 
operations on the starboard side of the rig, it  suddenly moved to port and came into 
contact with the starboard leg.  It  was immediately apparent that the vessel had 
ruptured a tank on its port side hull.  There were no casualties on either the vessel or 
rig as a result of this collision.  Visual inspection of the starboard leg was carried out 
by the standby vessel BHOS Harvester which confirmed there was no damage visible.  
Report of damage to NSO Fortune was reported to Humberside Coast Guard (no 
assistance required) and report of spill from vessel's tank was reported via PON 1 to 
HMCG, DECC and JNCC. Wind speed at the time of the incident was 23 knots with 
2.5m swell.  Current was 0.8 knots @ 116 degrees. Standby vessel obtained samples 
of spill (suspected diesel / water mix) and carried out agitation operations to break up 
slick. 
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157 2011 HSE August Central Gannet Alpha Fixed Steel Other Minor 
Operation - Gangway connection of the Edda Fides to the Gannet Alpha platform to 
allow the movement of personnel from the accommodation vessel to Gannet Alpha 
during the annual platform. At the time of the un-commanded disconnection of the 
bridge the wind speed was 24 knots, gusting 27 knots from direction 231 degrees. The 
gangway is a hydraulically controlled unit, observed by camera with the gangway unit 
monitored 24 hours a day from a control point on the Edda fides bridge. The 
investigation team is being mobilised to the Edda Fides on the 21st August.     Part Of 
states - At 05:10 on the 19th August the gangway between the Gannet Alpha platform 
and the 78 Any collision between a vessel which results in the damage to either the 
installation or vessel.  Edda Fides accommodation vessel disconnected via an un-
commanded operation (The gangway is DNV classed equipment), which resulted in 
some damage to the stairway of the gangway indicating collision with the platform 
structure. The incident is being investigated by the Shell marine dept. and the vessel 
owners. 
158 2011 HSE October - Unknown Unspecified Supply Minor 
The supply vessel Skandi Rona was called to come into the rigs Starboard side, made 
passage along the stern of the rig and while manoeuvring close to Sedco 711, the 
supply vessel, contacted the 711's starboard aft column, resulting in minor damage to 
the rig plating and stiffening  
159 2011 GISIS Unspecified Northern 
Magnus Field 
(North Sea) 
Fixed Steel Unspecified Moderate   
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160 2012 HSE March Liverpool Bay 
North Hoyle 
Wind Farm 
Wind Turbine Supply None 
Crane Collision Incident North Hoyle Windfarm - Vessel Odin & T23 Incident date 
and time: 15th March 2012 between 21:34 & 22:00 Project: Gearbox Exchange 
Report - CDMC report to Client 19th March 2012 F10 No. - BB48B0BAE3 Client. - 
RWE Designer- Vestas Wind Systems PC. - Vestas Offshore Special Projects C. - 
Hochtief, operators of vessel Odin CDMC. - Graeme Lewis (Vestas Offshore HSE) 
Executive Summary During a crane operation to retrieve towing gear and anchor from 
the tug Wal on March 15th between 21:34 and 22:00 the hoist rope for the smaller of 
the two hoist systems on the cane fitted to the Odin came into contact with the last 
(approximately) 4m of the blade on wind turbine T23. Following the discovery of this 
event by Vestas staff, crane operations were suspended, and an immediate dynamic 
risk assessment carried out to determine if there was any imminent danger to vessel or 
crew. Despite damage no immediate danger from the damaged blade existed. The 
Odin was therefore retained in its position alongside WTG T23 to allow the 
investigation to proceed unhindered. The incident occurred during a Vessel operation 
and not during Vestas works on the WTG. The lifting operation was carried out due to 
the earlier failure of the vessel winch normally used to retrieve towing gear and 
anchor, and took place in hours of darkness.  
161 2012 HSE March - Unknown Unspecified Supply Unspecified 
The supply vessel “Malaviya 19” was alongside discharging brine and water bulks 
when it  came into direct contact with the installation. The vessel was operating on the 
north face, with weather conditions recorded as; wind 315 degrees at 15 knots, and 
swell 310 degrees at 2.5m, current of 315 at 1.2 knots and an overcast sky with good 
visibility. During supply operations the vessel was initially able to maintain position 
and commenced cargo operations as planned, but was subsequently noted to be unable 
to maintain station and moved in toward the Platform. The vessel struck the Platform 
structure on the north side around and including the B9 leg. This information resulted 
in a GPA being initiated and the platform being brought to muster. A full production 
and gas import system shut down was initiated as a direct reaction to the incident. The 
vessel was then able to pull away from the installation and make its way outside of the 
500m zone. A visual inspection of the north face was conducted and damage assessed 
as being minor at this time, including scrape marks on the B9 leg and possible minor 
damage to a pile guide on the outer aspect of this leg. No one was hurt during this 
incident, with all personnel retained inside the TR until the structure was assessed and 
deemed safe.  
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162 2012 HSE September - 
OAS 
platform 
Unspecified Supply Minor 
During supply boat offloading activities today (Sunday 16th September) the mid ship 
bumper bar section on the Maersk Puncher came into contact with the underside of 
the OAS (walk to work landing platform) resulting in damage to both the OAS 
platform and supply vessel. The offload had been ongoing for approximately 3 hrs 
prior to the incident, but the vessel had just turned around (port side nearest the 
platform) 2 lifts before contact was made. Wind speed and sea height at the time of 
the incident were 22 knots and 2.0 - 2.5m.  
163 2012 HSE September Southern Clipper PT  Fixed Steel Stand-by Minor 
Slight impact damage to leg C1 and the Putford Enterprise midships (above the 
waterline). 
164 2013 HSE January - Unknown Unspecified Tug Unspecified 
The Island Valiant was completing subsea survey work of the Horne well, when the 
vessel struck the Horne and Wren platform. 
165 2013 HSE January - 
Well Head 
Platform 
Unspecified Supply Minor 
At approximately 1040 hrs on 29th January 2013, the multi-role ERRV m/v Putford 
Aries hit  the RN platform while going in to work cargo. Early indications are that the 
vessel had gone in to work Central Production Platform North side, suffered a loss of 
control (for reasons unknown at this point) drifted past CP, hit the NW corner of the 
Well Tower, damaging the Putford Progress (Enhanced Daughter Craft) and a 
handrail on the vessel’s bridge. The Master then tried to recover the vessel away from 
the installation, but drifted under the installation’s bridge and the vessel’s bow then 
contacted the CP East leg, scuffing the concrete and suffering a puncture hole on the 
vessel’s bow from the leg bumper. The vessel has pulled out of the 500m zone and 
subsequently returned to Great Yarmouth for repair. The damage to the Central 
Production platform and wellhead platform was of a minor nature. A full investigation 
is in progress  
 
 
 
Early indications are that the vessel had gone in to work Central Production Platform 
North side, suffered a loss of 
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166 2013 HSE May Central  Janice Alpha  Semi-Sub Diver Support  None 
On the 12.05.13 the following events took place: 21:40- cessation of Daughtercraft 
diving operations at the Janice Alpha FPU (Floating Production Unit). The 
Daughtercraft "Aberlour" heads back towards the mothership Adams Vision DSV. 
22:36- Aberlour recovered back to the mothership Adams Vision DSV. 22:52- due to 
increasing weather conditions the Adams Vision moved outside the Janice Alpha 
500m zone where it sat waiting for client instruction either to stand-by on location or 
to transit to Aberdeen. 23:15- the Duty SDPO (Senior Dynamic Positioning Officer) 
selected "Manual" manoeuvring mode (thus de-selecting thrusters from DP) but was 
unable to establish control of the system. The Adams Vision began an accelerated 
drift  towards the Janice Alpha. 22:38- the Adams Vision Master was called to the 
Bridge. Upon arriving the Master requested that the SDPO step out of the console and 
then took control himself. The Master switched over to Manual and confirmed that the 
levers were operational. Despite being able to t ake command of vessel propulsion the 
Master was unable to avoid soft contact with the Janice Alpha. Communication was 
made with the Janice Alpha to inform them of the soft contact. The Adams Vision 
then departed the 500m zone. The vessel crew carried out a damages investigation. 
The Adams Vision made contact with the Janice Alpha by way of: Adams Vision- 
upper Bridge structure port side Janice Alpha- port side/ forward section of helicopter 
decking At 00:15 on the 13.05.13 the Adams Vision commenced transit to Aberdeen. 
167 2013 HSE June - Unknown Unspecified Supply None 
Amendment to Incident reference No: 4BFE9E6C9E (Amendment to rig name) 
Whilst pulling off of location after completing cargo operations the supply vessel 
made contact with the Port and bow installation legs. Rig proceeded to precautionary 
muster and after initial visual inspection by the FRC (Fast Rescue Craft) revealed no 
structural damage, to cords or cross braces. The crews were stood down from muster. 
Further structural surveys to be carried out. Duty HSE informed. 
168 2013 HSE September - Unknown Fixed Steel Supply Unspecified 
The Vos Raasay vessel was approaching the platform for back loading of containers 
to the 48/29 FTP - however the vessel was positioned North of the platform 
approaching the platform with the tide to the 48/29A, the Master tried to reposition to 
the FTP but experienced loss of control and was taken with the tide under the platform 
bridge and into the structure of the 48/29Q. The 40 POB mustered at the secondary 
muster and all personnel were evacuated from the platform. 
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169 2013 HSE December - 
Preload Tank 
7P2 
Unspecified Tug Minor 
Brief Report Minor damage sustained after sea going harbour tug contacts rig during 
rig move operations. Detail Rig pinned on the Nexen Golden Eagle standoff location. 
Hull stationary and now elevated clear of the water at a 5 ft  air gap ready for preload 
operations. Aft tow vessel were to be disconnected and stood down. Wind speed was 
building to 25 knots, sea state was confused at 1.5 m, 5 to 6 sec period. At 23.75 hrs 
12 Dec 13, the sea going harbour tug ‘RT Spirit’ was requested to come in and release 
her tow line from the rigs Port Aft quarter smit bracket. As the tug came astern, with 
Captain at helm, the aft end of tug was lifted on the swell resulting in the aft end of 
the tug making contact with the rig hull. The keel plate/side shell of preload tank 7P2 
sustained minor damage. Temporary repair made from inside tank. Welding up 
cracked weld between side shell plate and keel plate at bottom edge of hull on Port 
Aft Corner. Repair completed in consultation with Class (ABS) and Ensco corporate 
engineering dept. Ensco corporate Engineering issued permanent repair plan and 
detailed drawing. This will require external work on the side shell of the rigs hull. To 
be completed in Q2 2014. (Spring/Summer due to better weather). ABS surveyor will 
be required on site to oversee repair. 
170 2014 HSE January - PW jacket  Jacket Stand-by None 
Standby vessel, Putford Jaguar, was close in to the PW jacket while transferring loads 
using the PW crane. During this operation the Putford Jaguar made contact with one 
of the unused anchor points on one of the North side support legs. There appears to be 
no obvious damage to the platform leg however the thin wall steel above the striking 
line at the aft of the vessel has been damaged. An internal investigation has been 
started. 
171 2014 HSE March Northern 
Nexen 
Goldeneye 
Jack-Up Tug Minor 
Rig afloat with 4 anchors deployed, 3 tugs assisting. Rig was moved astern toward 
final location onto Golden Eagle Platform within a required 1.5 metre tolerance. Aft 
crane engine cab and one area to port aft of the drill floor area made contact with 
uppermost deck on Golden Eagle platform. Localised damage sustained to the aft 
crane and cable trays around rig floor windfall. investigation ongoing 
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172 2014 HSE May Southern 
Leman Alpha 
AD1 Jacket 
leg B1. 
Fixed Steel Supply Minor 
The AD1 Crane had completed 1 lift of a mini container from the AD1 Main Deck 
down to the Putford Voyager, and while the Alpha Deck Crew prepared another mini 
container for backload, the Helmsman (1st Mate) on the Voyager had allowed the 
vessel to drift  slightly on the tide away from the AD1 Jacket. When the Platform 
contacted the Voyager and stated that the second lift was ready, the Helmsman started 
to move the Voyager astern towards the AD1 Jacket and position the vessel cargo 
deck under the AD1 Crane Hook. T idal flow at the time was 156 degrees at 1.5 knots 
(drift  off), wind 11 knots at 050 degrees. During the manoeuvre, the Helmsman mis-
judged the amount of propulsion to apply to the vessel to move the relatively short 
distance back to the Platform and the vessel came into contact with leg B1 on the 
AD1 Jacket as a result. Those on board felt the AD1 Jacket rock slightly when the 
vessel made contact. An immediate inspection was carried out on the AD1 leg and the 
vessel. Superficial damage (protective coating) was noted to leg B1 and to the Vessel 
(paint). It was also noted that the AD1 Crane Main Block had come into contact with 
a Davit on the vessel. POB on Platform and vessel were kept up to date throughout. 
173 2014 HSE August - Turbine. Turbine Diver Support  None 
Dive vessel on a four anchor system lost one anchor. There was a diver in the water at 
the time. The vessel drifted into the WTG and damaged the vessel and fuel tank. 
174 2015 HSE January - Unspecified Unspecified Supply Unspecified 
At 11:00hrs the Crane Operator commenced working the Troms Capella supply 
vessel. The Crane Operator informed the vessel that he would stand the vessel off due 
to increasing weather. The vessel acknowledged and began moving away from the rig. 
At 11:22 hrs the Troms Capella's bow came into contact with the Starboard Forward 
18 ft . intermediate column. General alarm sounded and the rig went to muster. Troms 
Capella pulled away. Full muster no injuries to personnel on the rig or supply vessel. 
Investigation ongoing. 
175 2015 HSE January Southern 
Paragon 
B391 
Jack-up Supply None 
Ocean surf collided with the starboard leg of the rig, causing no damage to the rig but 
sustaining metal work damage to her starboard side fairing. 
176 2015 HSE March Northern 
Apache 
North 
Unspecified Supply Unspecified 
Supply boat Sea Falcon collided with Platform’s North East Corner level one. This 
incident occurred whilst the above vessel was manoeuvring alongside the platform 
prior to starting deck cargo operations. Investigations ongoing. 
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No. Name Location  Operator 
Production 
Start 
Status  
Year 
Decommissioned 
Still 
operational 
Category 
Begin 
Year 
Operational 
Years 
1 Angus FPSO UK 31/26a Amerada 1992 Decommissioned 2012   Floating steel 1996 16 
2 Blenheim FPSO UK 016/21b Talisman 1995 Decommissioned 2000   Floating steel 1996 4 
3 Donan FPSO - SWOPS UK 15/20 BP 1992 Decommissioned 1998   Floating steel 1996 2 
4 Durward FPSO  UK 21/11 Amerada 1997 Decommissioned 2000   Floating steel 1996 4 
5 Emerald FPF UK 2/10 MSR 1992 Decommissioned 1996   Floating steel 1996 0 
6 Emerald FSV Ailsa Craig UK 2/10 MSR 1992 Decommissioned 1996   Floating steel 1996 0 
7 Esmond CP UK 43/13 BHP 1985 Decommissioned 1996   Fixed steel 1996 0 
8 Esmond CW UK 43/13 BHP 1985 Decommissioned 1996   Fixed steel 1996 0 
9 Gordon BW UK 43/15 BHP 1985 Decommissioned 1996   Fixed steel 1996 0 
10 Teal FPSO UK 21/25 Shell 1997 Decommissioned 2012   Floating steel 1996 16 
11 Hutton; TLP UK 211/28 Kerr McGee 1984 Decommissioned 2001   Floating steel 1996 5 
12 Maureen A UK 16/29 Phillips 1983 Decommissioned 1999   Fixed steel 1996 3 
13 Frigg - MCP01 UK014/09 Total E&P 1977 Decommissioned 2004   Gravity-based concrete 1996 8 
14 Fife FPSO UK 31/26 Hess 1995 Decommissioned 2012   Floating steel 1996 16 
15 Camelot CB UK 53/1 ExxonMobil 1992 Decommissioned 2002   Fixed steel 1996 6 
16 Hutton NW UK 211/27 BP 1983 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
17 Frigg (UK) TP1 UK010/01 Total E&P 1977 Decommissioned 2004   Gravity-based concrete 1996 8 
18 Frigg (UK) CDP1 UK010/01 Total E&P 1977 Decommissioned 2004   Gravity-based concrete 1996 8 
19 Ardmore - Rowan Gorilla VII UK030/24 Acorn 2003 Decommissioned 2005   Jack-up 1996 9 
20 Ardmore SAL 1 UK030/24 Fairfield 2003 Decommissioned 2005   Fixed steel 1996 9 
21 Ardmore SAL 2 UK030/24 Fairfield 2003 Decommissioned 2005   Fixed steel 1996 9 
22 Miller UK 16/8 BP 1992 Decommissioned 2011   Fixed steel 1996 15 
23 Cavendish Platform  UK043/19 RWE DEA 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
24 Chiswick UK049/04 Venture 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
25 Galley FPF UK 15/23a Talisman 1998 Decommissioned 2008   Floating steel 1996 12 
26 Inde [east] JD UK 049/24 Shell 1971 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
27 Inde [east] JP UK 049/24 Shell 1971 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
28 Inde [east] K UK 049/24 Shell 1971 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
29 Inde [east] L UK 049/24 Shell 1971 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
30 Inde [east] M UK 049/19 Shell 1971 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
31 Inde [east] N UK 049/24 Shell 1971 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
32 Brent D UK 211/29 Shell 1976 Operational   2015 Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
33 Goldeneye Platform UK 14/29a Shell  2004 Operational 2011   Fixed steel 1996 15 
34 Chiswick  Platform UK049/04 Venture 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
35 Hudson FPSO Petrojarl 1 UK 210/24a Dana 1993 Decommissioned 2015   Floating steel 1996 19 
36 Ivanhoe; AH001 UK15/21a Hess 1989 Decommissioned 2009   Floating steel 1996 13 
37 Shelley FPSO - Sevan Voyageur UK22/3a Premier 2008 Decommissioned 2010   Floating steel 1996 14 
38 Anglia A 48/19 Ithaca Energy 1991 Operational 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
39 Audrey A 49/11 Centrica 1988 Operational 2016   Fixed steel 1996 20 
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40 Audrey B 48/15 Centrica 1988 Operational 2016   Fixed steel 1996 20 
41 Brent A 211/29 Shell 1976 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
42 Brent B 211/29 Shell 1976 Operational   2015 Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
43 Caister 44/23 ConocoPhillips 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
44 Conwy NPAI 110/12a EOG 2012 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 3 
45 Dunlin A 211/23 Fairfield 1978 Decommissioned 2015   Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
46 Europa Steel Platform 49/22 ConocoPhillips 2000 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
47 Ganymede ZD 49/22 ConocoPhillips 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
48 Horne Platform  53/03 Tullow 2005 Operational 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
49 Janice A 30/17 Maersk 1999 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 16 
50 Murchison 211/19 CNR 1980 Decommissioned 2013   Fixed steel 1996 17 
51 Thames AP 49/28 Perenco 1986 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
52 Thames AR  49/28 Perenco 1986 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
53 Thames AW 49/28 Perenco 1986 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
54 Tyne Platform 44/18 Perenco 1996 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
55 Valiant north 1 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
56 Valiant north 2 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
57 Valiant south 49/21 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
58 Vampire Fixed Steel Platform 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1999 Decommissioned 2016   Fixed steel 1996 20 
59 Vanguard PQD 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
60 Victor JD 49/22 ConocoPhillips 1984 Operational 2016   Fixed steel 1996 20 
61 Viking AR 49/12 ConocoPhillips 1972 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
62 Viking BA 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1973 Decommissioned 2014   Fixed steel 1996 18 
63 Viking BC 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1973 Decommissioned 2014   Fixed steel 1996 18 
64 Viking BD 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1973 Decommissioned 2014   Fixed steel 1996 18 
65 Viking BP 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1973 Decommissioned 2014   Fixed steel 1996 18 
66 Viking CD 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1975 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
67 Viking DD 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1977 Decommissioned 2014   Fixed steel 1996 18 
68 Viking ED 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1977 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
69 Viking GD 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1973 Decommissioned 2011   Fixed steel 1996 15 
70 Viking HD 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1973 Decommissioned 2014   Fixed steel 1996 18 
71 Vulcan 1-PRD 49/21 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
72 Vulcan 2-PTD 48/25 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
73 Camelot CA 53/1 ERT 1989 Decommissioned 2012   Fixed steel 1996 16 
74 Ivanhoe 15/21a Hess 1989 Decommissioned 2013   Floating steel 1996 17 
75 Leadon FPSO 9/14a Maersk 2001 Decommissioned 2007   Floating steel 1996 11 
76 Alba FSU 16/26 Chevron  1994 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
77 Cavendish Platform  43/19a Ineos 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
78 Chestnut Hummingbird FPSO 22/02a Centrica 2008 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 7 
79 Chiswick  Platform 49/04a Centrica 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
80 Cutter QC Platform 49/09a Shell 2006 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 9 
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81 Garrow Platform  42/25a Alpha Petroleum 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
82 Grove Platform 49/10a Centrica 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
83 Kilmar Platform 43/22a Alpha Petroleum 2006 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 9 
84 Mimas Platform 48/09a ConocoPhillips 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
85 Munro Platform 44/17b ConocoPhillips 2005 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 10 
86 Tethys Platform 49/11 ConocoPhillips 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
87 Caravel QR 49/20a Shell 2008 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 7 
88 Donan FPSO Global Producer III 15/20a Maersk 2007 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 8 
89 Kelvin WHP 44/18b ConocoPhillips 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
90 Wenlock 49/12a Alpha Petroleum 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
91 Buzzard Sweetening Platform 20/6a Nexen 2011 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 4 
92 Shamrock QS 49/20a Shell 2008 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 7 
93 West Don Northern Producer 211/18a Enquest 2009 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 6 
94 Jacky WHP 12/21 Ithaca 2009 Decommissioned 2017   Fixed steel 1996 21 
95 West Don/Don SW SAL 211/18a Enquest 2009 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 6 
96 ECA Riser tower 42/29 Perenco 1999 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 16 
97 Wingate Platform 44/24b Wintershall 2011 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 4 
98 Jasmine LQ 30/6a ConocoPhillips 2013 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 2 
99 Jasmine WHP 30/6a ConocoPhillips 2013 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 2 
100 Huntington FPSO 22/14b Premier 2013 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 2 
101 Clipper South Platform 48/19a Ineos 2012 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 3 
102 Ensign NPAI Platform 48/14a Centrica 2012 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 3 
103 Breagh Platform 42/13a Ineos 2013 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 2 
104 York NUI 47/2a Centrica 2013 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 2 
105 Katy Platform 44/19b ConocoPhillips 2013 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 2 
106 Conwy NPAI 110/12a EOG 2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
107 Babbage Platform 48/2a Premier 2010 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 5 
108 Clair Ridge DP Platform 206/8a BP 2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
109 Clair Ridge QU 206/8a BP 2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
110 Golden Eagle PUQ Platform 20/1 Nexen 2014 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 1 
111 Golden Eagle W Platform 20/1 Nexen 2014 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 1 
112 Franklin West WHP 29/5b Total 2001 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 14 
113 Elgin WHP B 22/30c Total 2001 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 14 
114 Alma FPSO - Enquest Producer 30/24c Enquest 2015 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 0 
115 Cygnus A Wellhead Platform 44/11a Engie 2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
116 Foinaven FPSO Petrojarl 204/24 BP 1997 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 18 
117 Gryphon A 9/18b Maersk 1993 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
118 Balmoral FPV 16/21 Premier Oil 1986 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
119 Guillemot,Teal FPSO Anasuria 21/25 Anasuria 1997 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 18 
120 Amethyst east A1D 47/14 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
121 Amethyst east A2D 47/14 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
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122 Amethyst east B1D 47/15 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
123 Amethyst west C1D 47/14 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
124 Barque PB 48/14 Shell 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
125 Barque PL 48/14 Shell 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
126 Barque PB 48/13a Shell 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
127 Beatrice AD 11/30 Talisman 1981 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
128 Beatrice AP 11/30 Talisman 1981 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
129 Beatrice B 11/30 Talisman 1981 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
130 Beatrice C 11/30 Talisman 1981 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
131 Bessemer 49/23 Perenco 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
132 Boulton Wellhead Platform 44/21a ConocoPhillips 1997 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 18 
133 Cleeton CC 42/29 Perenco 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
134 Cleeton CPQ 42/29 Perenco 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
135 CleetonWellhead tower 42/29 Perenco 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
136 Clipper PC 48/19 Shell 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
137 Clipper PT  48/19 Shell 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
138 Clipper PW 48/19 Shell 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
139 Davy AMOSS 53/5a Perenco 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
140 Douglas DA 110/13b ENI 1996 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
141 Douglas DP 110/13b ENI 1996 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
142 Douglas DW 110/13b ENI 1996 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
143 Excalibur A 48/17a Perenco 1994 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
144 Galahad 48/12 Perenco 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
145 Galleon PN 48/20 Shell 1994 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
146 Guinevere 48/17 Perenco 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
147 Hamilton A 110/13 ENI 1997 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 18 
148 Hamilton north 110/13 ENI 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
149 Hewett; 48/29 A 48/29 ENI 1969 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
150 Hewett; 48/29 B 48/29 ENI 1969 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
151 Hewett; 48/29 C 48/29 ENI 1969 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
152 Hewett; 48/29 FTP 48/29 ENI 1969 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
153 Hewett; 48/29 Q 48/29 ENI 1969 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
154 Hewett; 52/5A 52/5 ENI 1969 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
155 Hyde 48/6 Perenco 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
156 Inde [west] AC 49/23 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
157 Inde [west] AD 49/18 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
158 Inde [west] AP 49/18 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
159 Inde [west] AQ 49/23 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
160 Inde [west] AT  49/23 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
161 Inde [west] BD 49/18 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
162 Inde [west] BP  49/18 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
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163 Inde [west] CD 49/23 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
164 Inde [west] CP 49/23 Perenco 1971 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
165 Lancelot  48/17 Perenco 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
166 Leman AC 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
167 Leman AD 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
168 Leman AD1 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
169 Leman AD2 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
170 Leman AK 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
171 Leman AP 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
172 Leman AQ 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
173 Leman AX 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
174 Leman BD 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
175 Leman BH 49/26 Shell 1968 Decommissioned 2016   Fixed steel 1996 20 
176 Leman BP 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
177 Leman BT  49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
178 Leman CD 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
179 Buchan A 21/1 Repsol-Sinopec 1981 Operational   2015 Semi-Sub 1996 19 
180 Leman CP 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
181 Leman D 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
182 Leman DD 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
183 Leman DP 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
184 Leman E 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
185 Leman ED 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
186 Leman EP 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
187 Leman F 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
188 Leman FD 49/27 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
189 Leman FP 53/1a Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
190 Leman G 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
191 Leman H 53/2 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
192 Leman J 49/28 Perenco 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
193 Lennox 110/15a Eni 1996 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
194 Markham ST1 49/05 Centrica 1992 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
195 Morecambe DP6 110/2 HRL 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
196 Morecambe DP8 110/2 HRL 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
197 Morecambe North 10/2 HRL 1994 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
198 Murdoch Compression Platform 44/22 ConocoPhillips 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
199 Murdoch 44/22 ConocoPhillips 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
200 Pickerill  A 48/11 Perenco 1992 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
201 Pickerill B 48/11 Perenco 1992 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
202 Ravenspurn ST2 43/26a Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
203 Ravenspurn ST3 42/30 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
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204 Ravenspurn A 42/30 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
205 Ravenspurn B 42/30 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
206 Ravenspurn C 42/30 Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
207 Ravenspurn WT1 43/26a Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
208 Rough AD 47/8b Centrica 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
209 Rough AP 47/8b Centrica 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
210 Rough BP 47/3d Centrica 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
211 Rough CD 47/3d Centrica 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
212 Schooner Platform 44/26a Faroe Petroleum (U.K.) Limited 1996 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
213 Sean south PD 49/25 Shell 1986 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
214 Sean south PP 49/25 Oranje Nassau 1986 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
215 Sean north RD 49/25 Oranje Nassau 1986 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
216 LOGGS GGS AP 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
217 LOGGS GGS CP 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
218 LOGGS GGS PP 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
219 West Sole WA 48/6 Perenco 1967 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
220 West Sole WAP 48/6 Perenco 1967 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
221 West Sole WAS 48/6 Perenco 1967 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
222 West Sole WB 48/6 Perenco 1967 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
223 West Sole WC 48/6 Perenco 1967 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
224 Windemere 49/9 Ineos 1997 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 18 
225 Alba northern 16/26 Chevron 1994 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
226 Alwyn north NAA 3/9 Total E&P 1987 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
227 Alwyn north NAB 3/9 Total E&P 1987 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
228 Andrew 16/28 BP 1996 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
229 Arbroath 22/17 Repsol-Sinopec 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
230 Armada Platform 22/5 BG 1997 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 18 
231 Auk A 30/16 Repsol-Sinopec 1975 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
232 Beryl B 9/13 Apache Beryl 1976 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
233 Beryl Riser tower 9/13 Apache Beryl  1976 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
234 Brae A 16/7 Marathon 1983 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
235 Brae B 16/7a Marathon 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
236 Brae east  16/03a Marathon 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
237 Britannia Platform 16/26 ConocoPhillips 1998 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 17 
238 Bruce D 9/9 BP 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
239 Bruce PUQ 9/8a BP 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
240 Captain WPPA 13/22a Chevron 1997 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 18 
241 Claymore A 14/19 Repsol-Sinopec 1977 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
242 Claymore Quarters Platform 14/19 Repsol-Sinopec 1977 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
243 Clyde 30/17b Repsol-Sinopec 1987 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
244 Captain FPSO 13/22 Chevron Texeco 1997 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 18 
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245 Cormorant north 211/21a TAQA 1982 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
246 Douglas FPF 110/13 Eni 1996 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
247 Dunbar 3/14a Total E&P 1994 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
248 Eider 211/16a Taqa Bratani 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
249 Erskine 23/26a Chevron 1997 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 18 
250 Everest north 22/9 BG 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
251 Everest north riser 22/10 BG 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
252 Forties FA 21/10 Apache  1975 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
253 Forties FB 21/10 Apache  1975 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
254 Forties FC 21/10 Apache  1975 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
255 Forties FD 21/10 Apache  1975 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
256 Forties FE 22/6 Apache  1975 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
257 Forties Unity riser 21/9 BP 1975 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
258 Fulmar  A 30/16 Repsol-Sinopec 1982 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
259 Fulmar AD 30/16 Repsol-Sinopec 1982 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
260 Gannet  A 21/25 Shell 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
261 Harding Platform 9/23 Taqa Bratani 1996 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
262 Heather A 2/5 Enquest Heather 1978 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
263 Judy  30/7 ConocoPhillips 1995 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
264 Kittiwake A 21/18a Enquest 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
265 Lomond 23/21 BG 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
266 Magnus 211/12 BP 1983 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
267 Marnock ETAP PDR Platform 22/24a BP 1998 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 17 
268 Marnock ETAP QU Platform 22/24a BP 1998 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 17 
269 Montrose A 22/17 Repsol-Sinopec 1976 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
270 Morecambe AP1 110/3 HRL 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
271 Morecambe CPP1 110/3 HRL 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
272 Morecambe DP1 110/3 HRL 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
273 Morecambe DP3 110/8 HRL 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
274 Morecambe DP4 110/3 HRL 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
275 Nelson 22/11 Enterprise 1994 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
276 Ninian north 3/3 CNR 1978 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
277 Ninian south 3/08 CNR 1978 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
278 Piper B 15/17 Repsol-Sinopec 1976 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
279 Rough BD 47/3d Centrica 1985 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
280 Saltire A 15/17 Repsol-Sinopec 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
281 Scott JD 15/22 Nexen 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
282 Scott JU 15/22 Nexen 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
283 Tartan A 15/16 Repsol-Sinopec 1981 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
284 Tern 210/25 TAQA 1989 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
285 Thistle A 211/18a Enquest Heather 1978 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
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286 Tiffany 16/17 CNR 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
287 Beryl A 9/13 Apache Beryl  1976 Operational   2015 Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
288 Brent C 211/29 Shell 1976 Operational   2015 Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
289 Cormorant A (South) 211/26a TAQA 1979 Operational   2015 Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
290 Ninian Central 3/03 CNR 1978 Operational   2015 Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
291 Ravenspurn CPP 43/26a Perenco 1990 Operational   2015 Gravity-based concrete 1996 19 
292 Curlew FPSO 29/7 Shell 1997 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 18 
293 Ketch A Platform 44/28b Faroe Petroleum (U.K.) Limited 1999 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 16 
294 Malory Platform 48/12 Perenco 1998 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 17 
295 Neptune Platform 47/4b Perenco 1999 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 16 
296 Ross FPSO Bleo Holm 13/28 Repsol-Sinopec 1999 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 16 
297 Trent Platform 43/24 Perenco 1996 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
298 LOGGS GGS RP 49/16 ConocoPhillips 1988 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
299 Inde D Platform (PERENCO) 49/23 Perenco 1989 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
300 Mungo NUI Platform 22/20 BP 1998 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 17 
301 Pierce FPSO Haewene Brim 23/27 Enterprise 1999 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 16 
302 Shearwater A Wellhead Platform 22/30b Shell 2000 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 15 
303 Shearwater C PUQ Platform 22/30b Shell 2000 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 15 
304 Waveney Platform 48/17 Perenco 1998 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 17 
305 Banff FPSO 29/2 CNR 1996 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
306 Bruce Phase II Platform 9/9 BP 1993 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
307 Captain bridge linked platform 13/22a Chevron 1997 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 18 
308 Corvette Platform 49/24 Shell 1999 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 16 
309 Elgin PUQ  22/30c Total 2001 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 14 
310 Elgin WHP 22/30c Total 2001 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 14 
311 Franklin WHP 29/5 Total 2001 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 14 
312 Galleon PG 48/14 Shell 1994 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
313 Guillemot West FPSO 21/30 Dana 2000 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 15 
314 Skiff PS Platform 48/20a Shell 2000 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 15 
315 Brigantine BG 49/19 Shell 2001 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 14 
316 Brigantine BR 49/19 Shell 2001 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 14 
317 Viscount Platform 49/16 ConocoPhillips 2002 Decommissioned 2015   Fixed steel 1996 19 
318 Banff FSU Apollo Spirit  22/27 CNR 1999 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 16 
319 Clair Phase 1 Platform 206/8 BP 2005 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 10 
320 Hoton Platform 48/7b BP 2001 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 14 
321 Jade Platform 30/2c ConocoPhillips 2002 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 13 
322 Millom West Platform 113/26 ConocoPhillips 1999 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 16 
323 Minerva Platform 47/3 Amoco 2003 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 12 
324 Buzzard Production Platform 20-Jun Nexen 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
325 Buzzard Utilit ies Platform 20-Jun Nexen 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
326 Buzzard Wellhead Platform 20-Jun Nexen 2007 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 8 
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327 Calder Platform 110/07 ConocoPhillips 2004 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 11 
328 Carrack QA Platform 49/14 Shell 2003 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 12 
329 Clipper PR Platform 48/19 Shell 1990 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
330 Saturn 48/10 ConocoPhillips 2005 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 10 
331 Viking KD Platform 49/12 ConocoPhillips 1999 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 16 
332 Viking LD Platform 49/17 ConocoPhillips 1999 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 16 
333 Cygnus A PU Platform 44/11a Engie 2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
334 Cygnus QU Platform 44/11a Engie 2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
335 Cygnus B Wellhead Platform 44/12a Engie 2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
336 Mariner PDQ Platform 9/11a Statoil 2018 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -3 
337 WIDP Sevan 400 FPSO 210/24a Dana 2017 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -2 
338 Stella FPF-1 30/6a Ithaca  2016 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -1 
339 Leman AC Compression Platform 49/26 Shell 1968 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 19 
340 Clipper PH Platform 48/19 Shell 2013 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 2 
341 BW Catcher FPSO 28/9a BW Offshore 2017 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -2 
342 Culzean Wellhead Platfom 22/25a Maersk  2019 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -4 
343 Culzean Utilit ies Living Quarters 22/25a Maersk  2019 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -4 
344 Culzean Processing Platform 22/25a Maersk  2019 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -4 
345 Mariner FSU 9/11a Statoil 2018 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -3 
346 Ailsa FSO 22/25a Maersk  2019 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -4 
347 Kraken FPSO 9/2b EnQuest Heather 2017 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 -2 
348 Noble Lloyd Noble  9/11a Statoil (U.K.) Limited 2017 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 -2 
349 Solan Platform 205/26a Premier  2016 Operational   2015 Fixed steel 1996 -1 
350 Ettrick FPSO Aoka Mizu 20/03a Nexen 2007 Decommissioned 2016   Floating steel 1996 20 
351 Kittiwake SAL 21/18a Enquest 2006 Decommissioned 2009   Fixed steel 1996 13 
352 Athena FPSO 14/18b Ithaca Energy 2012 Decommissioned 2016   Floating steel 1996 20 
353 MacCulloch FPSO 15/24b ConocoPhillips 1997 Decommissioned 2015   Floating steel 1996 19 
354 Welland South 53/4a Perenco 1990 Decommissioned 2010   Fixed steel 1996 14 
355 Schiehallion FPSO 204/20 BP 1998 Decommissioned 2012   Floating steel 1996 16 
356 Galaxy 3   Sanat Fe 1999 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 16 
357 Maersk Resilient   ABS 2008 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 7 
358 GSF Labrador 48/25c Transocean 1983 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
359 ENSCO 100   Ensco 1986 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
360 ENSCO 101   Ensco 2000 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 15 
361 ENSCO 120    Ensco 2013 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 2 
362 ENSCO 121   Ensco 2013 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 2 
363 ENSCO 122   Ensco 2014 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 1 
364 ENSCO 70   Ensco 1981 Non-Operational 2014   Jack-up 1996 18 
365 ENSCO 71   Ensco 1982 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
366 ENSCO 72   Ensco 1981 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
367 ENSCO 92   Ensco 1982 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
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368 ENSCO 80   Ensco 1978 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
369 Stena Spey   Stena 1983 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
370 Noble Hans Deul   Noble 2008 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 7 
371 Noble Regina Allen   Noble 2013 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 2 
372 Noble Sam Turner   Noble 2014 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 1 
373 Noble Julie Robertson   Centrica 1982 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
374 Paragon B391   Paragon Offshore 1982 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
375 Paragon HZ1   Paragon Offshore 1981 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
376 Paragon MSS1   Paragon Offshore 1981 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
377 Baug   Borr Drilling 1991 
Operational - 
Stacked 
  2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
378 Brage   Borr Drilling 1998 Operational Stacked   2015 Jack-up 1996 17 
379 Eir   Borr Drilling 1999 
Operational - 
Stacked 
  2015 Jack-up 1996 16 
380 Fonn   Borr Drilling 1986 
Operational - 
Stacked 
  2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
381 Maersk Gallant    Nexen 1993 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 19 
382 Maersk Highlander   Maersk Oil & Gas 2016 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 -1 
383 Maersk Reacher   BP 2009 Operational - Ready    2015 Jack-up 1996 6 
384 Maersk Resolve   Wintershall 2009 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 6 
385 Noble Llyod Noble   Statoil 2016 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 -1 
386 Prospector 5    Total 2014 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 1 
387 Rowan Gorilla V   Total 1998 Operational - Ready    2015 Jack-up 1996 17 
388 Rowan Gorilla VI   ConocoPhilips 2000 Operational - Ready    2015 Jack-up 1996 15 
389 Rowan Norway   ConocoPhilips 2011 Operational   2015 Jack-up 1996 4 
390 John Shaw   Transocean 1982 Decommissioned   2015   1996 19 
391 Ocean Guardian     1985 
Operational - 
Stacked 
  2015   1996 19 
392 Sedco 706   Transocean 1976 Operational   2015   1996 19 
393 Sea Fox 4     1976 Operational   2015   1996 19 
394 Transocean Rather   Transocean 1987 Operational   2015   1996 19 
395 Ocean Princess   Diamond Offshore Drilling 1975 Non-Operational 2013 2015   1996 17 
396 Deepsea Aberdeen   Odfjell Drilling 2014 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 1 
397 Ocean Patriot    Shell 1983 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
398 Ocean Valiant    Maersk Oil & Gas 1988 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
399 Paul B. Loyd, Jr.   BP 1987 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
400 Sedco 711     1982 
Operational - Cold 
Stacked 
2016 2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
401 Sedco 712   Faifield energy 1983 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
402 Sedco 714     1983 
Operational Cold 
Stacked 
2016 2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
403 Sertao   Petrobas 2012 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 3 
404 Transocean leader   EnQuest  1987 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
405 Transocean Spitsbergen   Statoil 2009 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 6 
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406 West Pheonix   Nexen 2008 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 7 
407 WilHunter     1983 
Operational - Cold 
Stacked 
2016 2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
408 WilPhoenix   Apache/Taqa 1982 Operational   2015 Floating steel 1996 19 
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No. Year Source Month Location 
Name of 
Unit 
Type of Unit Vessel Cause Comments 
1 1996 HSE June -   
Semi-Submersible 
Drilling 
Cargo 
Total Power 
Loss 
Cargo vessel lost power and was drifting towards the rig. Drilling operations 
suspended and down manning took place. Local vessels gave assistance to get a 
tow line attached and pull the vessel clear of the rig. 
2 1997 HSE March -   
Semi-Submersible 
Drilling 
Standby 
Engine 
Failure 
Vessel reported engine failure while positioned up wind of drilling rig. Relative 
bearing observation indicated vessel would drift  past close but not collide with 
rig. Monitoring continued. Stand by vessel proceeded with attempts to place tow 
line onto vessel. Tow was secured and CPA was increased to in excess of 100 
yards. Tug arrived on scene and secured tow line on vessel. Tow line had parting 
shortly after being secured. Vessel later recovered power. 
3 1997 HSE June Southern   Fixed Steel 
Anchor 
Handler 
Total Power 
Loss 
Whilst preparing for rig move of jack up drilling rig - anchor handling vessel 
suffered total loss of power. Vessel started drifting and narrowly missed colliding 
with platform. 
4 1997 HSE August -   
Semi-Submersible 
Accommodation 
Supply 
Manoeuvring 
Misjudgement 
Supply vessel was in a position at the stern of the rig with a potable water hose 
connected transferring potable water and off-loading containerised deck cargo. 
Vessel was positioned on a northerly heading and in attempting to reposition 
encountered manoeuvring difficulties and made contact with rig's No. 5 anchor 
wire on port aft side. Rig was de-ballasted to transit draught for wire inspection. 
Some strand damage was evident on No. 5 anchor wire. 
5 1997 HSE October Central   FPSO 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
D.P. Control 
Failure 
Shuttle tanker secured to FPSO and GPS signals were poor and both DARPS and 
DGPS were deselected from DP console. Shuttle maintained position using 
Artemis only but this failed for a short period and DP system reverted to 'model 
control'. Due to software problem this caused shuttle tanker to manoeuvre astern 
causing mooring hawser to be tensioned. The off-position alarm sounded and 
control of shuttle established by using DGPS absolute system. This caused 
shuttle to manoeuvre ahead and stabilise in normal  offloading position. 
6 1997 HSE November Northern   Fixed Steel Supply 
Manoeuvring 
Misjudgement 
During crane operations with the supply vessel a 1 tonne container was knocked 
over on the vessel deck due to sudden vessel movement. During operations to 
regain control the vessel then moved close to the riser access tower. Wind speed 
- 27 knots. Direction - 144 degrees. Wave height - 3 metres. Visibility - fine and   
clear. 
7 1997 WOAD March - 
OCEAN 
NOMAD 
Semi-Submersible Standby 
Engine 
Failure 
THE ENGINE OF STANDBY VESSEL 'GRAMPIAN PRINCE' CUT OUT 
AND STARTED DRIFTING TOWARDS THE RIG. ONSHORE 
HELICOPTERS WERE SCRAMBLED, BUT NOT REQUIRED. THE RIG 
WAS ATTACHED TO A TUG AT THE TIME. NO FURTHER 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE. SOURCE: PRESS&JOURNAL 970307. 
8 1998 HSE March Central   Fixed Steel Standby 
Engine 
Failure 
Engine failure of one engine on stand by vessel. Weather conditions 7-8 metres 
seas 45 knot winds. Vessel unable to carry out stand by duties and had to hold 
station. 
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9 1998 HSE April Southern   Fixed Steel Trawler 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
Beam trawler entered 500 metres safety zone while fishing. 
10 1998 HSE June -   
Semi-Submersible 
Drilling 
- - 
Vessel 6 nautical miles away. Coastguard alerted. Helicopter available for 
precautionary downmanning. Supply vessel in field prepared to take undertow. 
11 1998 HSE September Northern   Fixed Steel Trawler 
Engine 
Failure 
Standby vessel contacted installation control room and informed them that a 
trawler had no engine power and was drifting toward installation and current 
position was 2 miles from north east side of installation. Wind 145 degrees, 25/ 
30 knots, 2/ 3 metre seas, visibility poor in mist, down to 200 metres in places, 
cloud cover 8 oktas. Another fishing vessel was on location but unable to offer 
any assistance. Installation OIM was called out and platform emergency 
procedures for collision activated. Stand by vessel launched it’s FRC and the 
crew transferred a handline from accompanying vessel to the drifting vessel so 
that a 3" wire tow line could be connected between the vessels. Accompanying 
vessel took up slack on wire tow rope and vessel was towed past on installation's 
north face at 750 metres, 
12 1998 HSE December Northern   FSU 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
Thruster 
Control 
Failure 
Incident occurred during normal crude oil export transfer operations between the 
FSU and shuttle tanker. Shuttle tanker suffered loss of propeller pitch control, the 
propeller failing to zero pitch with the resultant loss of thrust. Shuttle tanker later 
re-established pitch control and initiated a pump shutdown by breaking the 
telemetry link. 
13 1999 HSE January Northern   Fixed Steel Standby 
Total Power 
Loss 
Installation's standby vessel was observed from the platform not displaying any 
navigational lights. The platform was advised that the standby vessel had lost all 
power and was drifting towards the platform. The OIM initiated emergency 
procedures onboard the platform and notified HM Coastguard. A nearby 
installation's standby vessel transferred to the scene and attended the drifting 
vessel. Vessel drifted north of the installation and later reported that all power 
and main engines had been restored. Drifting vessel reported that the loss of 
power was due to a generator tripping causing all load to be transferred to 
another generator which then shutdown   due to overload causing total loss of 
electrical and consequential loss of main engines. 
14 1999 HSE April Central   Fixed Steel 
Diver 
Support  
D.P. Control 
Failure 
Whilst moving the vessel from the southern side to the eastern side of the 
platform there was a failure of the ship's starboard 'taut wire boom' causing the 
vessel to swing starboard. At the time the vessel was engaged in ROV work at 
platform. 
15 1999 HSE May Southern   Fixed Steel 
Passing 
Merchant 
Tanker 
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
Oil tanker was on a collision course with installation. All radio calls went 
unheeded and 10 persons evacuated from the installation. When the tanker 
changed course distance from installation was half a mile. 
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16 1999 HSE June Central   Fixed Steel Supply 
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
Standby vessel reported that a supply vessel was heading towards the platform on 
a possible collision course and they had been unable to contact the vessel. 
Platform GPA and muster initiated and emergency response plan implemented. 
Contact was established approx 20 minutes before the closest point of approach 
and the vessel altered  course. 
17 1999 HSE August Central   Floating Production Supply 
Engine 
Control 
Failure 
Supply vessel was working cargo at an installation when an alarm sounded on 
the bridge. Control of the vessel's port main engine (PME) was lost and vessel's 
Master took manual control of the vessel and communicated with the Chief 
Engineer. A further alarm on the joystick desk indicating a thruster failure and 
the Master made the decision to pull clear of the installation.  The platform deck    
crew was warned by the vessel to stand clear of the potable water hose that 
subsequently parted. The vessel cleared the installation to outside the 500 metres 
zone to effect repairs. 
18 1999 HSE August Southern   Fixed Steel 
Diver 
Support  
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
ROV support vessel was using platform as way mark on auto pilot. Auto pilot 
not switched off until vessel 10 to 60 metres from installation. 
19 1999 HSE September Southern   Fixed Steel - 
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
Having failed to make contact with an approaching vessel, the standby vessel 
launched their fast rescue boat. The FRC came alongside the approaching vessel. 
20 1999 HSE September West of Shetlands   FPSO 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
Power Failure 
After an oil export the shuttle tanker and FPSO assumed fixed headings close to 
their weather vaning headings and began disconnection operation. During 
disconnection the ESD2 automatic disconnect facility was inhibited while crew 
reconnected messenger lines and paid these out. During recovery of oil export 
hose FPSO experienced reduction in electrical power availability; thrusters 
automatically tripped and power to oil export hose reel reduced increasing time 
taken to recover hose. Whilst hawser and messengers were being recovered, 
FPSO heading changed rapidly: 55 degrees in about 2 minutes. Shuttle tanker 
Master took manual control of tanker and manoeuvred it , using minimum power, 
to safe position ending disconnect operation with ship stopped 10 - 30 metres 
away from FPSO at 90 degrees difference in heading. Wind SE, force 3-4. Slight 
/mod sea state. Sea/swell Ht sig 2.6 metres, max 4.6 metres, period 8 secs. Swell 
predom westerly. 
21 1999 HSE October Morecambe Bay   Jack-Up 
Fishing 
vessel 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
Fishing boat infringed the installation's safety zone when it  came as close as 40 
metres from the SW corner of the installation. Installation was evacuated but the 
vessel could not be raised on the radio by   the standby vessel. 
22 1999 HSE November Northern   FPSO 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
D.P. 
Computer 
Failure 
Shuttle tanker was making its approach in preparation for cargo offloading. At a 
distance of approximately 200 metres shuttle tanker experienced failure of main 
propellor pitch control. This initiated a sequence of events which resulted in a 
100% ahead pitch demand from the DP system. The vessel started to move ahead 
and manual control was selected. The vessel was steered to starboard and 
arrested 120 metres from the FPSO's stern at approximately 90 degrees. 
115 
 
23 2000 HSE January Southern   Fixed Steel Barge 
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
A large object was sighted on a potential collision course with platform. 
Investigation found object to be an RAF target pontoon 19m x 4m x 2.5m (20 
tonnes). Pontoon taken in tow by standby vessel until salvage vessel took   
control. 
24 2000 HSE January Southern   Fixed Steel - - 
Drilling rig was moving from the NW bell location to the standoff location. 
When it  became free at the NW bell location, it  unexpectedly moved towards the 
wellhead. The footprint of the jack-up port leg overlapped the footprint of the 
protection frame on the wellhead. Well and pipeline were shut in and 
depressurised. 
25 2000 HSE June Central   Fixed Steel Research 
Steering 
Failure 
Research vessel suffered a loss of steering whilst inside the platform 500 metres 
zone. The vessel pulled away under reverse power and using remote steering. 
Closest approach to the platform was 150 metres. 
26 2000 HSE September -   - Barge 
Mooring 
Failure 
An 800 feet dumb barge being towed by two tugs came into contact with the dive 
station and detached it  from its moorings while a diver was operating inside cell 
1 attached to the dive station by an umbilical line. The diver was not injured but 
was immediately removed from the water and diving operations suspended. 
27 2001 HSE July Southern   Fixed Steel - 
Weather 
Conditions 
Flotel was at the standoff position and was also retrieving two of the last four 
anchors. An unexpected squall came through the area from a direction of 200 
degrees causing the flotel to pivot in a direction towards the installation.  With 
the backup resources at hand, e.g. the vessel's propulsion and the four anchor 
handling vessels, the flotel was brought back under full control in a timely 
manner. The air gap between the flotel and the installation was reduced. During 
this situation the installation's OIM was informed and they decided to go into 
alert and shutdown their platform. 
28 2001 HSE October -   
Semi-Submersible 
Drilling 
Fishing 
Vessel 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
Standby vessel reported unidentified vessel approaching the rig, speed 6-8 knots, 
CPA 0.2 nautical miles. Weather was thick fog with south easterly x 30 knot 
wind.  Rig was moored to 8 anchors and drilling 12 1/ 4" hole with water based 
mud. Unidentified vessel    had passed within 0.5 nautical miles of nearby 
installation and her standby vessel had been unable to raise vessel on VHF or see 
it  for identification. Standby vessel tried unsuccessfully to contact on VHF. 
Drilling operations were suspended and anchor winches all clutched out in 
preparation to move off location. Aberdeen Coastguard informed that 
approaching vessel was 1.8 nautical miles from the rig CPA 0.12 nautical miles. 
OIM instructed standby vessel to fire flares across approaching vessel's bow to 
warn vessel. Abandon rig alarm sounded. Muster at aft boats. Men positioned 
port fwd. column with flares. Radio contact established and all hands stood 
down. 
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29 2001 HSE May Central Alba FSU FSU 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
DP Failure 
The operation in progress was a crude oil transfer from the Alba Floating storage 
Unit to the shuttle tanker Aberdeen.  A tandem system was used with 80 metre 
hawser and 16 inch hose.  After successful pre-discharge DP trials with the FSU 
systems the vessel made a routine approach and on completion of hook-up 
operation, the crude transfer was commenced at 1849 hrs on 26th May.  From 
vessel's log 27th May; "0132 hrs DARPS 1&2 failed.  0133 hrs off-loading 
position alarm, stop cargo-DP in manual.  0138 hrs position stable- re-select DP 
loading mode.  0150 hrs resume loading.  1335 hrs completed loading".  With 
DARPS restored, the operation was resumed by mutual agreement.  The DP 
system operated without fault for the remainder of the operation; the 
disconnection and unmooring was uneventful.  When failure of both DARPS 
occurred there was erroneous gyro information presented on the vessels systems-
no failures/faults of associated systems were observed on the FSU.  Although 
manual control was selected correctly, in good time and with no system failures 
evident, potential for collision was deemed to exist.  The charterer of the 
Aberdeen, Navon is to arrange, with the agreement of the owners and Chevron 
UK Ltd, verification trials at the Alba FSU under the direction of DP systems 
manufacturer Kongsberg Seatex.  Projected trials date is 1st June.  The results of 
the Seatex verification trials and the Aberdeen's incident report will be used to 
form conclusions on how to prevent a similar incident.  Vessels lying steady on a 
heading of 226 deg T .  Weather: wind Sx 12k, waves sig. 0.5m max, 0.8 period 
4.6 sec, Temp. air 11degC, sea 11.5degC, mbar 1015.     The incident occured on 
the Shuttle tanker "Aberdeen" with mooring hawser secured and export hose 
connected. 
30 2001 HSE June - Polyconcord Semi-Submersible - 
Mooring 
Failure 
The Polyconcord Flotel had a reportable incident during anchor retrrievel and un-
mooring from the Elgin PUQ location - SEE ATTACHMENT 
31 2001 HSE September Central Piper B Fixed Steel 
Passing 
Vessel 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
Infringement of 500m exclusion zone by unauthorised vessel.  MV Emsland en 
route from varberg in Sweden to Belfast entered the piper platform 500m 
exclusion zone without permission.  The vessel was detected by the standby 
vessel havila sea but was unable to prevent the vessel from entering the 500m 
zone with the closest point of approach being the south west corner of the 
platform.  Refer to attachments. 
32 2001 HSE October - 
Ocean 
Princess 
Semi-Submersible - 
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
At 08:32 hours the rig  standby vessel, Grampian Guardian reported unidentified 
v/l approaching the rig, speed 6-8 knots, cpa 0.2m. Weather was thick fog with 
south easterly x 30knots wind. Ocean princess was moored to 8 anchors drilling 
121/4" hole with water based mud. Unidentified v/l had passed within 0.5nm of 
Buchan Platform and her standby vessel.  
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33 2002 HSE February Central Alba FSU FSU 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
Weather 
Conditions 
Shuttle tanker tandem off-loading operations to “Gerrita” had commenced at 
09:28hrs 20th .Alba FSU and Gerrita were lying with on approximately WNW 
heading in normal configuration. The Gerrita was attached to the FSU by a 
mooring hawser and crude oil export hose, with a separation distance of approx 
80 mtrs. This position was being maintained by the Gerrita using Dynamic 
Positioning (DP). At approx 1000 / 20th the wind force strengthened very rapidly 
with the direction veering from NE approx 17kts to approx E 45 - 50 kits. This 
rapid change in wind conditions put the wind astern and caused the Gerrita to 
move away from the normal configuration towards the FSU's starboard quarter, 
with an increasing difference in headings between the 2 vessels. At 1012 the FSU 
General Alarm was sounded and crude export was shut down as a precaution. All 
personnel were mustered at their emergency stations at 1018. The Alba ERRV 
Havila Searcher was summoned onto close standby with the Gerrita. The Gerrita 
DP system was unable to regain the normal configuration in line astern of the 
FSU due to the severity of the weather conditions. The Gerrita Master attempted 
to regain position by taking manual control, but was also unable to achieve this. 
The FSU instructed Gerrita to carry out an Emergency Shutdown Class - 2 (full 
disconnection of hose and hawser) and to move clear astern. The Gerrita was in a 
position abreast of the FSU Control room, approx 25 - 30mtrs off, almost at right 
angles to the FSU when the class - 2 disconnection took place at 1016hrs. Gerrita 
then moved clear of the FSU by 1024 when the mooring messenger was released, 
at which time the vessel was approx 100mtrs off the starboard bow at right 
angles to the FSU. He then proceeded to a safe location 3 miles down wind of the 
field to await an improvement prior to resuming off-loading operations. Location 
of where incident happened - shuttle tanker tandem offloading - close approach 
on starboard side. 
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34 2002 HSE March - 
Captain 
FPSO 
FPSO 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
Engine 
Failure 
During loading of oil from ChevronTexaco FPSO to the Navon Cargo Tanker 
Gerrita the tanker suffered a main engine failure. The following describes the 
sequence of events. March 13th at 13:06 the main engine stopped due to a burst 
pipe supplying lube oil to engine. At 13:08 loading was stopped and at 13:11 the 
ESD II was engaged. The vessels heading at ESD II WAS 358 degrees, the 
distance to the FPSO was 78.5 metres. The current was from the north at 1.9Kts 
and the wind direction was 270 degrees at 8-10Kts. The vessel was moving 
slowly astern when the ESD II was engaged and all thrusters were operational, 
with the vessel able to control the heading. The standby vessel was called in to ' 
Near Standby ' but the emergency tow-line was not connected as the vessel was 
able to make a control withdrawal and was in no danger of getting closer to any 
other installation in the area. At 14:55 the engine on the Gerrita was restarted and 
tested and found to be back in working order after repairs had been made. 
35 2002 HSE April Central 
Tartan 
Alpha 
Platform 
- - - 
22.35 Our standby vessel picked up a radar target, on potential collision course 
with the platform.  The vessel did not respond to calls on the radio, standby 
vessel contacted platform estimated impact time 40 minutes.  Platform told to 
muster, in preparation for potential abandonment.  Vessel changed direction and 
standby vessel confirmed no further risk to platform.  Personnel stood down.  
The wind was 10 knots west, seas one metre and visibility ten miles. 
36 2002 HSE April - Ensco 92 Jack-Up - Power Failure 
The "tor chimera" radio E92 of lost power and location. STD - by vessel "Blue 
Iona" notified and transits to location - Ship is 1.1 NM from big: Emergency 
alarm is activated and crew reports to minster cull and Ensco Eros is activated. 
Ship is reported stable with anchor dropped and holding E92 commenced POB 
evacuation 65/47 upheld members via helicopter support to nearby condo/Ensco 
installations, other vessel support at location. Highland oeampion, platform 
trader. Situation continued stable and E92 with stand by support vessels alert 
through dambreams Wednesday 1/05/02. Weather winds offshore @ 218 deg 
with 21/2 - 3 m seas. The combinco installation status is safe with both wells shut 
in and topsides vented. The 12 man essential crew will remain on standby with 
emergency evac. available on the nearby e72. 
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37 2002 HSE May Central 
14/19 
Claymore 
Fixed Steel 
Fishing 
vessel 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
Weather clear, vis-10nm+. Time: 12.30hrs (BST). During a period of helicopter 
operations on the CAP a member of the helideck crew noticed a fishing vessel 
approx. 1200m on the platform East side & that it was heading towards the 
installation. The incoming chopper landed on the deck and the helicrew went 
about their duties. While awaiting the arrival of the offgoing pax the helicrew 
noticed that the F/V was still heading towards the installation. The HLO advised 
the MARCO that this vessel was approx. 500-600m distance from the platform 
and that it  was heading towards us. The MARCO advised the standby vessel - 
Scott Protector - who was on close standby duty covering the heli-ops and also 
some overside work, stationed on the lee side of the platform - this was CPP 
platform SW. The SBV left station at full speed and proceeded around to the 
CPP East side to warn off the approaching fishing vessel. With the F/V well into 
the 500m zone the SBV was heading across her bows and with horns blaring. 
The F/V eventually went about, the distance from the installation at this time was 
estimated to be approx. 120-150m. the F/V was not answering on ch.16, the SBV 
eventually made brief contact on ch.73. 
38 2002 HSE June Central 
Nelson 
Platform 
Fixed Steel 
Diver 
Support  
DP Failure 
Whilst in close proximity (10 metres) to the Nelson Platform the dive vessel 
CSO Alliance suffered a fail of its DP navigation system which resulted in the 
senior DPO de - selecting the system and manually taking control to stabilise the 
vessel. 
39 2002 HSE August Central Kittiwake Fixed Steel 
Fishing 
Vessel  
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
At approximately  23:10 hrs on 11-Aug-02 the platform standby vessel (Bue 
Shetland Service) reported an infringement of the platform 500m zone by a 
fishing vessel.  The Shetland Service was able to contact the fishing vessel 
(subsequently identified by its markings as PD340 Ocean Venture) and the 
fishing vessel altered course to take it  away from the platform. An OIR/13 shall 
be submitted with further details of this incident. 
40 2004 HSE May Central 
Heather 
Alpha 
Fixed Steel Trawler 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
Two pair trawlers " Harvester PD 98 and Harvester PD MS, fishing close to 
installation @ 19.25 PD98. Entered safety zone. Coastguard confirmed agents 
"Peterhead fisherman". HSE duty officer called 22.02 OIR 15 will be sent in. 
41 2004 HSE June Southern 
Ravenspurn 
North 
Fixed Concrete 
Fishing 
Vessel 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
A fishing vessel was seen on radar to be on a collision course with the 
Ravenspurn North Installation. Standby Vessel, Putford Aries, was unable to 
make radio contact with the fishing vessel to warn it off. Platform Emergency 
Response  procedures initiated. The vessel changed course from an easterly 
course to a north easterly course passing the platform within the 500 meters 
exclusion zone. 
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42 2005 HSE October Southern 
Sean PP 
49/25 A 
Fixed Steel 
Passing 
Merchant 
Container 
Unauthorised 
500m zone 
500 Metres Infringement of Romeo Platform 07/10/05 at 2125 hrs. I observed the 
cargo vessel LUKAS call sign V2PG2 mmsi no 304674000 4 miles NW of 
ROMEO platform on a course of 160 degrees true. It appeared by his course 
vector that they were going to infringe the 500 metre zone of the platform so I 
attempted to make contact with the LUKAS on ch 16, 13 & 6 to inform them of 
this & ask them to alter there course to starboard to clear the platform & W 
cardinal buoy adjacent to the platform. By 2135 I could not get any response 
from the LUKAS as I informed the SEAN PAPA control room of the situation. 
The SEAN PAPA turned on the fog horns on the ROMEO to try and attract the 
LUKAS attention & we tried everything we could to attract the LUKAS attention 
including shining my searchlight into the LUKAS bridge. On doing that I could 
not see anyone in the bridge of the LUKAS & I stayed alongside the LUKAS 
calling them all the time until they were past & clear of the SEAN PAPA which 
was 2200hrs whereupon I informed GT. YARMOUTH coastguard of the 
situation & the PUTFORD ACHATES took over trying to contact the LUKAS & 
followed them in the hop of attracting their attention. The LUKAS went inside of 
the ROMEO's 500 metre zone @ 2149 hrs & was 300 metres off the platform @ 
its closes point of approach. Weather conditions on scene. Wind 180 degrees @ 8 
knots. Sea state calm. Visibility 3 to 4 miles. 
43 2006 HSE February - 
GSF 
Labrador 
Jack-Up - 
Thruster 
Failure 
MV Aquarius was alongside the rig  backloading Barite through a hose. The 
vessel lost power to its thrusters. This caused limited station keeping ability, 
decision by Captain was to pull away from the Rig immediately and in doing so 
parted the hose. No contact was made with the Rig. Minimum loss of barite 
occurred (PON1 submitted) 
121 
 
44 2006 HSE February Southern 
Clipper PM 
48/19A 
Fixed Steel 
Passing 
Vessel 
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
At approximately 05.20 hours on 18th Feb 2006, the stand by vessel Putford 
Enterprise detected the vessel Ocean Lord heading directly fore the Clipper 
Platform, on a course of 306 degrees and a speed of 14.8 knots. The Putford 
enterprise called the Ocean Lord approximately 10 time on channel 16 to alert 
the vessel, with no response. A DSC was sent on channel 70 twice, again wit no 
response. With 20 mins to impact, the Master of the Putford Enterprise called the 
Clipper Room Operator to alert the platform to the hazard. The Putford was put 
on an intercept heading and continued to try and raise the Ocean Lord on 
Channel 16 and DSC. A search light was shown in the direction of the vessel and 
with 10 minutes to impact, the Ocean Lord altered course away from the Clipper. 
The Ocean Lord was asked to maintain a proper lookout and radio watch visa 
channel 16. All the preceding was reported to MCA, to allow the coast guard to 
follow up the incident with the vessels concerned. A HAZREP was raised by the 
MCA. 
45 2006 HSE September Northern 
Magnus 
211/12 
Fixed Steel Supply 
Positional 
Failure 
Supply vessel 'Normand Aurora' whilst being worked for bulk loading/unloading 
activities, went from C-joy (Poscorn) joystick into DP-joystick mode in order to 
get a better accuracy of positioning the vessel. A procedure often used when 
disconnecting hoses. After a short t ime they experienced that the platform 
created a so called 'shadow' for the differential signal for the DGPS whereby the 
vessel lost the differential signal for a short time. This resulted that the DP 
rejecting the DGPS signal and gave a 'position drop out alarm' with the result that 
the vessel lost position whereby the thrusters started to react spontaneously. 
Vessel moved closer towards the platform. Manual intervention was immediately 
taken by switching back into 'C-joy joystick mode' and manoeuvred the vessel 
away to a safer distance from the platform in order to disconnect the hoses. 
46 2006 HSE October Southern 
Clipper PM 
48/19A 
Fixed Steel 
Passing 
Vessel 
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
Vessel BBC Japan reported by standby boat and automatic identification system 
to be on a direct collision course with platform. Standby boat Putford Enterprise 
could no initially achieve communication with BBC Japan. Clipper OIM 
received 15 minutes notification. Platform crew called to Prepare to Abandon 
Platform and process shutdown and venting commenced. Vessels BBC Japan 
changed course 10 minutes prior to predicted collision. 
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47 2007 HSE January Southern Murdoch Fixed Steel 
Passing 
Cargo 
Vessel 
Engine 
Failure 
On the 11th January 2007 at 15.20 the cargo vessel (Vindo) lost engine power. 
The vessel was approximately 9 nautical miles east of the Murdoch complex. 
The Murdoch platform alerted the coast guard and the main ConocoPhillips 
office in Aberdeen, activating the emergency response team. The weather was 
storm force 10 and there was no option of resuce of platform personnel from the 
water, therefore Murdoch complex was shut down, vented and non-essential 
personnel were evacuated, by helicopter, to nearby Ensco 101 drilling platform. 
As the Vindo drifted closer towards Murdoch without any success in restoring 
engine power, the remaining personnel were evacuated to the Viking Platform. 
The vessel briefly regained engine power allowing it  to be steered around 
Murdoch before the engines failed again. The vessel continued to drift through 
the field missing the nearby Caister (Normally unmanned installation) by 
approximately 500m. In an attempt to secure her position, Vindo dropped anchor 
in the vicinity of the Murdoch/Boulton and Murdoch main transportation 
pipelines. Post event survey of these pipelines showed that no damage occured 
during Vindo anchor operations. The Murdoch platform was re-manned fully and 
production commenced by mid-afternoon, Friday 12th January 2007. (9 nautical 
miles from Murdoch Platform) 
48 2007 HSE August Northern 
Dunbar 
Platform 
Fixed Steel 
Diver 
Support  
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
Reporting occurrence on Vessel Bar Protector during construction diving 
operations alongside the east face of Total Dunbar Platform. Vessel crane came 
briefly in contact with an overhang structure of the platform. The contact caused 
one light fit ting from the platform to be damaged and subsequently fall on the 
deck of the vessel. No injuries have been sustained by personnel on Platform and 
Vessel. No damage has been sustained by vessel. Operations were immediately 
suspended and divers recovered. Platform Management informed and PTW 
suspended. Investigation on occurrence ongoing, vessel is at t ime of writing 
heading to Lerwick for scheduled crew change.    24/08/07 - notifier called to 
complete b4. 
49 2007 WOAD November Southern Murdoch Jacket - -   
50 2007 WOAD November Southern 
CAISTER, 
44/23A 
Jacket - -   
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51 2009 HSE March - 
Triton 
FPSO 
FPSO 
Shuttle 
Tanker 
Power Failure 
The offloading tanker Nancy Knutsen was scheduled to do a cargo offload from 
the Triton FPSO on 05/03/09 0618 Hrs Nancy Knutsen completed the mooring 
and offloading hose connection astern of the Triton FPSO 0630 Hrs Commenced 
offloading cargo from Triton to Nancy Knutsen 0638 Hrs Nancy Knutsen 
reported a loss of power on vessel and requested the standby vessel Grampian 
Prince to make ready for connecting the tow line. At the same time the Nancy 
Knutsen sent an ESD 1 signal to the Triton which stopped the cargo offloading.  
The Nancy Knutsen lost power to one main engine and to its thrusters. It still had 
power on one main engine The offloading tanker Nancy Knutsen was scheduled 
to do a cargo offload from the Triton FPSO on 05/03/09 0618 Hrs Nancy 
Knutsen completed the mooring and offloading hose connection astern of the 
Triton FPSO 0630 Hrs Commenced offloading cargo from Triton to Nancy 
Knutsen 0638 Hrs Nancy Knutsen reported a loss of power on vessel and 
requested the standby vessel Grampian Prince to make ready for connecting the 
tow line. At the same time the Nancy Knutsen sent and ESD 1 signal to the 
Triton which stopped the cargo offloading.  The Nancy Knutsen lost power to 
one main engine and to its thrusters. It  still had power on one main engine   Over 
the next few minutes the Nancy Knutsen drifted in to approximately 35 metre 
astern of the Triton. Its normal offloading position is about 68 metres astern of 
the Triton 0642 Hrs Nancy Knutsen reported it  had control of propulsion and was 
manoeuvring slowly astern to take up position on Taut Hawser (tight mooring 
line) astern of the Triton 0645 Hrs Nancy Knutsen in position on taut hawser 
astern of the Triton with all essential equipment for safe manoeuvring of the 
vessel up and running. (Main engine and thrusters) The Nancy Knutsen was now 
maintaining its position with minimum weight on hawser. Nancy Knutsen 
informed Triton that it  was now holding it  position in a safe manner and was 
carrying out further checks on its systems prior to letting go from Triton.  0818 
Hrs Nancy Knutsen confirm it had carried out checks on all it  system and was 
ready to disconnect from the Triton.0819 Hrs Disconnected offloading hose  
0827 Hrs Commenced unmooring  0840 Hrs Completed unmooring   0845 Hrs  
Nancy Knutsen clear of 500 metre zone.  The Nancy Knutsen is continuing its 
investigation into the cause of the loss of power and we await its report. For 
information   No damage was done to either of the vessels. 
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52 2011 HSE November Northern 
 Lyell 
Manifold B 
Fixed Steel 
Diver 
Support  
- 
Note; Please disregard Type of work and Type of Dangerous Occurrence above, 
options do not relate to diving operations. Type of Dangerous Occuurrence: 
Schedule 2 Part 1, Diving Operations, 10 (e) any uncontrolled ascent which puts 
a diver at risk. Diver 1 and Diver 2 were engaged in diving operations outside the 
forward diving bell located at Lyell Manifold B when there was a requirement to 
reposition the DSV by 10m. It  was agreed by the Dive Supervisor and Bridge 
that the Stbd taut wire would be recovered and the Port taut wire deployed to 
facilitate the vessel move. The divers remained at the manifold and were 
instructed to check their umbilicals were clear prior to recovery of the taut wire; 
they reported back all was OK. On commencement of recovery of the Stbd taut 
wire, Diver 1 was lifted from B manifold and called an all stop. This was carried 
out immediately. It  was subsequently assessed that the taut wire clump weight 
had risen to 15m above the seabed and the manifold was 8m above the seabed. 
The diving bell was positioned 5m above the manifold. It estimated that the 
upward excursion of the diver was 2 to 3m. Following the all stop, the taut wire 
was lowered to 2m and Diver 1 confirmed he had returned to bottom. Diver 1 
confirmed he was OK and was instructed to follow his umbilical to the taut wire 
and unfoul it . This was sucessfully completed. Divers then returned to the bell 
and the system where Diver 1 again confirmed he was OK. Initial investigation 
indicated that although Diver 1 had full visibility of his umbilical he did not see 
the taut wire. ISS will issue a Safety Flash emphasising the requirement to fully 
check umbilicals prior to any vessel move or deployment/recovery of taut wires, 
and to ensure the guidance in IMCA D010 is adhered to.  
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53 2012 HSE June - Ensco 102 - 
Passing 
Vessel  
Post/ 
Operation 
Neglected 
13:00 STANDBY VESSEL 'VOS PROVIDER' IDENTIFIES VESSEL ON COLLISION 
COURSE WITH ENSCO 102 INSTALLATION AND ATTEMPTS TO MAKE CONTACT 
WITH VESSEL VIA VHF CHANNEL 16. 13:16 STANDBY VESSEL 'VOS PROVIDER' 
ALERTS E102 RADIO ROOM ON VHF CHANNEL 10 OF A VESSEL, LATER 
IDENTIFIED AS THE M/V "PATRIA" PRESENTLY ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH 
THE RIG HAVING A CPA (CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH) OF 0.5NM AND ARE 
UNABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH VESSEL'S BRIDGE WATCHKEEPER. 
GENERAL ALARM IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATED FROM INSIDE THE RADIO ROOM 
AND THE OIM ARRIVES SHORTLY AFTERWARDS TO MAKE AN 
ANNOUNCEMENT FOR ALL PERSONNEL TO GO TO THEIR RESPECTIVE 
MUSTER STATIONS AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS AN EMERGENCY 
SITUATION HAD DEVELOPED INVOLVING A VESSEL ON A COLLISION COURSE 
WITH THE RIG. 13:18 THE RIG FLOOR INFORMS THE RADIO ROOM THAT THE 
WELL HAS BEEN SHUT IN & IS SECURE. 13:20 "VOS PROVIDER" INFORMS E102 
RADIO ROOM THAT THE VESSEL IS CURRENTLY ON A BEARING OF 245 DEGS 
AT 4.8NM FROM THE RIG. 13:22 LEVELS 1 TO 4 REPORTED TO BE ALL CLEAR OF 
PERSONNEL. 13:25 E102 RADIO ASK "VOS PROVIDER" TO SUPPLY ANY 
AVAILABLE DETAILS OF THE VESSEL AND WAS INFORMED OF THE 
FOLLOWING: SIZE 83M IN LENGTH, 13M IN BEAM, RADIO CALLSIGN P3YL6, 
IMO No. 009123312, MMSI No. 209734000 AND BOUND FOR THE PORT OF 
MONTROSE. 13:26 FULL HEAD COUNT, 107 PERSONS ACHIEVED. 13:26 ENSCO & 
CONOCO ONSHORE RESPONSE TEAMS GIVEN SITREP AND INFORMED OF FULL 
HEAD COUNT ONBOARD. 13:26 THE MASTER OF THE "VOS PROVIDER" 
ADVISES E102 RADIO THAT HE IS CONTINUING TO USE ALL CHANNELS OF 
COMMUNICATION TO ALERT THE VESSEL BY WAY OF CHANNEL 16 VHF, 2182 
Khz RADIOTELEPHONY AND GMDSS DSC CHANNEL 70 VHF. 13:27 THE MASTER 
OF THE "VOS PROVIDER" ADVISES E102 RADIO THAT THE M/V "PATRIA" HAS 
NOW ALTERED COURSE TO 270 DEGS AND WILL PASS THE RIG APPROX 2NM 
TO THE NORTH. 13:34 THE MASTER OF THE "VOS PROVIDER" ADVISES E102 
RADIO THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TRYING TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE 
M/V "PATRIA" AND WILL "SHADOW" THE VESSEL TILL IT PASSES 
INSTALLATION SAFETY. 13:35 ASKED THE MASTER OF THE "VOS PROVIDER" 
FOR THE CURRENT SPEED, COURSE & DISTANCE OF THE M/V "PATRIA" AND 
WAS INFORMED: 12.1 KTS, 258 DEGS & 1NM CPA OFF E102. 13:38 THE MASTER 
OF THE "VOS PROVIDER" ESTABLISHES CONTACT WITH THE BRIDGE 
WATCHKEEPER ON THE M/V "PATRIA" ON CHANNEL 16 VHF AND TRANSFERS 
TO CHANNEL 10. 13:40 E102 RADIO ASKS THE MASTER OF "VOS PROVIDER" IF 
HE CAN OBTAIN THE M/V "PATRIA" FLAG STATE IF POSSIBLE. IT WAS NOTED 
BY E102 RADIO THAT THE BRIDGE WATCHKEEPER ONBOARD THE M/V 
"PATRIA" ACTED AWKWARDLY & RELUCTANTLY WHEN ASKED THIS BY THE 
MASTER OF THE "VOS PROVIDER". EVENTUALLY THE VESSEL FLAG STATE 
WAS GIVEN AS CYPRUS. 13:44 OIM INSTRUCTS PERSONNEL TO STAND DOWN 
FROM MUSTER STATIONS. 13:52 THE MASTER OF THE "VOS PROVIDER" 
ADVISES E102 RADIO THAT THE M/V "PATRIA" IS NOW PASSED CLEAR TO THE 
NORTH AND WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE VESSEL FURTHER.  
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54 2014 HSE April Central 
Kittiwake 
Platform. 
Fixed Steel Standby 
Steering 
Failure 
Whilst preparing to carry out close standby cover the vessel lost steerage and 
passed within 3 metres of the platform SW Corner leg. The vessel was travelling 
at a speed of 2-3 knots at the time of the incident. No impact to the platform or 
vessel occurred and the vessel proceeded to exit the 500 metre zone having 
regained steerage and power. The incident took place within a 3-4 minute time 
period. No personnel were underdeck at the time of the incident. All overside and 
close standby activities suspended pending further investigation. POB 68. Wind 
Speed 12 knots. Wind Direction 225 degrees. 
55 2014 HSE December Central 
1) Lomond 
Platform 
and 2) 
Borgholm 
Dolphin 
1) Fixed Steel, 2) Semi-
sub 
Supply 
Engine 
Failure 
Edda Frende is a 4,000 te Gross weight Supply Vessel which suffered an engine 
fire and as a result lost all ability to navigate and steerage. The vesssel was 12 
miles SW of the Lomond installation at the time, with a sea state presenting a 
collision threat to the Lomond Platform and Borgholm Dolphin Flotel. Vessel 
drift  was circa 1.2 knots giving a time to closest point of approach of 10 hours. 
With this confirmed and a field POB in excess of 300 people the Lomond OIM 
initiated a precautionary downman of both facilities. 160 people departed the 
flotel before the drifting vessel was secured by anchor handlers and confirmed as 
no longer posing a threat to either facility. 
56 2014 HSE December - 
The Ocean 
Guardian  
Semi-Submersible Supply 
Engine 
Failure 
The Ocean Guardian received a call from the MCA informing us that the 
Grampian Venture had lost main engine power and was drifting in an Easterly 
direction at 2kts. The Grampian Discovery was our SBV at the time the MCA 
contacted us and informed us that the Grampian Venture was drifting 13.1nm 
west of the Ocean Guardian. The Control room made contact with the Grampian 
Venture 11nm from our location brg 270°, at that t ime the Grampian Venture 
informed us that his CPA to us was 5nm and that he would pass a minimum of 
4nm south of our position. We continued to monitor the range and bearing on the 
rigs radar which gradually increased as he got closer to the rig, the effect of the 
tide turning and running from the North pushed him South 4nm as was first  
communicated to us by the Grampian Venture. 
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Ship/Platform Collision Incident Database 
(2015) for offshore oil and gas installations 
RR1154 
www.hse.gov.uk 
There is a potential for major structural damage to offshore 
installations leading to fatalities and serious injuries in the 
event of collision by either a passing or an in-field seagoing 
vessel. Both categories of collision have occurred on the UK 
Continental Shelf although to date only significant, rather 
than catastrophic, consequences have occurred. 
Internationally, collisions have occurred that have caused 
both loss of life and environmental damage.  This report 
describes  work to update the Ship/Platform Collision 
Incident Database for the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and 
the collision frequency analysis which was previously 
described in  Research Report RR053 (2001).  Report RR1153 
considers collision threat detection.   
 
Data was collected from collision incident record sources to 
confirm or complete previous records and to expand the 
database up to December 2015. The database overlaps with 
the previous version by providing information from 1996 to 
2015. The database of operating experience has been 
recompiled and extended to encompass all mobile and fixed 
installations operating on the UKCS and takes into account 
recent abandonments. The main database includes actual 
collisions, while ‘near misses’ are analysed in a separate 
section. In an attempt to expand the previous database and 
gain further understanding of the scale and nature of the 
‘near miss’ events, data from a variety of sources is 
included: the findings are interpreted in  section 4 of the 
report.  
 
This report and the work it describes were funded by the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Its contents, including 
any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the 
authors alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy. 
 
